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Abstract 
According to McAdams‟ (1988; 1993) Life Story Model of Identity, narrative identity is 
constructed through the development of the life story in adolescence and young adulthood.  
This theoretical claim has sparked an emerging body of research examining links between 
the development of the life story and psychological functioning during this developmental 
period (McLean & Breen, 2009; McLean, Breen, & Fournier, 2010; Tavernier & 
Willoughby, 2012).  The aim of this thesis was to contribute to this emerging body of work 
by examining the relationship between autobiographical reasoning, the core process 
through which the life story develops, and psychological functioning in young adulthood.  
Across four studies, young adults constructed life story narratives of high points, low 
points and turning points from their life story.  These narratives were coded for the 
presence, and valence, of autobiographical reasoning.  Autobiographical reasoning was 
measured primarily in terms of self-event connections, statements linking an aspect of the 
narrated event to the young adults‟ sense of self (McLean & Fournier, 2008).  
Autobiographical reasoning valence was measured in terms of self-event connections that 
described the self in positive, negative, neutral and mixed (positive and negative) ways.  
The first study (Study 1a) showed that the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in 
young adults‟ life story narratives predicted psychological functioning.  Young adults who 
made negative self-event connections in life story narratives experienced poorer 
psychological functioning (measured in terms of psychological distress and psychological 
well-being) than young adults who made little or no negative self-event connections.  
Conversely, young adults who made more positive self-event connections experienced 
comparatively better psychological functioning than those who made fewer positive self-
event connections.  The relationship between positive self-event connections and positive 
psychological functioning was most salient in the context of narratives about negative 
events from the life story.   Study 1a also showed that for young adults who tended to 
make higher numbers of positive self-event connections, endorsing negative events as 
central to the life story was not associated with poor psychological functioning, whereas it 
was for young adults who made fewer positive connections.   The second study (Study 1b) 
presented a methodology for examining the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning valence and psychological functioning over time.  Although the small sample 
size in Study 1b prevented firm conclusions being made, findings showed that young 
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adults‟ tendency to make negative, but not positive, self-event connections remained stable 
over time.  The preliminary findings from Study 1b also showed that positive and negative 
self-event connections in life story narratives were not associated with changes in 
psychological functioning over time.  The third study (Study 2) found that young adults‟ 
tendency to reason about the self in positive and negative ways was associated with a 
number of cognitive response styles (explanatory style, rumination and use of cognitive 
reappraisal strategies).  The results of Study 2 also highlight important ways that cognitive 
response factors, and young adults‟ assessments of meaning in their lives, may interact 
with autobiographical reasoning valence to predict psychological functioning.  The fourth 
study (Study 3) aimed to investigate relationships between the phenomenology of life story 
memories and the amount, and valence, of autobiographical reasoning in narratives of 
these events.  Findings showed few associations between autobiographical reasoning and 
autobiographical memory phenomenology.  Possible reasons for the absence of these 
relationships are discussed.  Wider implications and theoretical explanations for the 
findings reported in this thesis are discussed in terms of models of coping and Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).    
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Chapter One 
The Life Story 
 
“Now that I have put pen to paper and written my life story I am pleased it is 
all out in the open.  I could never bring myself to discuss my story, so 
consequently it festered inside me.  But that has now changed, and thank 
goodness” 
Muriel Lee, 92 years of age 
 
There is something inherently powerful about the life story.  The above quote from 
the life story of my paternal grandmother conveys just some of the influence that her life 
story had on her sense of well-being, and the subsequent relief she experienced upon 
writing her story and sharing it with others.  This thesis is centred on the theoretical notion 
that our life stories are intricately associated with our perceptions and beliefs about who 
we are as individuals (McAdams, 1988; 2001; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007).  Within 
this broad theoretical context, the central aim of this thesis was to address the question of 
whether, and how, the development of the life story relates to psychological functioning.  
These questions were examined in the developmental period of young adulthood, a 
theoretically significant time for the construction of the life story and identity.  The 
purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the theoretical notion that the life story comprises 
narrative identity (McAdams, 1988; 1993) and explore three related questions 1) what is 
the life story, 2) how is the life story formed, and 3) what role does the life story play in 
our lives?  This body of conceptual, theoretical and empirical work provides the necessary 
contextual and background information for the central question of this thesis, namely, 
whether and how the life story relates to psychological functioning in young adulthood.   
Defining the Life Story 
From a theoretical perspective, the life story is constructed from autobiographical 
memory, broadly defined as memory for our own experiences (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 
2004; Loftus & Fathi, 1985; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).  As individuals, we experience a 
large number of events both in our everyday lives and over our lifetime (Davis & Burns, 
1999; Heady & Wearing, 1989).  Yet only a portion of autobiographical memories for 
these experiences are included in the life story (Bluck & Habermas, 2001).  Thus while 
3 
 
autobiographical memories provide the raw material from which the life story is based, the 
construction of the life story is considered to be more complex than the simple recollection 
and recounting of autobiographical memories.   
According to theorists such as McAdams (1988; 2001) and Pillemer (1998; 2001), 
the events that comprise the life story are the most personally relevant experiences of an 
individuals‟ life.  These highly personally relevant events have been defined and 
operationalised in a number of ways.  McAdams (1988) defines these events as „nuclear 
episodes‟, “autobiographical events which ... tend to be understood and felt as uniquely 
ours” (p. 63).  Pillemer (2001) alternatively suggests that the life story is likely to contain 
memories for „momentous events‟, defined as “distinctive, circumscribed, highly 
emotional and influential episodes” in a person‟s life (p. 123).  Singer and Moffitt (1991-
1992) suggest that life story events are those which are „self-defining‟, events which cause 
strong emotions, have been thought about many times, feel important and help individuals 
understand who they are.   
Although worded slightly differently, these definitions of life story events all imply 
that the events which comprise the life story gain personal relevance because they convey 
important information about who a person is, or explain why they are the person that they 
are today.  Consistent with this interpretation, Bluck and Habermas (2000) suggest that 
events included in the life story often provide an explanation for changes or developments 
in the individual.  Similarly, Pillemer (1998; 2001) argues that memories for momentous 
events often contain within them life lessons that continue with the individual long past the 
initial experience.  Pillemer (1998; 2001) further states that momentous events also 
encompass experiences that caused a change in individuals‟ long-term goals or life-path 
(termed „originating‟ and „turning point‟ events) or solidify an individuals‟ belief system 
(termed „anchoring‟ events).  These descriptions of life story events suggest that the way 
individuals process and reflect on their life events plays an important role in determining 
their personal relevance.  Having established a working definition of the life story, I will 
now turn to the question of how the life story develops.  Gaining this developmental 
perspective provides an important theoretical context for considering claims of whether, 
and by what means, the life story becomes narrative identity.  
Autobiographical Memory and the Life Story– Developmental Considerations 
According to key developmental theorists, autobiographical memory develops from 
a very young age in the context of social interactions and conversations with adults 
(Fivush, 2007; Fivush & Nelson, 2006; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).  Children between the 
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ages of 18 months and three years become increasingly involved in parent-child 
conversations about past events (Haden, Ornstein, Rudek, & Cameron, 2009).  Key 
proponents of the social-interaction theory of autobiographical memory development 
suggest that through exposure to, and engagement in these conversations, children learn to 
distinguish between past and present events and discover how to construct a narrative, or 
story, about a personally experienced event (Nelson, 2003).   
Parents differ in the extent to which they encourage children to contribute and 
elaborate on information within conversations, and such differences in conversation style 
have been associated with qualitative differences in children‟s memory over time. In one 
study, Reese, Haden, and Fivush (1993) recorded conversations between mothers and their 
children at four time points (when the child was 40, 46, 58, and 70 months of age).  Each 
conversation was coded for parent and child factors.  Parent factors included elaborations 
(utterances which introduced new information or directed the conversation to new aspects 
of the experience) and repetitions (utterances which repeated the content of a previous 
statement).  Child factors included memory responses (utterances that introduced new 
information, directed the conversation to new aspects of the experience or asked the parent 
for more information), repetitions and evaluations (utterances expressing 
agreement/disagreement with a comment made by the parent).  Some mothers, described 
as „highly elaborative‟, made more elaborative statements than repetitive statements, while 
other mothers, described as „low elaborative‟, made an equal number of elaborative and 
repetitive statements.  Correlational findings showed that children of highly elaborative 
mothers recalled more information (i.e. made more memory responses) than children of 
low-elaborative mothers.  Longitudinally, children exposed to high levels of parental 
elaboration during early developmental stages (i.e. when the child was 40 months of age) 
provided more elaborative personal narratives in later years.  These findings suggest that 
initially, children of highly elaborative mothers make more memory contributions in 
conversation with parents at an early age and, in later years, independently construct more 
elaborate memory narratives (see also Fivush, 2011; Fivush, Reese, & Haden, 2006).   
From a theoretical perspective, early parent-child conversations contribute not only 
to the development of autobiographical memory, but also to the development of the self or 
„self-concept‟.  In highlighting the crucial role of language in the development of the self 
and autobiographical memory, Nelson (2003) notes that by discussing past events with 
children, parents communicate the personal importance and/or meaning of the child‟s 
experiences to them.  That is, engaging in conversations about past events provides the 
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child with a sense that the event is of personal importance to them.  In addition, discussing 
the child‟s internal experiences (e.g. thoughts, beliefs and emotions) and their actions or 
behaviours provides the child with a sense of self, that in turn is embedded within the 
memory for the past experience (Fivush & Nelson, 2006). 
In particular, conversations about past events that elicited negative emotions in the 
child may have particularly strong connection to self-concept development (Fivush, Berlin, 
McDermott Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, & Cassidy, 2003).  Bird and Reese (2006) recorded 
parent-child conversations about emotional experiences (e.g. experiences in which the 
child felt angry, sad, scared, and happy).  Conversations were coded for certain ways of 
discussing emotions, including whether the emotion was explained, confirmed and/or 
resolved.  The children (between 63 and 81 months of age) also rated the extent to which 
various self-descriptors applied to them along nine dimensions (e.g. achievement – strives 
to perform highly, social closeness – enjoys being around others).  Children who 
demonstrated greater consistency in their self-views (i.e. their self-views were present 
across contexts) were more likely to be exposed to parent-child conversations where 
negative emotions were explained.  This finding was interpreted as evidence that 
highlighting the personal meaning of events through conversational narratives helps 
children to understand their emotional experiences and hence understand themselves 
better.  The findings also highlight that from an early age, knowledge about who we are 
and what is important to us as a person, becomes closely associated with our memory for 
past experiences.   
In summary, autobiographical memory develops from an early age in the context of 
conversations about the past.  Children of parents who tend to be more elaborative in 
recounting past events in these conversations tend to produce more elaborative memory 
narratives when recounting past events on their own.  Parent-child conversations about the 
past, and in particular, conversations about negative emotional experiences may help 
children understand the personal significance of their experiences.  While this 
developmental perspective provides an important context for understanding the emergence 
of autobiographical memory, at what point does the ability to recall autobiographical 
memories develop into the ability to construct a life story? This is an important question 
that will now be addressed. 
The Role of Autobiographical Reasoning in the Development of the Life Story 
Although autobiographical memory and story-telling capacities may start to 
develop in childhood, from a theoretical perspective, the ability to construct a life story 
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does not emerge until adolescence or young adulthood (Habermas, 2010; McAdams, 
1988).  Habermas and Bluck (2000) suggest that the ability to construct the life story 
coincides with developmental changes that take place during this lifetime period.  The first 
change is a social and cultural drive to conceptualise oneself in biographical terms, that is, 
to think about who one is as an individual and communicate this to others.   The second 
factor is the development of a set of social-cognitive competencies that enable individuals 
to engage in a unique form of reflection termed „autobiographical reasoning‟.   
Autobiographical reasoning is defined as a process of reflection in which 
individuals draw connections between past experiences and enduring and current 
characteristics of the self (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).  Although the term „self‟ is not 
explicitly defined in Habermas and Bluck‟s (2000) definition of autobiographical 
reasoning, it is used synonymously with the terms „self-characteristics‟ and „self-
definition‟.  Thus the process of autobiographical reasoning from a theoretical perspective 
involves making connections between past events and descriptive and/or evaluative 
information about the self (see Singer & Bluck, 2001; McLean et al., 2007).   
In addition to the development of autobiographical reasoning capabilities 
Habermas and Bluck (2000) propose that the emergence of the life story also coincides 
with the development of four social-cognitive capabilities.  These include the ability to 
order past events in a temporal manner (temporal coherence), the ability to think about the 
self in abstract terms (i.e. as embodying certain personality traits) and account for changes 
or developments in the self over time (causal coherence, of which autobiographical 
reasoning is a part), the ability to summarise and interpret themes within stories and apply 
these to one‟s own life (thematic coherence), and having an awareness of cultural norms 
regarding the major milestones and events one is expected to experience during the life 
course (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).   
Habermas and colleagues (Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Habermas & de Silveira, 
2008) have tracked these social-cognitive changes in life stories across the developmental 
period from childhood to young adulthood.  Habermas and de Silveira (2008) asked 8, 12, 
16 and 20 year olds to orally narrate their entire life story and coded these narratives for 
temporal, causal and thematic coherence.  Findings showed an increase in all three 
coherence measures during adolescence.  Compared with children, adolescents made more 
references to life phases and correct dates and times, statements indicating causal links 
between events and between events and the self, biographical arguments relating to their 
developmental context or development over time, generalised statements about themes or 
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consistencies evident in their experiences, and  complex cognitive processes including 
statements indicating an understanding or opinion of their experiences than did children in 
the younger age groups.   
In addition to these indicators of life story development, there is evidence that 
autobiographical reasoning increases across the developmental periods of adolescence and 
young adulthood.  Before examining empirical support for this claim, it is useful to 
consider how autobiographical reasoning is conceptualised and operationalised in 
measurable terms. 
Autobiographical reasoning has been conceptualised in two main ways; as self-
event connections and sophistication of meaning.  Self-event connections, first described 
by Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker (2007), are defined as explicit statements that 
describe a link between a personal experience and an aspect of the self.  Aspects of the self 
referenced in self-event connections frequently include personal traits and dispositions, 
values, attitudes and beliefs about the world and the development of personal strength/ 
growth (McLean & Fournier, 2008; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006).  The following is an 
example of a narrative containing self-event connections.  This excerpt is from the life 
story of a female young adult who was 20 years of age at the time the narrative was 
constructed. 
“I was 18 [years old] and caught my long term boyfriend cheating ... I 
think this is an important event in my life because I discovered how well I 
could cope with a bad situation.  I have learnt to accept and let go of bad 
things that happen”  
This example highlights two salient self-event connections.  First, the young adult 
describes how the experience of catching her boyfriend cheating lead her to realise how 
well she is able to cope with a difficult situation.  Second, she attributes the development 
of a current trait in herself (the ability to accept and let go of bad things) to this particular 
experience.  From a theoretical perspective, this self-discovery and insight into her self-
development occurred during the young adult‟s reflection and thinking about the event 
after it had happened.  This process, and the links she formed between event and self, 
increased the likelihood that the experience would be included in her life story (Pasupathi 
et al., 2007). 
The second conceptualisation of autobiographical reasoning, sophistication of 
meaning, was first described by McLean and Thorne (2003).  Sophistication of meaning is 
characterised as the level of insight or complexity of knowledge – particularly about the 
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self – that is attained as a result of reflecting on one‟s past and self.  McLean and Thorne 
(2003) proposed that gaining broader insights into the self through reflecting on past 
experiences represents a deeper level of reflection and post-event processing than learning 
specific lessons.  Lesson-learning no doubt serves a very useful function in individuals‟ 
lives.  That is, a lesson learnt from a specific experience can guide future behaviour in 
order to avoid aversive situations or maximise positive outcomes in the future.  The 
following example from the life story of a young male adult, 22 years of age, highlights 
the lesson-learning process: 
“I was twenty one when I was out one night and was caught drink driving 
for the second time ... I drove straight into a checkpoint ...I alone was in 
the car and made the choice to drive ... This is important because if I am 
caught again I will go to jail, it‟s that simple ...I have actively toned down 
my drinking habits and will never drink drive again” 
Although not explicitly framed as a life lesson by the young adult himself, his 
changes in behaviour (consuming less alcohol and choosing not to drive under the 
influence of alcohol again) are clearly linked to this experience of being caught.  These 
decisions and subsequent behaviour change will conceivably be a positive factor in his life 
as it will allow him to avoid negative consequences (going to jail, having an accident) in 
the future.   
In contrast to lesson learning, gaining insight from a past experience involves a 
shift in one‟s thinking or understanding that extends beyond specific behaviours or 
situations.  McLean and Thorne (2003) suggest that gaining insight often involves a 
change in individuals‟ understanding and beliefs about themselves, others and/or the 
world.  Gaining insight is illustrated in the following example: 
“When I was 17 years old I got accepted into university ... It was exciting 
as I felt like I was starting something new and there were many 
opportunities for me. It also gave me joy that I knew I had got in and 
passed [secondary school qualification] ... This event showed me that I am 
a hard working person and know when to put the effort in ... it makes me 
feel worthwhile and like I have accomplished something” 
In this example, the young adult realised that she possesses two attributes, that is, 
she is hard-working and has the ability to apply effort when needed.  Although she links 
these two attributes to this one experience, they represent general qualities that the young 
adult has that can be applied in numerous areas of her life.  As gaining insight involves 
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reflecting on broader, more abstract self-characteristics as opposed to the focus on concrete 
behavioural patterns in lesson learning, gaining insight is considered to reflect greater 
complexity, or sophistication, of reflection (McLean and Thorne 2003; Thorne, McLean, 
& Lawrence, 2004). 
There are a number of key similarities and differences between the two 
conceptualisations of autobiographical reasoning, self-event connections and 
sophistication of meaning.  Self-event connections and sophistication of meaning both 
refer to the extent to which individuals derive information about the self from their life 
events; however, they do so in slightly different ways.  Self-event connections capture any 
explicit links a narrator has made between event and self, and therefore provide a basic 
measure of the extent to which autobiographical reasoning has occurred.  Sophistication of 
meaning extends the measurement of this basic process by capturing the degree to which 
this knowledge describes abstract characteristics of the self such as „hard-working‟ (high 
level of sophistication) or concrete behavioural lessons „I will not drink and drive‟ (lower 
level of sophistication).  Having outlined how autobiographical reasoning is 
operationalised, I now return to the issue of developing autobiographical reasoning 
capabilities in adolescence and young adulthood. 
There is some evidence that autobiographical reasoning increases across the 
adolescent years.  McLean and Breen (2009) asked adolescents, 14 to 18 years of age, to 
write about a turning point from their life story, and coded each narrative for sophistication 
of meaning.   Overall, sophistication of meaning ratings increased across the age groups, 
with the most marked increase between the ages of 16 and 17 years.  These findings show 
that compared with younger adolescents (14 years of age), older adolescents (18 years of 
age) were more likely to report insights gained into the self in the context of narratives 
about turning points from the life story.  In a related study, Pasupathi and Mansour (2006) 
asked adults between 18 to 86 years of age to narrate a turning point and a crisis they had 
experienced in their life.  Each narrative was coded according to whether self-event 
connections were present or not.  Age was significantly associated with the presence of 
self-event connections in narratives of crises but not turning points.  Within narratives of 
crises, the likelihood of eliciting a narrative containing self-event connections increased 
during young adulthood.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the presence of 
autobiographical reasoning in narratives of major life events increases over the adolescent 
and young adulthood periods. 
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Earlier in this Chapter, I suggested that the events which comprise the life story 
hold a high level of personal significance for the individual.  The concept of 
autobiographical reasoning provides a useful way of assessing the personal significance of 
one‟s life events.  By definition, autobiographical reasoning is a process of reflection in 
which individuals draw connections between past experiences and enduring and current 
characteristics of the self (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).  Thus by drawing these connections, 
individuals intertwine elements of themselves into the memory for the past experience, 
which in turn, gives the experience personal significance.  Consistent with this claim, 
narratives of events from the life story contain more evidence of autobiographical 
reasoning than do narratives of autobiographical memories not included in the life story 
(Grysman & Hudson, 2010).  Thus from a theoretical perspective, the life story comprises 
events which have personal significance, which in turn is garnered through reflecting on 
the broader meaning of the event for the self (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).   
In summary, the development of autobiographical reasoning and the subsequent 
emergence of the life story is observed during the adolescent and young adulthood years.  
The foundations for the development of these capabilities can be tracked right back to 
early childhood, and the development of autobiographical memory in the context of 
parent-child conversations about the past.  Key theorists (see Fivush, Hazzard, McDermott 
Sales, Sarfati, & Brown, 2003; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007; McLean, Breen, & 
Fournier, 2010) have suggested that parental elaboration may be a precursor to 
autobiographical reasoning as this style of recalling past experiences involves greater 
levels of reflection than non-elaborative recall.  In light of this developmental context, I 
turn to a discussion of McAdams‟ Life Story Model of Identity (McAdams, 1988; 1993; 
2001).   
McAdams’ Life Story Model of Identity: Concepts and Considerations 
Life story theorist Dan McAdams suggests that the life story comprises, or is, an 
individual‟s narrative identity (McAdams, 1988; 1993; 2001).  Although this thesis does 
not explicitly test the central theoretical claim of McAdams‟ model, the notion that identity 
is the life story provides the broad theoretical framework from which earlier psychological 
research on the life story, and this thesis is based (Angus, Levitt, & Hardtke, 1999; Brooks 
& Dallos, 2009; Hill & Dallos, 2012; McLean, 2005; 2008; McLean & Breen, 2009).   
The key theoretical premise of McAdams‟ Life Story Model of Identity, that 
narrative identity is the life story, was formulated in relation to the early developmental 
theory of Erikson (1968).  Erikson (1968) asserted that the major developmental task 
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facing young adults as they transition from adolescence to adulthood is the development 
and strengthening of identity.  Although the life story approach to identity development 
taken by McAdams is based on this core theoretical principle, the way in which identity is 
defined by the Eriksonian and life story models is considerably different.  According to 
Erikson (1968), human development passes through key stages, with each stage posing 
new and difficult challenges that need to be achieved.  The primary achievement of the 
adolescence period according to this perspective involves answering questions of identity, 
that is, “who am I” and “How do I fit into the adult world”.   Answering these questions 
involves careful consideration of the various roles, ideological and religious beliefs, 
attitudes and personal characteristics one can and wants to hold (identity exploration), and 
making a commitment in terms of self-definition and action that satisfies these 
characteristics and virtues (Waterman, 1982).  Thus identity, from this early (Eriksonian) 
perspective, comprises the consortium of individuals‟ thoughts, beliefs, values and goals 
held in relation to various life domains, and the actions and behaviours taken by the 
individual in accordance with these.  Erikson‟s theory of identity has been difficult to 
validate empirically, however, and no evidence has been found for the presence of set 
developmental „stages‟.  Rather, indicators of identity achievement have been shown to 
increase across adulthood (Whitbourne, Sneed, & Sayer, 2009).   
Identity Construction and Life Story Development in Young Adulthood 
McAdams suggests that function of the life story is identical to that of Erikson‟s 
(1968) identity theory, namely, to answer the question of “who am I?”.  Similarly, both 
Erikson (1968) and McAdams (1988; 1993) agree that identity develops during the 
adolescent and young adulthood years.  The point of difference between Erikson‟s (1968) 
and McAdams‟ (1988; 1993) models is the proposed means by which identity develops.  
Unlike Erikson, McAdams (1988; 1993) suggests that identity is developed through the 
life story.  McAdams (1988; 1993; 2011) further states that the life story is an internalised 
narrative that individuals construct in order to „make sense‟ of, or understand, who they 
are and how they developed into the person they are today.   
McAdams and colleagues suggest that narrative identity is one component of a 
broader framework of human personality
1
(McAdams, 1995; 1996; McAdams & Pals, 
2006).  According to this framework, personality can be assessed at three hierarchical 
                                                          
1
   The conceptualisation of narrative identity as a component of personality is based on the notion that the 
goal for personality psychology is to provide a framework for describing and understanding people 
(McAdams & Pals, 2006). 
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levels, with each level providing increasingly specific and detailed information about the 
individual (McAdams, 1995; 1996; 2001).  The first level in the hierarchy includes trait 
descriptions akin to those found in traditional measures of personality (e.g. 5-factor 
models, see Digman, 1990).  According to McAdams, these traits provide broad 
descriptive categories that can be applied to individuals, but lack flexibility in terms of 
describing individuals‟ behaviour across settings and contexts (see Wright & Mischel, 
1987).   For example, an individual may be described as „extroverted‟, which denotes a 
certain pattern of behaviour, but does not guarantee that an individual will behave in a 
certain way in a range of settings.  These descriptions can also be applied to many other 
individuals and thus are not unique to the person to which it is applied.  The second level 
of the hierarchy includes constructs such as motives, goals, values and identifiable patterns 
of behaviour that are concerned with what individuals want from their lives.  These 
„personal concerns‟ can, and do, show temporal and contextual flexibility but again can be 
shared by a number of people and thus are not entirely unique to the individual.   
The third level of McAdams‟ hierarchy comprises narrative identity, an internalised 
narrative, “inner story”, that describes the most important experiences in an individual‟s 
past and explains their development as a person within the context of this personal past 
(Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, 2008; McAdams, 1996; 2001; 2011).  Unlike the information 
contained within the first two levels, an individuals‟ life story, including the actual life 
events experienced by the individual and the manner in which they are recalled and 
reconstructed, is entirely unique to the individual.  The term „narrative identity‟ is used 
specifically in this model to illustrate the important theoretical role of narrative as a 
vehicle for making sense of, and understanding ourselves and our experiences (McAdams, 
2011). 
Despite its widespread acceptance, there are a number of unresolved issues in 
McAdams‟ Life Story Model of Identity.  One of the key issues is clarity regarding the 
definition of the terms; „narrative identity‟ and „life story‟.  Of particular concern, the 
definitions of the terms narrative identity and the life story in McAdams‟ model are 
inherently circular.  That is, each construct is defined only in terms of its counterpart - the 
life story is narrative identity and narrative identity is the life story.  Sound theories should 
have well-defined terms that are explicit and operationalised (Prochaska, Wright, & 
Velicer, 2008).  McAdams‟ model does not offer any additional explanation or definition 
of narrative identity outside the notion that narrative identity is this internalised narrative.  
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Theoretical suggestions regarding the definition of identity that have been made outside of 
McAdams‟ model may be useful when considering the concept of narrative identity. 
Vignoles, Schwartz and Luckx (2011) acknowledge that although the notion of 
identity is a popular construct within psychology, it has been notoriously difficult to 
define.  These authors note that although precise definitions vary, identity tends to be 
defined in one of three ways; as individual, relational and/or collective identity (Sedikides 
& Brewer, 2001).  Where individual, or personal, identity is defined as the self-definitions 
that individuals employ to describe themselves, relational identity is defined as 
individuals‟ relationships in terms of others (e.g. mother, teacher) and collective identity is 
defined as individuals‟ identification with groups and social classifications  (Vignoles et 
al., 2011).   While all of these definitions of identity are related to how individuals answer 
the central question of “who am I?” the focus of personal identity is on internal 
characteristics, while the focus of relational and collective identity focuses on relationships 
that are external to the individual.  Elements of the life story as described by McAdams 
may fit within each of these types of identity.  If the development of the life story is 
achieved through autobiographical reasoning as discussed above, however, then the life 
story from a theoretical perspective is closely aligned with the notion of individual or 
personal identity, the self-definitions that individuals employ to describe themselves. 
McAdams agrees that the life story serves a self-understanding function - 
individuals construct a life story in order to understand who they are.  It is not clear within 
his model, however, whether narrative identity is the self-understandings that are achieved 
through the process of constructing a life story or whether narrative identity refers to a self 
that encompasses much more than the beliefs and understandings a person has about who 
they are (see Ward, 2012).  Further adding to this lack of clarity, the terms „self‟ and 
„identity‟ or „narrative identity‟, are used somewhat interchangeably in the life story 
literature.  Perhaps the clearest explanation of the relationship between the self, self-
understanding, and the life story is provided by proponents of McAdams‟ model, McLean, 
Pasupathi, and Pals (2007).  These authors suggest that the self comprises both the life 
story and the self-concept, where the self-concept is defined as “conscious beliefs about 
the self that are descriptive or evaluative” (p. 263).  McLean et al. (2007) suggest that the 
self-concept and life story are inherently linked, in that some elements of the self-concept 
are reflected in the life stories through the process of autobiographical reasoning.  In light 
of this theoretical support, it seems reasonable to expect that narrative identity comprises, 
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at least in part, the self-understandings that an individual expresses through the 
construction of the life story.   
An additional issue that theories of identity, narrative or otherwise, have had to 
address is whether individuals have one single, or multiple identities.  Vignoles et al. 
(2011) suggest that identity is multifaceted in the sense that individuals can describe 
themselves in many different ways, for example, as a daughter, an extrovert, and 
academically able.  In a similar manner, narrative identity is conceptualised as 
multifaceted in the sense that individuals do not simply have one life story.  That is, the 
life story may comprise any number of experiences an individual has had over their 
lifetime, the life story is continually updated as individuals gain new experiences, and the 
life story that is shared with others may depend on the social context in which it is told 
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 1988; 2001; Pasupathi, 2001).   
In light of the limitations of McAdams‟ model, particularly the definition of key 
terms, the notion that narrative identity is the life story which emerges during the 
adolescent and young adult years, has been notoriously difficult to test.  Support for this 
claim has instead relied on relationships to more indirect assessments of identity and 
developmental changes in the purpose of autobiographical remembering.  For example, 
Webster and McCall (1999) found that younger adults were more likely to report that they 
reminisce for the purpose of seeking out or clarifying information about who they are (e.g. 
when I reminisce it is to try to understand myself better) than were older adults.  Bluck and 
Alea (2009) found that relative to older adults, younger adults were more likely to report 
thinking and talking about their past for the purpose of creating „self-continuity‟.  That is, 
young adults were more likely to think about the past with the aim of gaining a sense of 
stability over time or explaining changes in the self over time.  These studies did not 
examine reminiscence in the context of the life story, nor did they explicitly assess identity 
development.  Instead, an assumption was made that identity development is a greater 
developmental concern for the young adults in their studies, and that these findings 
provide some evidence for this. 
Some support for the notion that autobiographical reasoning is associated with the 
development of identity in adolescence and young adulthood has also been derived from 
research investigating the self-reported use of sharing key life story events.   McLean 
(2005) asked young adults to write narratives of three self-defining memories and for each 
memory, to state whether they had told the memory to others and if so, what the purpose 
was for telling the memory to others.  Each narrative was then coded for sophistication of 
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meaning, the extent to which participants learnt lessons or gained an insight into the self as 
a result of the event.  Memories were most commonly disclosed to others for the purpose 
of self-explanation, that is, to explain oneself to someone and for the purpose of 
entertaining others.  Statements depicting insight into the self and lessons learnt were more 
commonly found in narratives of autobiographical memories that were shared with others 
for the purposes of self-explanation than in narratives of memories shared for the purpose 
of entertainment (McLean, 2005).  One interpretation of these findings is that disclosing 
memories for the purposes of self-explanation may help the individual discover and 
strengthen their views about who they are, which is a core feature of identity development 
as proposed by the life story approach.  One limitation of this work, however, is that 
participants‟ views about the purpose for telling the memory was retrospective and thus 
may have been influenced by the experience and outcome of telling the memory to others.  
That is, participants who gained insights into the self from telling the memory to others 
may be more likely to assume that they had this self-explanatory goal leading up to the 
disclosure. 
Attempts have also been made to link the Eriksonian and life story perspectives on 
identity development.  McLean and Pratt (2006) administered a measure of identity status 
to a sample of adolescents over a six year period as they transitioned to young adulthood 
(mean age at time 1 = 17 years, time 2 = 19 years, time 3 = 23 years).  The measure of 
identity status contained four states of identity development resulting from the inter-
relation between identity exploration and commitment.  These four states included 
„identity achievement‟ (individual has both explored and committed to an identity), 
moratorium (exploration has occurred but no commitment), „foreclosure‟ (individual has 
committed to an identity without exploring their identity), and „diffusion‟ (no evidence of 
exploration or commitment). At the last time point, the young adults were also asked to 
narrate a turning point from their life story.  Results showed that young adults who, at the 
age of 23, made less sophisticated meaning in narratives of turning points were more likely 
to be in a state of foreclosure (where they demonstrated commitment to an identity in the 
absence of exploration) and diffusion (where they demonstrated no exploration or 
commitment to identity) than young adults who made more sophisticated meaning.  These 
findings were taken to suggest that while autobiographical reasoning may not be required 
to successfully achieve identity, the absence of autobiographical reasoning may reflect 
sub-optimal identity development.   
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In summary, the central premise of McAdams‟ Life Story Model of Identity is that 
identity is the life story.  In this Chapter, I have suggested that the life story is comprised 
of autobiographical memories that are considered highly personally relevant to the 
individual.  One of the key ways through which autobiographical memories gain personal 
significance is through autobiographical reasoning, a process of reflection in which 
individuals construct links between past life experiences and descriptive/evaluative 
statements about their current self.  In light of the limitations of McAdams‟ model, namely 
the circularity and absence of clearly defined terms, the relationship between identity 
development and autobiographical reasoning remains a theoretical one.  Before moving to 
a discussion of how autobiographical reasoning may relate to psychological functioning, it 
is important to note two additional factors that can influence the development of the life 
story: social reconstruction and culture. 
Influence of Social Interaction on the Development of the Life Story 
McAdams (1988; 1993) suggests that the existence of the life story does not need 
to be proven by being shared with others.  Rather, the life story is an internalised narrative 
that can either be consciously or unconsciously created (McAdams, 1993).  In reality, the 
life story is rarely recounted to others in its entirety (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Linde, 
1993).  More often, certain parts of the life story, or key autobiographical events, are 
shared with others for the purposes of developing connections and social bonds, to provide 
others with advice on the basis of one‟s own experiences or to explain or convey, 
important features or elements of one‟s personal past (Bluck & Alea, 2009).  Although the 
life story may not frequently be recounted to others in its entirety, initial evidence suggests 
that the majority of important life events are discussed with others.  In one study, Thorne, 
McLean, and Lawrence (2004) asked young adults to write about three „self-defining 
memories‟, defined as a memory of a specific event that has been thought about many 
times, elicits strong emotions, helps the participant understand who they are as a person 
and is more than one year old.  Most (88%) of self-defining memories reported by young 
adults in this study had previously been told to others.   
Where elements of the life story and important life events are disclosed to others, 
the memory for these experiences can be influenced by the process of social construction 
(Marsh & Tversky, 2004; Pasupathi, 2001).  Sharing past experiences with others can alter 
the content of autobiographical narratives in a number of key ways.  Listeners can actively 
attend to the story or appear disinterested, which can alter the amount of detail provided in 
the narrative (Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2007).  Listeners can also ask questions about the 
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experience, which can influence or guide what information is elicited, and can challenge or 
offer a different perspective on events which can alter the manner in which the experience 
is perceived (McLean et al, 2007; Pasupathi, 2001). 
Influence of Culture on the Development of the Life Story 
In addition to the external processes of social construction, the life story may also 
be influenced by cultural norms and expectations regarding the form and content of the life 
story.  Habermas and Bluck (2000) propose that the life story is constructed in accordance 
with cultural norms and expectations regarding what a prototypical life story will look like.  
Cultural norms and expectations regarding the prototypical life story have been variously 
defined as the cultural concept of biography, and the cultural life script (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2004; Bluck & Habermas, 2000).  These terms overlap conceptually to a significant 
degree.  The „cultural concept of biography‟ refers to the expectations held by members 
within a culture regarding what life events are expected to have the greatest impact on the 
individual, and thus most likely to be included in the life story, and at what age these 
events are likely to occur (Bluck & Habermas, 2000).  The extent to which a life story 
adheres to these cultural norms and expectations determines the cultural coherence of the 
story (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).  The cultural life script, on the other hand, refers to the 
actual list of life events, and timing of these events, that members of a culture expect to 
happen in a prototypical life (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  From a theoretical perspective, 
the cultural life script is unique to, and will differ greatly across, various cultures whereas 
the cultural concept of biography is a trans-cultural force that impacts the construction of 
the life story across all cultures. 
Empirical work supports the existence of the cultural life script and, in Western 
cultures, has converged on 35 key life events that are likely to be experienced over the 
course of the lifetime (Rubin, Berntsen & Hutson, 2008).  According to key theorists 
(Bohn & Berntsen, 2008), the cultural life script acts as a search engine that is activated 
when individuals are asked to tell their life story (or a part of the life story) and guides 
which life events are recalled in response to this request.  While there is no guarantee that 
these events will be included in the life story for every individual, their shared cultural 
importance increases the likelihood that they will be included (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).   
Habermas (2007), found only partial support for the notion that the cultural concept 
of biography is used to structure the life story.  Habermas (2007) asked young adults to 
record the seven most important events an individual from their culture (German) are 
likely to experience in their lifetime.  In a separate sample, young adults were asked to 
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record the seven most important memories of their lives and to write about these in the 
form of a life story narrative.  Comparisons between the lists of actually experienced 
important memories and the normative list of important memories revealed a relatively 
small degree of overlap between the two sets of events.  That is, approximately one-quarter 
of personal memories matched the list of normative life events.  In explaining this finding, 
Habermas (2007) suggests that while cultural norms may influence the inclusion of key 
events in the life story to an extent, the influence exerted by individual differences (such as 
personality) may also be strong. 
In summary, the construction of the life story is influenced by a number of key 
factors.  These include social reconstructive processes that influence how one‟s life story 
events are remembered and cultural norms which dictate which events are likely to have 
the greatest impact on an individuals life and thus should be included in the life story.  The 
construction of the life story is also influenced by the manner in which the events are 
processed by the individual, namely through autobiographical reasoning.  The remainder 
of this thesis is concerned with the question of whether and how autobiographical 
reasoning relates to psychological functioning during a lifetime period in which the 
development of identity is a significant concern; young adulthood.  The following Chapter 
(Chapter Two) is dedicated to the discussion of research that relates more directly to the 
relationship between life story development and psychological functioning. 
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Chapter Two 
Autobiographical Reasoning, Life Story Development and Psychological Functioning 
 There is increasing evidence that the processes of autobiographical reasoning and 
life story development are associated with psychological functioning.  The links between 
autobiographical reasoning, life story development and psychological functioning have 
been examined in three related branches of research.  The first branch has focused on 
associations between the amount and complexity of autobiographical reasoning and 
psychological functioning.  This branch is based on the theoretical notion that 
autobiographical reasoning serves an identity development function, which reflects 
positive psychological functioning during the adolescent/young adulthood periods.  The 
second branch of research has examined the relationship between psychological 
functioning and the detection of positive meaning and/or positive outcomes from one‟s life 
events.  The third branch has focused on the relationship between psychological 
functioning and valence of events (i.e. positive / negative events) which are included in the 
life story.   
 One of the major challenges in this field of research is the high degree of variance 
in the way psychological functioning is defined.  Within this literature, psychological 
functioning has been conceptualised in one of three ways.  First, poor psychological 
functioning has been conceptualised in terms of the presence of psychological distress, 
such as symptoms of depression (see McLean, Breen, & Fournier, 2010).  Second, positive 
psychological functioning has been conceptualised as components of psychological well-
being described by the field of positive psychology e.g. self-esteem, optimism, satisfaction 
with life (McLean & Breen, 2009; McLean & Pratt, 2006).  Third, positive psychological 
functioning has also been conceptualised as indicators of psychological maturity from the 
psychoanalytic perspective (Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005).   
Many studies investigating links between life story development and psychological 
functioning have used composite measures of „psychological well-being‟ which combine 
symptoms of psychopathology (e.g. symptoms of depression) with indicators of positive 
adjustment (e.g. indicators of self-esteem; McLean, Breen, & Fournier, 2010).  While this 
approach has the benefit of providing a holistic view of psychological functioning, it may 
also be at risk of concealing differences between autobiographical reasoning and the 
different components of psychological functioning.   
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A second limitation of this body of work is the diversity in the way 
autobiographical reasoning is conceptualised.  In Chapter One, I described two 
conceptualisations of autobiographical reasoning; self-event connections and 
sophistication of meaning.  The concepts of self-event connections and sophistication of 
meaning are well-defined and have demonstrated a reasonable level of reliability (McLean 
& Fournier, 2008).  Self-event connections and sophistication of meaning do, however, 
lack a degree of specificity in that the basic definition of these constructs do not describe 
the actual links that are made between past event and current self.  That is, noting that an 
individual has made a self-event connection indicates that they have engaged in the 
process of autobiographical reasoning, but does not tell us anything about what the 
individual is actually saying about themselves in relation to the event.  Similarly, a high 
sophistication rating shows that an individual has gained some sort of insight into 
themselves as a result of an experience, but does not tell us what that insight is. 
Few attempts have been made to address the issue of specificity in self-event 
connections and sophistication of meaning ratings.  In one study, McLean and Fournier 
(2008) asked younger (mean age = 21.4 years) and older adults (mean age = 72.4 years) to 
discuss three self-defining memories and coded these memory narratives for self-event 
connections.  These authors then distinguished between the content of self-event 
connections, whether the connection described a trait, outlook, value or personal growth, 
and the valence of the connection, whether it was evaluated by the participant as positive 
or negative.   Findings showed that self-event connections describing personal growth and 
values were more likely to be positively perceived than were self-event connections 
describing ones dispositions and outlook on life.  While this study did examine the content 
of self-event connections, further links to psychological functioning were not explored. 
Although self-event connections and sophistication of meaning are among the most 
commonly used measures of autobiographical reasoning, a number of additional measures 
have been created with a specific focus on positive self-descriptions.  For example, themes 
of positive self-transformation are defined as statements which express openness towards 
exploring the effect of negative experiences on the self and describe positive outcomes 
from these experiences (Pals, 2006).  In contrast, themes of differentiated processing refer 
to statements which suggest that life events are perceived as causing various forms of 
personal growth (Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011)
2
.  While these conceptualisations have 
                                                          
2
   These conceptualisations of autobiographical reasoning are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four 
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been examined in relation to psychological functioning, they have either been shown to be 
fairly complex, amalgamating a number of different criteria such as openness and the 
detection of positive outcomes (Pals, 2006), or narrow in their focus solely on personal 
growth (Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011). 
One consequence of these limitations is that research regarding the links between 
autobiographical reasoning, the life story and psychological functioning can appear 
difficult to reconcile.  Where relevant, I have made connections between 
conceptualisations of autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning used in 
individual studies, to highlight similarities in the approach taken by different researchers.  
It is important to note, however, that research examining links between autobiographical 
reasoning, the life story and psychological functioning is in early stages, and there is still 
much we do not know about the nature of these relationships (McLean & Mansfield, 
2010).  Having outlined these limitations, I now turn to a discussion of the first branch of 
research, which has examined associations between the amount and complexity of 
autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning. 
The identity function of autobiographical reasoning – links to psychological 
functioning 
From a theoretical perspective, having a life story that is rich in autobiographical 
reasoning reflects healthy psychological functioning in young adulthood (McLean, 2005; 
2008).  This notion is derived from the combination of two key theoretical propositions 
discussed in Chapter One.  The first proposition is that the construction of identity in 
adolescence and young adulthood is a developmental milestone one needs to attain in order 
to function well within society (McAdams, 1988; 1993).  The second proposition is that 
identity is equivalent to the life story, and autobiographical reasoning is the core process 
through which the life story/identity is developed (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 
1988; 1993).  Thus the presence of autobiographical reasoning in life stories constructed 
by adolescents and young adults may reflect positive psychological functioning, given the 
proposed drive for identity development during this lifetime period(McAdams, 2011). 
Moderate support has been found for this claim.  Blagov and Singer (2004) devised 
a measure of „integrative memories‟, defined as life story narratives describing a lesson the 
individual derived from the event.  This definition of integrative memories is similar to the 
conceptualisation of „lesson learning‟ in McLean and Pratt‟s (2006) sophistication of 
meaning scale.  Blagov and Singer (2004) conceptualised psychological functioning in 
terms of self-restraint, defined as multiple aspects of positive socialisation; impulse 
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control, suppression of aggression, consideration of others and responsibility.  According 
to these authors, moderate levels of self-restraint reflect adaptive psycho-social maturity as 
individuals with these levels of self-restraint demonstrate effective and flexible emotion 
regulation capabilities and can effectively socialise with others.  Low and high levels of 
self-restraint were not considered to reflect adaptive psycho-social maturity as the former 
reflects difficulty regulating emotions and impulses while the latter reflects rigidity with 
regard to affect regulation.  Blagov and Singer (2004) found that young adults (between 17 
and 22 years of age) who exhibited moderate levels of self-restraint were more likely to 
construct narratives of self-defining memories containing lessons they had derived from 
the event relative to young adults who demonstrated maladaptive levels of self-restraint.  
This finding was interpreted as evidence that autobiographical reasoning (i.e. deriving 
lessons from one‟s life events) reflects emotional maturity in young adulthood.   
In a more recent study, Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) found that for 
adolescents, engaging in autobiographical reasoning may be associated with improvements 
in psychological functioning over time.  Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) asked 
adolescents (mean age = 17 years, 52% female) to write narratives of turning point 
experiences.  Turning points were defined as “a major turning point in your life that 
changed the way you thought about something or how you behaved” (p. 1061).  Each 
narrative was then coded for sophistication of meaning according to the system by McLean 
and Pratt (2006) outlined in Chapter One.  Psychological functioning in this study was 
measured by reverse scored symptoms of depression, social anxiety, daily hassles, and 
self-esteem.  Overall, findings showed that adolescents who reported learning a lesson or 
gaining insight from their turning point experienced better psychological functioning than 
adolescents who reported no meaning.  Furthermore, sophistication of meaning predicted 
positive psychological functioning after controlling for baseline levels of functioning (i.e. 
prior to the turning point experience).  Interestingly, psychological functioning before the 
experience of a turning point did not significantly predict whether lessons or insights were 
gained following the experience.  These findings suggest that the presence of 
autobiographical reasoning in turning point narratives constructed by adolescents predicts 
positive changes in psychological functioning over time. 
The relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning has, however, been shown to be moderated by age.  McLean et al. (2010) 
asked adolescent boys (aged 11 to 18 years) to write about four significant events from 
their life story; a high point, a low point, a turning point, and a continuity experience 
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(defined as an experience in which the adolescent stayed the same).  Each narrative was 
coded for self-event connections and sophistication of meaning.  In a separate session, 
participants were asked to complete a measure of depression and a measure of self-esteem.  
These two measures were then combined to form a broad measure of „psychological well-
being‟.  Findings showed that regardless of age, boys who were more likely to construct 
narratives containing self-event connections that described self-change experienced higher 
levels of self-esteem and lower levels of depression than boys that were less likely to make 
these connections. 
The relationship between sophistication of meaning and psychological well-being 
differed across age groups, however.  For older adolescent boys, constructing life story 
narratives that contained a specific insight into the self (relative to lessons learnt or 
no/vague connections between the event and self) was associated with higher self-esteem 
and lower levels of depression.  In comparison, for younger adolescent boys, constructing 
narratives containing insight into the self was associated with lower self-esteem and higher 
levels of depression.  In explaining these findings, the authors suggested that the cognitive 
capacities involved in gaining insight into the self may not be developed until later 
adolescence, and that attempts to engage in this type of processing at an earlier stage may 
cause distress.  In contrast, simply drawing connections between past experience and 
current self as highlighted by self-event connections may not rely on such advanced 
capacities and hence may be associated with well-being regardless of age.   
It is important to note that the findings of McLean et al. (2010) do not highlight 
possible gender differences in the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and 
well-being during adolescence as girls were not included in the sample.  In citing earlier 
evidence that parents tend to be more elaborative when having conversations with girls 
than they are with boys (Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1996), McLean et al. (2010) suggest that 
boys may not have developed the narrative skills to successfully engage in 
autobiographical reasoning during early adolescents.  The fact that no differences are 
found in the amount or complexity of autobiographical reasoning in adulthood (see 
McLean, 2005; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006) suggests that these gender differences may 
cease to exist at some point during the transition from adolescence to adulthood.   
Taken together, the research of Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) and McLean et 
al. (2010) provide preliminary evidence that, at least for older adolescents, learning lessons 
and gaining insight into the self from one‟s experiences reflects positive psychological 
functioning.  These findings are supported by a broader body of work showing that the 
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process of gaining insight into one‟s experiences more generally (i.e. not just in relation to 
the self) can play an active role in promoting physical and psychological health.  
Pennebaker and colleagues have devised an expressive writing task aimed at facilitating 
the process of gaining insight into one‟s experiences.  In this paradigm, two groups of 
participants are asked to either write about their deepest thoughts and feelings about an 
important experience (expressive writing condition), or write about superficial topics 
(control condition) over a number of days (see Pennebaker, 1993; 1997 for a review).   
Findings from this paradigm consistently show that young adults who demonstrate 
a deeper understanding of significant life events over the days of writing, experience better 
physical and psychological health than young adults who process events at a more 
superficial level.  Specifically, within the expressive writing condition, participants who 
increasingly use words which denote insight (e.g. realise, understand, thought, knew) and 
causation (e.g. because, why, reason) over three to five days of writing show greater health 
improvements than participants who used these types of words at a consistent rate over 
time (Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999 for a review).  For example, university students who 
wrote about their transition to university (expressive condition) and who demonstrated an 
increase in the use of insight and causal words experienced better physical health 
(measured in terms of fewer health centre visits for illness related reasons) than students 
who evidenced no change in causal/insight words (Pennebaker & Francis, 1996).  Similar 
expressive writing tasks have shown to lower symptoms of depression among young adults 
(Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006) and increase marital satisfaction among soldiers 
recently exposed to combat (Baddeley & Pennebaker, 2011).   
Consistent with the findings of McLean et al. (2010), however, there is some 
evidence that the benefits of gaining a greater understanding of one‟s life events through 
expressive writing tasks is qualified by the age and developmental stage of participants.  
Fivush, Marin, Crawford, Reynolds, and Brewin (2007) assigned younger children 
(between 9 to 13 years of age) to an emotional writing condition in which they were asked 
to write about their deepest thoughts and feelings or a control condition in which they were 
asked how they would spend a typical day.  Children in the emotional writing condition 
included more emotional and evaluative information in their narratives than did children in 
the control condition.  Evaluations and explanations were associated with an increase in 
symptoms of anxiety among children in the emotional writing condition, however.  In 
explaining these findings, the authors concluded that unstructured narrative tasks can 
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increase psychological distress in children who may lack the regulatory and narrative skills 
to engage in adaptive reflection.    
These findings have incited a wider discussion on some of the complexities in the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning (McLean 
& Mansfield, 2010).  The findings of McLean et al. (2010) and Fivush et al. (2007), in 
particular, highlight the importance of age and developmental status in considering the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning.  In this 
thesis I proposed that another variable, whether autobiographical reasoning describes the 
self in positive or negative terms, significantly impacts the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning.  This proposition was derived 
from the second branch of research which will now be discussed.  This branch of research 
has investigated the relationship between psychological functioning and adaptive patterns 
of meaning found in life stories. 
Adaptive patterns of meaning making - links to psychological functioning 
The second branch of research examining links between autobiographical 
reasoning, the life story and psychological functioning is concerned with the relationship 
between positive psychological functioning and what have been collectively defined as 
adaptive patterns of meaning-making in life story narratives.  The term „meaning-making‟ 
is broadly used to refer to the process by which individuals describe, interpret and evaluate 
their life events and the self through the construction of the life story (McLean 2005; 
McLean & Pratt, 2006; Singer, 2004).  The notion of meaning making is extremely broad 
and is used to describe a large range of processes and, often, the outcomes of these 
processes (see Park, 2010 for the distinction between „meaning-making‟ and „meanings-
made‟).  Some of the processes subsumed under the general heading of „meaning-making‟ 
and the products (i.e. meanings made) of these processes include: subjective appraisals or 
reappraisals regarding the meaning of life events; garnering an understanding of the cause 
of life events; perceptions of personal growth or positive changes in the self as a result of 
an event; changes in one‟s life goals or beliefs following an event; and a changed or 
greater sense of meaning in one‟s life (Park, 2010).  As highlighted in this list, 
autobiographical reasoning (i.e. forming connections between past event and current self) 
is just one component of the broader concept of meaning-making. 
Several studies have shown that describing positive meanings about events and/or 
the self within the life story tends to be associated with positive psychological functioning 
(Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Grossbaum & Bates, 2002; King, Scollon, 
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Ramsey, & Williams, 2000; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, &Bowman, 2001). In an 
influential study, McAdams et al.(2001) asked mid-life adults (aged 35 to 65 years) to 
narrate eight events from their life story; a high point, low point, turning point, their 
earliest memory, an event from childhood, adolescence, adulthood and another important 
event.  Each narrative was examined for themes of redemption and contamination.  
Themes of redemption were identified when, in the context of their life story narratives, 
participants described a negative situation or experience of negative emotional states that 
ended with a positive outcome.  Themes of contamination were identified when 
participants described a positive situation or experience of positive emotional states that 
ended negatively.   
McAdams et al. (2001) found that adults who were more likely to include 
redemption sequences life story narratives (summed across all event types) reported more 
satisfaction with life; higher self-esteem; were more likely to believe that they could 
understand, make sense of and manage life‟s challenges; and experienced lower levels of 
depression than adults who were less likely to include redemption sequences.  In contrast, 
the inclusion of contamination sequences in adults‟ life story narratives was associated 
with lower levels of life satisfaction, lower levels of self-esteem, and higher levels of 
depression.  In a related study, Grossbaum and Bates (2002) found that among midlife 
adults, contamination themes found across five life story events (high, low and turning 
points, and an early and another experience) predicted poor life satisfaction, while 
redemption sequences predicted three components of positive psychological well-being as 
measured by the Ryff scales (personal growth, self-acceptance, and positive relations with 
others).   
One of the major challenges in the work of McAdams et al. (2001) and Grossbaum 
and Bates (2002), and, in fact, in all research adopting similar methodologies, is the 
measurement of meaning-making and psychological functioning using cross-sectional 
designs.  As noted by Pasupathi (2012), capturing meaning-making and autobiographical 
reasoning at one point in time may provide an incorrect view of an individuals‟ tendency 
to draw positive and/or negative meanings from their life events.  From a theoretical 
perspective, the meaning-making process is likely to be dynamic, with the actual meanings 
drawn from life events changing over time (Pasupathi, 2012).  In addition to changes in 
meaning that may be expected as time since the event occurred elapses, changes over time 
may also be influenced by social constructive forces as the details of events are discussed 
with others (Pasupathi, 2001).  Another limitation associated with measuring meaning-
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making and psychological functioning at one time point is that conclusions regarding 
causality between the two constructs cannot be made.  In light of these limitations, the 
findings of McAdams et al. (2001) and Grossbaum and Bates (2002) provide some 
preliminary evidence that positive psychological functioning in adulthood is associated 
with the extent to which one‟s life events are narrated with positive or negative endings.   
Also within this branch of research, the ability to describe benefits and positive 
outcomes from negative life events in particular appears to be a strong indicator of positive 
psychological functioning (Adler & Poulin, 2009; King et al. 2000; McAdams et al. 2001; 
Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Stein, Folkman, Trabasso & Christopher-Richards, 
1997).  MacCallum and Bryant (2008) asked bereaved individuals who were experiencing 
complicated grief, a maladaptive and debilitating set of grief symptoms experienced more 
than six months after the death, and bereaved individuals with no symptoms of 
complicated grief to describe three self-defining memories.  Memories that were 
specifically related to the deceased individuals‟ death were coded for themes of 
redemption.  Findings showed that narratives constructed by bereaved family members 
who were not experiencing symptoms of complicated grief were more likely to contain 
themes of redemption than were narratives constructed by bereaved individuals‟ 
experiencing complicated grief.   In addition, none of the memory narratives provided by 
individuals experiencing complicated grief contained themes of redemption.  These 
findings suggest that poor psychological functioning, defined in terms of complicated 
grief, was associated with a relative inability to infer any positive outcomes or aspects of 
the difficult experience. 
Although MacCallum and Bryant (2008) did not define redemption themes as 
autobiographical reasoning per se, statements indicating redemption themes (e.g. realising 
personal strength and coping ability, forming better relationships with other family 
members) overlap with the construct of autobiographical reasoning.  Overall, their findings 
highlight an important link between the way individuals reflect on and reason about 
negative life events and psychological functioning.  From a theoretical perspective, 
negative events disrupt individuals‟ lives (e.g. in terms of their goals, relationships, values 
and activities) in a way that positive and neutral events do not (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Sousa & 
Dickerhoof, 2006; Pals, 2006).  As a consequence of this feature, negative events may 
require more explanation than do positive and neutral events, and these explanations may 
moderate the impact of these events for the individual (Baker-Ward, Eaton, & Banks, 
2005).  Consistent with this notion, negative or challenging life events tend to contain 
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more evidence of cognitive processing and autobiographical reasoning than do positive 
and neutral events (Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005; McLean & Pratt, 2006; McLean & 
Thorne, 2003; Pals, 2006; Thorne et al.,2004).   
More direct examinations of the link between autobiographical reasoning in the 
context of negative events and psychological functioning have shown that the ability to 
reason about positive outcomes for the self following challenging or difficult life 
experiences predicts positive psychological functioning in the years following the 
experience (King et al. 2000; Pals, 2006; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011).  From a 
theoretical perspective, Gillies and Neimeyer (2006) argue that positive psychological 
adaptation following a negative life experience, such as bereavement, is associated with 
engagement in three core processes.  First, individuals are driven to „make sense‟ of the 
experience, that is, to find a reason for why the event occurred.  Second, positive 
adaptation is associated with the ability to find „benefit‟ from the experience.  Third, 
positive adaptation is associated with a change in „identity‟, that is, shifts in one‟s view of 
the world and the self that can occur as a result of the search for meaning in negative 
experiences.  Although not a direct test of this claim, one study by Pals (2006) suggests 
that at least the first two of these processes - the drive to make sense of the experience and 
the detection of benefit from the experience - are associated with positive psychological 
functioning in adulthood. 
Pals (2006) asked 83 middle-aged women (52 years of age) to construct narratives 
of difficult life experiences that had occurred since leaving college.  Each narrative was 
coded for themes of positive self-transformation, defined as statements expressing 
openness towards exploring the effect of the experience on the self, and statements 
describing positive outcomes from the negative experience.  Nine years later, when the 
women were 61 years old, each participant underwent an interview with a clinician in 
which they were asked to discuss their thoughts and feelings on a number of topics such as 
work, family, relationships, health and aging.  From these interviews, the authors 
constructed a measure of maturity (composite of clinician ratings regarding the participants 
self-understanding, integrity and emotional sophistication), and obtained participants‟ 
subjective appraisals regarding their level of satisfaction with their life and their physical 
health.  Women who constructed narratives that contained themes of positive self-
transformation at age 52 years scored higher on each indicator of psychological 
functioning (maturity, satisfaction with life, physical health) almost ten years later relative 
to women whose narratives did not contain themes of positive self-transformation.   
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Pals‟ (2006) conceptualisation of positive self-transformation overlaps 
considerably with the notion of post-traumatic growth, which has also been discussed in 
relation to narrative identity and the life story (Pals & McAdams, 2004).  Post-traumatic 
growth has been described as a process by which a) individuals consider and explore the 
meaning of traumatic events and b) construe positive outcomes for the self as a result of 
the traumatic experience (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).  These positive outcomes often 
include positive changes in the self, relationships with others and one‟s outlook or 
philosophy on life (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; 2004).  Narrative may be one of the key 
ways through which post-traumatic growth develops as it enables individuals to construct 
and define the shift in their own words, while narrating the event within the context of the 
life story actively connects the growth with identity (Pals & McAdams, 2004; Woodward 
& Joseph, 2003).  Post-traumatic growth has been associated with adaptive coping and 
positive mental health following major illness (Park, Chmielewski, & Blank, 2010), 
combat situations (Moore, Varra, Michael, & Simpson, 2010), the 9/11 World Trade 
Centre attacks (Park, Riley,& Snyder, 2012). 
Autobiographical reasoning that describes personal growth in a more general sense 
(i.e. not solely as a product of traumatic events) has also been linked with positive 
psychological functioning.  By definition, instances of autobiographical reasoning that 
describe personal growth link challenging or difficult life experiences with self-
development and progression that are experienced as a direct result of the experience 
(McLean & Fournier, 2008).  Lilgendahl and McAdams (2011) conducted semi-structured 
life story interviews with 88 mid-life adults (mean age of 48 years).  Each life story was 
transcribed and coded for themes of differentiated processing, the degree to which life 
events were perceived as causing various forms of personal growth.  Participants also 
completed various measures of subjective well-being (satisfaction with life, positive and 
negative affect) and psychological well-being (self-acceptance, relations with others, 
autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life).  Overall, adults who 
incorporated more evidence of differentiated processing in their life story narratives 
experienced better subjective and psychological well-being than adults who were less 
likely to demonstrate these themes.  When analysed by the valence of the life event (i.e. 
whether the event was positive or negative), however, findings showed that the 
relationship between differentiated processing and subjective / psychological well-being 
existed only in relation to negative experiences.   
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In summary, there is increasing evidence that engaging in autobiographical 
reasoning is associated with positive psychological functioning in cases where the products 
of the reasoning process describe positive outcomes for the individual.  This relationship 
between positive autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning may be 
particularly evident when the reasoning process takes place in relation to negative life 
events.  Returning again to the central theoretical premise of McAdams‟ Life Story Model 
of Identity, these findings have clear implications for the notion that identity is the life 
story.  That is, an individual who constructs a life story that contains positive 
interpretations of their life events and/or links these events to positive characteristics of the 
self does, according to McAdams‟ model, have a narrative identity that is positive in 
nature.  Having such a positively valenced life story, in turn, appears to be associated with 
a range of indicators of positive psychological functioning. 
Centrality of life story events and psychological functioning 
The third and final body of work that has investigated links between the life story 
and psychological functioning pertains to the nature of events that are included in the life 
story.  As discussed in Chapter One, the life story is comprised of events and experiences 
that have personal significance to the individual (Pillemer, 1998; Singer & Salovey, 1993).  
Individuals who experience psychological distress not only experience greater exposure to 
negative life events than others (Korkeila et al., 2010; LaNoue, Graeber, de Hernandez, 
Warner & Helitzer, 2012), but also demonstrate a bias towards including negative life 
events in their life story that is not seen in non-distressed individuals (Habermas, Ott, 
Schubert, Schneider and Pate, 2008).  If we assume that narrative identity is the life story 
(McAdams, 1988; 1993), then identity among psychologically distressed individuals may 
be comprised, to a greater degree than non-distressed individuals, of negative life events.   
Even among individuals who experience an average or typical number of negative 
or stressful life events, including highly negative or stressful life events in the life story 
can be a risk factor for psychological distress (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Berntsen, Willert, 
& Rubin, 2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2007; MacCallum & Bryant, 2008).  This is especially 
true when these negative events are subjectively appraised as having more personal 
significance than other, more positive, experiences.  In the study by MacCallum and 
Bryant (2008) described above, individuals who were suffering from complicated grief 
following the death of a loved one reported more self-defining memories relating to the 
deceased than did bereaved individuals who did not experience complicated grief.   
Additionally, Sutherland and Bryant (2005) found that trauma survivors who were 
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experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were more likely to recall memories of 
the trauma in response to a self-defining memory task than trauma survivors who did not 
experience PTSD.    These findings suggest that for these highly distressed individuals, the 
experiences of loss or trauma were more likely to be included in the life story, and hence 
their narrative identity, than non-distressed individuals.   
In 2004, Berntsen and Rubin introduced the idea that individuals perceive certain 
events as more central to their life story than others.  These authors suggest that events 
which are central to one‟s identity and life story become a reference point for, and shape 
individuals understanding of, themselves and other life experiences.  Perceiving negative 
events as being a central component of one‟s identity and life story has been shown to be a 
risk factor for psychological distress (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Berntsen, Willert, & 
Rubin, 2003).  Berntsen & Rubin, 2007) found that undergraduate students who endorsed 
traumatic experiences as central to their identity and life story exhibited more symptoms of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) than did students who did not hold these beliefs.  
In a related study, Boals (2010) found that in a sample of university students, symptoms of 
depression and PTSD were positively correlated with beliefs about the centrality of 
negative events.  These findings suggest that the extent to which individuals perceive 
negative events as a core part of their life story is an important predictor of psychological 
functioning. 
Justification for Current Studies 
The literature reviewed in this Chapter highlights a number of ways in which the 
development of the life story may be associated with psychological functioning.  First, 
evidence of more advanced life story development, as measured by autobiographical 
reasoning, is associated with positive psychological functioning in older adolescence and 
young adulthood.  Although not directly examined, this relationship may reflect more 
advanced identity development, which is a key developmental concern for adolescents and 
young adults.  Second, adults who construct life stories which reflect positive meaning-
making and contain autobiographical reasoning that describes the self in positive ways 
experience better psychological functioning than adults whose life stories do not contain 
such positive meanings.  Third, the inclusion, and centrality, of negative events in the life 
story may be a risk factor for poor psychological functioning.  There are, however, a 
number of gaps in research supporting these claims, and a number of questions about the 
nature of the relationship between autobiographical reasoning, the life story and 
psychological functioning remain. 
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First, we know very little about the relationship between psychological functioning 
and autobiographical reasoning that describes the self in positive ways in young adulthood 
as existing studies investigating these associations have focused solely on the 
autobiographical reasoning processes of adolescents, and mid-life and older adults.  Given 
that the development of the life story (and identity) has been established as a key 
developmental concern for this age group, it is reasonable to expect similar patterns of 
findings in young adults to those found with mid-life and older adults.  That is, with the 
increasing focus on autobiographical reasoning as a means of constructing information 
about the self, it is reasonable to expect that the patterns between psychological 
functioning and positively-toned autobiographical reasoning observed in adults may 
emerge, or be present, during young adulthood.  Examining the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning in young adulthood is also 
important as a significant proportion of young adults experience symptoms of 
psychological distress such as depression and anxiety (Hankin et al., 1998).   These 
experiences predict continuing mental health difficulties into adulthood and are associated 
with difficulty achieving social-developmental tasks such as the consolidation of identity  
(Howard, Galambos, & Krahn, 2010; Vleioras & Bosma, 2005).   
Second, prior research has demonstrated a bias towards examining the relationship 
between psychological functioning and autobiographical reasoning that describes the self 
in positive ways.  As outlined earlier, these definitions have centred on the constructs of 
positive self-transformation and personal growth.  Comparatively less work has 
investigated the psychological functioning of individuals who attribute negative 
characteristics to the self through autobiographical reasoning.  Given that the few measures 
of negative meaning-making that do exist within the literature predict poor psychological 
functioning (e.g. redemption themes; McAdams et al., 2001), it is reasonable to expect that 
negatively-toned autobiographical reasoning will similarly relate to poor psychological 
functioning in young adulthood. 
Third, there is a lack of consensus within the literature regarding the best way to 
measure the construct of autobiographical reasoning valence, that is, the extent to which 
autobiographical reasoning describes the self in positive and negative ways.  Existing 
definitions of positively-toned autobiographical reasoning (e.g. positive self-
transformation) are complex, specific and on some occasions, demonstrate poor reliability.  
In contrast, self-event connections are easily defined and able to be reliably coded, but lack 
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specificity in terms of what they can tell us about the nature of the links individuals are 
making between past event and current self.   
To address these latter two concerns, the current thesis coded autobiographical 
reasoning valence in terms of positive, negative, neutral, and mixed (positive and negative) 
self-event connections.  The conceptualisation of positive, negative, neutral and mixed 
self-event connections in the current thesis provides a novel and simplified way of 
capturing autobiographical reasoning valence that has three main benefits over existing 
conceptualisations.  First, the inclusion of both positive and negative self-event 
connections allows both adaptive (positive) and potentially maladaptive (negative) forms 
of autobiographical reasoning to be captured.  Second, positive self-event connections are 
not limited to a certain type of positive outcome for the self (e.g. „positive self-
transformation‟ or „personal growth‟) and thus provide a more general measure of adaptive 
autobiographical reasoning.  Third, positive and negative self-event connections can be 
coded in all narratives, regardless of the event type.  This compares with previous 
indicators of positive autobiographical reasoning, which have largely been limited to the 
identification of positive outcomes or endings from negative events (see King et al., 2000; 
McAdams et al., 2001; Pals, 2006).   
The operational definitions for positive, negative, neutral and mixed self-event 
connections were developed according to the original description of self-event connections 
provided by McLean and Fournier (2008).  McLean and Fournier (2008) described self-
event connections as “any time when someone [makes] an explicit connection between the 
past and the self” (p. 529).  In the current thesis, self-event connections were defined as 
positive when the connection referred to a positive characteristic of the self, mentioned 
personal growth, or denoted a positive evaluation of the self (e.g., “This event made me 
stronger”).  Self-event connections were defined as negative when the statement 
referenced a negative characteristic of the self, or denoted a negative evaluation of the self 
(e.g., “this event is one of the main causes for the long term depression that I experience”).  
Self-event connections were defined as neutral when there was no evaluation of the self, or 
the connection was not clearly positive or negative (e.g., “this experience changed how I 
think about the world”).  Self-event connections were coded as mixed when the connection 
involved elements of both positive and negative meaning. These were often situations 
where participants had learnt something (and thus could be considered an experience 
involving growth), but where the lesson learnt had negative connotations (e.g. “This 
experience taught me about the harsh realities of life”). 
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Self-event connections were only recorded as positive or negative if: the self-
characteristic highlighted was explicitly referred to as positive or negative by the 
participant (e.g., “It was a great experience because it taught me how to be independent” – 
positive; “It has helped me over the last year, but in a negative way” - negative), or if it 
satisfied common cultural understandings of desirable and undesirable characteristics (e.g., 
“I gained a lot of self-confidence” – positive, and “This [event] has made me more 
paranoid” – negative).   
The fourth point to make before outlining the details of the studies containing in 
this thesis is to acknowledge that there is a lot we do not yet know about the relationship 
between the development of the life story and psychological functioning.  In reviewing the 
life story literature, McLean and Mansfield (2010) acknowledge that we do not yet know 
whether the development of the life story (through autobiographical reasoning) causes 
differences in psychological functioning, is the product of psychological functioning, or if 
there is a third variable that accounts for the association.  Thus one of the key aims of this 
thesis was to undertake a number of studies that will increase our understanding of the 
relationships between autobiographical reasoning and life story development, and 
psychological functioning.   
The Aims of This Thesis 
This thesis broadly examines the relationship between psychological functioning 
and the valence of autobiographical present in the life stories of young adults.  Four studies 
in this thesis were developed to address eight primary research aims: 
1. To establish a relationship between psychological functioning and autobiographical 
reasoning valence in young adulthood (Studies 1a, 1b, 2, and 3). 
2. To examine whether the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and 
psychological functioning is altered by young adults‟ tendency to reason about the self 
in positive and negative ways (Study 1a). 
3. To examine whether the relationship between the centrality of negative events in the 
life story and psychological functioning is altered by young adults‟ tendency to reason 
about the self in positive and negative ways (Study 1a). 
4. To explore the issue of directionality in the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning valence and psychological functioning, in particular, whether 
autobiographical reasoning at one time point would predict changes in psychological 
functioning over time (Study 1b). 
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5. To examine relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence and cognitive 
response styles; explanatory style, rumination, and cognitive reappraisal strategies 
(Study 2). 
6. To explore whether cognitive response styles explain or alter the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning (Study 2). 
7. To explore relationships between autobiographical reasoning and two aspects of the 
phenomenology of life story events; visual perspective and subjective distance (Study 
3). 
8. To explore whether autobiographical reasoning moderates key associations between 
psychological functioning and memory phenomenology (Study 3). 
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Chapter Three 
Overview of Methodology 
Given the potentially burdensome task of eliciting entire life narratives (for both 
participants and researchers), life story research has tended to focus on eliciting narratives 
of key life events or experiences that are likely to be included in the life story, in favour of 
eliciting entire life narratives (Pillemer, 2001; McLean & Thorne, 2003; Singer & Moffitt, 
1991–1992; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Thorne, 2000; Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004).  
One of the key strengths of this approach is that it enables researchers to examine patterns 
and themes present in narratives that are assumed to be present in entire life narratives, in 
an efficient manner.  On the other hand, a key limitation of this approach is that the life 
story is mostly examined in a piecemeal fashion, rather than a holistic and complete way.  
This can mean that crucial information about how individuals structure and integrate life 
story events into an overarching narrative is lost (Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Habermas and 
de Silveira, 2008).  This limitation is not so important when the focus of research is on the 
core process through which the life story is developed, autobiographical reasoning. 
Methodology used to elicit life story narratives 
Across the three main studies in this thesis (Study 1a, Study 2, and Study 3), young 
adults were asked to write about three or four key events from their life story.  Asking 
participants to recount a small number of key events from the life story is a popular 
approach in life story research as it enables the core process of autobiographical reasoning 
to be captured without placing the burden of recounting an entire life narrative on 
participants (McLean, 2005; 2008; McLean & Pratt, 2008).  The methodology used to 
elicit the key life story events in this thesis was adapted from Dan McAdams‟ guided 
autobiography tool (McAdams, 2006; available at 
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/guided/).  The full guided 
autobiography tool consists of ten „critical episodes‟, defined as moments in an 
individual‟s life that stand out for some reason.  The ten events are: high point, low point, 
turning point, a continuity experience (opposite of turning point), earliest memory, a 
childhood event (occurring before the age of 13 years), an adolescent event (occurring 
between the ages of 13 – 19 years) a morality experience (involving lessons of „right and 
wrong‟), an event involving a major decision and an event involving the achievement or 
working towards a currently valued goal.   
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Consistent with the approach taken in the majority of autobiographical reasoning 
studies, the current research focused on three of these event types: high points, low points 
and turning points.  In the first study (Study 1a; Chapter Four), participants were asked to 
narrate two high points and two low points from their life story.  These two event types 
were chosen as they enabled comparisons to be made between the way young adults 
reasoned about the self in the context of both positive and negative life events.  
Participants were asked to narrate two events of each type (high and low points) to 
minimise the likelihood that differences in autobiographical reasoning by event type were 
not influenced by the actual event.  That is, measuring autobiographical reasoning over 
two low points increases the likelihood of capturing an individual‟s general 
autobiographical reasoning tendencies than measuring it in relation to one single event.  
Following the completion of this first study, it became apparent that there were few 
differences in autobiographical reasoning amount, complexity and valence across the two 
events of each type.  The methodology employed in the second and third studies were 
therefore modified. 
In the second (Study 2) and third study (Study 3), participants were asked to narrate 
one high point, one low point and one turning point from their life story.  The decision to 
include turning points followed the notion discussed by a number of key researchers, that 
autobiographical reasoning is likely to be a core feature of, and prevalent in, narratives of 
turning points.  That is, turning point experiences are conceptualised as moments involving 
a change in the individuals‟ knowledge and understanding of themselves and/or the world 
(Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012).   
Another key methodological decision was whether to elicit verbal or written life 
story narratives.  A decision was made to elicit written life story narratives in the current 
research for a number of reasons.  As noted by Pasupathi (2001), life story narratives 
communicated to others are subject to social reconstruction.  That is, a story that is told to 
others can change in terms of content and meaning, depending on the responses of the 
audience to which it is told.  As a result of this, research adopting an oral method of 
eliciting life story narratives has been careful to give only the most basic and rudimentary 
prompts for gaining more detail in a narrated event (e.g. Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006).  
Although these basic prompts are not likely to change the actual content of a story, it may 
encourage individuals to keep providing more information about an event than they 
otherwise would.  It also raises the issue of when to stop prompting for more information 
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and for whom and when to prompt, both factors which may reduce the standardisation and 
the reliability of the task.   
Description of the autobiographical narrative task 
The first step in the autobiographical narrative task was to inform participants of 
the demands of the task.  Participants were first informed that they would be asked to 
“describe [three/four] key events or experiences that you‟ve had in your life. These should 
be events or experiences you that might include in your life story”.  As part of this 
introductory information, participants were also told that they would be given a general 
description of the events they were expected to write about; however, within these general 
descriptions, they could choose the actual events they described and what details they 
chose to include in their narratives. Participants were then provided with a description of 
each type of event [high point, low point and turning point] and asked to write for as long 
as they liked about each of the events.  Within their narratives of each event, participants 
were asked to consider how old they were when this event occurred, what happened in the 
event, who was involved, what they were thinking, feeling, why they think that this is an 
important event in their life story.  They were also asked to consider what the event says 
about who they are, who they were, who they might be, and how they have developed over 
time.  Consistent with (McAdams, 2006), the instructions for each of the event types were: 
High points: “High points are defined as moments or episodes in a person‟s life 
in which he or she feels a sense of happiness, joy, excitement, contentment or 
some other positive emotion. These experiences vary widely and people report 
them to be associated with a whole range of experiences. A high point for you 
can be any experience that stands out in your memory as something that is/was 
extremely positive”. 
Low points: “Low points are moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which 
he or she feels extremely negative emotions such as despair, disillusionment, 
guilt, shame etc. A low point for you can be any experience that stands out in 
your memory as something that is/was extremely negative” 
Turning points: “In looking back on one's life, it is often possible to identify 
certain key "turning points" - episodes in which a person undergoes substantial 
change. Turning points can occur in many different spheres of a person's life -- 
in relationships with other people, in work and school, in outside interests, etc. 
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We are especially interested in a turning point in your understanding of 
yourself” 
“Please identify a particular episode in your life story in which you underwent 
an important transition or change with respect to your understanding of 
yourself. It is not necessary that you consciously saw the event as a turning 
point when it actually happened. Rather, what is important is that you now see 
this particular event as a turning point in your life. If you feel that you have 
experienced no dramatic turning points in your life, then describe a particular 
episode in your life that comes closer than any other to qualifying as a turning 
point” 
Ethical approval for each of the studies conducted for this thesis was granted by the 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington.  A 
number of steps were taken to address any possible negative effects of the task on 
participants.  First, participants were told that they could choose which events they 
wrote about before commencing the narrative task and were informed that they could 
withdraw from the study at any time.  Second, all participants were provided with 
verbal debriefing at the conclusion of the testing sessions and were given a written 
debriefing information sheet that they took away with them when they had completed 
the study.  This debriefing information described the nature and purpose of the study 
and participants were encouraged to ask any questions they had about the research.  
Participants were also given a list of support services they could contact if they were 
interested in seeking support for distress caused by life events that may or may not 
have been written about during the course of the study.   
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Chapter Four 
Study 1a: The relationship between autobiographical reasoning processes and 
content, centrality of events and psychological functioning 
Study 1a was designed to address the first three aims of this thesis.  The first aim 
was to establish a relationship between psychological functioning and autobiographical 
reasoning valence, as defined by positive and negative self-event connections.  The second 
aim was to extend the findings of Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) and McLean et al. 
(2010), which suggest that the amount and complexity of autobiographical reasoning 
found in the life stories of older adolescents/young adults is associated with positive 
psychological functioning.  Specifically, this study aimed to investigate whether the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning (amount/complexity) and psychological 
functioning was altered by young adults‟ tendency to reason about the self in positive and 
negative ways.  The third and final aim was to examine links between autobiographical 
reasoning valence and another component of life story development, the centrality of 
negative life events.  Specifically, this study aimed to examine whether the relationship 
between the centrality of negative events in the life story and psychological functioning 
was altered by young adults‟ tendency to reason about the self in positive and negative 
ways.   
 This study formed the basis of a manuscript submitted for publication to the 
Special Issue of Memory: „The Costs and Benefits of Finding Meaning in the Past‟ in 
2012.  This manuscript was accepted for publication in 2012
3
.  This Chapter repeats much 
of the same information presented in Chapters One and Two.  Although repetitive, this 
Chapter presents the information again as it is relevant for understanding the aims and 
hypotheses for the study. 
  
                                                          
3
   Banks, M. V., & Salmon, K.Reasoning about the self in positive and negative ways: Relationship to 
psychological functioning in young adulthood, Memory, (in press). 
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When I was younger my Dad was diagnosed with a serious illness… 
eventually it got to the point where the doctors couldn‟t do anything more 
and he passed away.   This event made me grow up well before I should 
have… Although the experience was tough for everyone, it has taught me 
that life is short and that I should never take people for granted… It has 
made me a lot mentally stronger, and I am able to cope with the more 
trivial things in life that other people my age see as a big deal. 
 
Reflecting on the personal significance of our life events is a core component of 
life story development (McAdams, 1993, 1996; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007; 
Pillemer, 2001).  This process of reflection is highlighted in the above excerpt from the life 
story of a young adult. In this example, the young adult describes how the death of their 
father led to the development of both personal characteristics (personal strength, coping 
skills) and the learning of valuable life lessons (life is short, not taking people for granted).   
The process of drawing connections between past events and the current self, as illustrated 
in this example, has been termed „autobiographical reasoning‟ (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).   
Autobiographical reasoning is generally regarded as an indicator of psychological 
health and well-being (King, Scollon, Ramsey, & Williams, 2000; Lilgendahl & 
McAdams, 2011; McLean & Breen, 2009; McLean, Breen, & Fournier, 2010; Pals, 2006).  
Research supporting this claim is based on the theoretical notion that autobiographical 
reasoning is the key process through which the life story, and subsequently narrative 
identity, develops (McAdams, 1993, 2001; McLean, 2005, 2008; McLean & Thorne, 
2003; McLean et al., 2010; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 
2007).  This notion is closely aligned with early developmental theories (Erikson, 1968), 
which propose that identity formation is a key component of human development.  Given 
the role of autobiographical reasoning in supporting the development of identity, evidence 
of this type of processing in autobiographical narratives is considered to be an indicator of 
normative, healthy development (Habermas & de Silveira, 2008).  
Autobiographical reasoning and identity development 
Autobiographical reasoning has been operationalised in a number of ways.  Two 
conceptualisations commonly referenced in narrative identity research are self-event 
connections and sophistication of meaning.  Self-event connections are defined as explicit 
statements that describe a link between a personal experience and an aspect of the self such 
as personal traits, values, attitudes and beliefs (McLean & Fournier, 2008; Pasupathi & 
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Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi, Mansour & Brubaker, 2007).  Sophistication of meaning is 
characterised as the level of insight or complexity of knowledge – particularly about the 
self – that is attained as a result of reflecting on one‟s past and self (Thorne, McLean, & 
Lawrence, 2004).  Both self-event connections and sophistication of meaning measure the 
extent to which information about the self is derived from life events, but they do so in 
slightly different ways.  Self-event connections capture any explicit links a narrator has 
made between event and self, and therefore provide a basic measure of the extent to which 
autobiographical reasoning has occurred.  Sophistication of meaning extends the 
measurement of this basic process by capturing the degree to which this knowledge 
describes abstract characteristics of the self or concrete behavioural lessons.   
In support of the theoretical views discussed earlier, there is some, albeit indirect, 
evidence that both self-event connections and sophistication of meaning are related to the 
development of identity.  Self-event connections are readily coded in narratives of 
memories that are considered self-defining (McLean, 2008) and statements depicting 
deeper insights into the self are commonly found in narratives of autobiographical 
memories that are shared  with others for the purposes of self-explanation (McLean, 2005).  
Moreover, self-event connections and sophistication of meaning ratings tend to increase 
over adolescence, a crucial time for identity development (Habermas & Paha, 2001; 
McLean & Breen, 2009; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006).   
Autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning 
There is, however, a paucity of research investigating how self-event connections 
and sophistication of meaning relate to psychological functioning.  One recent study 
suggests that more self-event connections and more sophisticated meaning in narratives of 
important life events may relate to psychological functioning, but only for certain groups 
(McLean et al., 2010).  McLean and colleagues asked adolescent boys (aged 11 to 18 
years) to write about four significant events from their life story and coded each narrative 
for self-event connections and sophistication of meaning.  Regardless of age, boys who 
constructed narratives containing more self-event connections that described self-change 
experienced higher levels of self-esteem, autonomy and lower levels of depression.   
The relationship between sophistication of meaning and psychological well-being 
however, differed across age groups.  For older adolescent boys, making statements 
indicative of deeper levels of insight into the self was associated with higher self-esteem 
and lower levels of depression.  In comparison, for younger adolescent boys, more 
sophisticated meaning was associated with poorer psychological well-being.  In accounting 
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for these findings, the authors suggested that the cognitive capacities involved in gaining 
deeper insights into the self may not be developed until later adolescence, and that 
attempts to engage in this type of processing at an earlier stage may cause distress.  In 
contrast, simply drawing connections between past experience and current self may not 
rely on such advanced capacities and hence may be associated with well-being regardless 
of age.  Current thinking in relation to this body of research now favours the view that the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological well-being is more 
complex than a simple “more is better” correlation (McLean & Mansfield, 2010).   
Understanding the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and 
psychological functioning may be enhanced by considering the findings of a broader body 
of work identifying adaptive patterns of autobiographical reasoning (see Bauer & 
McAdams, 2004; Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, 
Patten, & Bowman, 2001; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997;  Stein, Folkman, 
Trabasso & Christopher-Richards, 1997).  This research shows that autobiographical 
reasoning describing personal growth and positive self-transformation as a result of 
challenging or difficult life experiences predicts positive psychological well-being in the 
years following the experience (King et al., 2000; Pals, 2006; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 
2011).   
 For example, Pals (2006) coded mid-life adults‟ narratives of difficult life 
experiences for themes of positive self-transformation, defined as statements expressing 
openness towards exploring the effect of the experience on the self, and describing positive 
outcomes from the negative experience.  Narratives that contained themes of positive self-
transformation predicted psychological well-being (maturity and satisfaction with life) and 
physical health almost ten years later.  Similarly, Lilgendahl and McAdams (2011) found 
that themes of differentiated processing (the degree to which life events were perceived as 
causing various forms of personal growth) in life story narratives of mid-life adults were 
associated with subjective and psychological well-being.  Although the precise 
conceptualisations of autobiographical reasoning differed across these two studies, these 
findings suggest that the extent to which autobiographical reasoning refers to the self in a 
positive manner is an important predictor of psychological well-being.   
 Taken together, the findings of the reviewed research suggest that both the extent 
to which individuals‟ engage in autobiographical reasoning, and the degree to which 
autobiographical reasoning is employed to link life experiences with positive outcomes or 
characteristics of the self, are important predictors of psychological well-being.  
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Surprisingly, research has not yet examined whether, and how, these two components of 
autobiographical reasoning interact, nor whether the combination of these factors perhaps 
better predicts psychological well-being than either factor alone.  Furthermore, while 
existing evidence suggests that reasoning about the self in positive ways is associated with 
positive psychological well-being, we know very little about the well-being status of 
individuals who, through the process of autobiographical reasoning, link past experience to 
negative characteristics or outcomes for the self.  It is reasonable to expect that engaging in 
autobiographical reasoning will be associated with positive well-being when the 
connections drawn between event and self describe the self in positive ways, and 
associated with poor well-being when the connections describe the self in negative ways.  
The current study aimed to address these gaps by first investigating the 
relationships between autobiographical amount/complexity, autobiographical reasoning 
valence (number of positive/negative self-event connections) and psychological 
functioning.  Further to this, I examined whether the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning (amount and complexity) and psychological functioning would be altered 
(moderated) by individual differences in the propensity to reason about the self in positive 
or negative ways.  I predicted that for young adults who made a greater proportion of 
negative self-event connections, more, and more complex, autobiographical reasoning 
would be associated with poorer psychological functioning.  For young adults who made a 
greater proportion of positive self-event connections, I predicted that more, and more 
complex, autobiographical reasoning would be associated with positive psychological 
functioning.  The proportion of self-event connections that described the self in 
positive/negative ways were used as the moderating variables as this provided a measure 
of individual differences in the propensity to reason about positive/negative characteristics 
of the self that was independent of the number of connections made.   
I examined the moderation effects in the context of narratives about negative life 
events (life story low points) and positive life events (life story high points) separately.  
Prior work shows that greater processing of negative, but not positive, life events is 
associated with subjective assessments of positive mental health status and satisfaction 
with life (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Sousa & Dickerhoof, 2006).  In accordance with these 
findings, I predicted that more, and more complex, reasoning would be related to 
psychological functioning (with the direction of the relationship explained by the 
proportion of positive/negative connections) in narratives of low, but not high points.  
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The current study extended existing research in two additional ways.  First, 
psychological functioning was conceptualised in terms of both the absence/presence of 
psychopathology and psychological well-being, and moderation analyses were conducted 
for these two measures separately.  This approach is consistent with the notion that 
psychopathology and psychological well-being are related, yet discrete, constructs (see 
Ryff & Keyes, 1995) and that positive psychological functioning comprises more than the 
absence of psychological distress (Bech, Olsen, Kjoller, & Rasmussen, 2003).  Second, I 
focused on young adulthood as this developmental stage is proposed to be a crucial time 
for the formation of identity and establishing a sense of self as an autonomous individual 
(Bauer & McAdams, 2010; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008).   
Autobiographical reasoning and the centrality of events 
 A further aim of the current study was to integrate research regarding adaptive 
patterns of autobiographical reasoning in the context of negative life events with a separate 
body of work investigating the psychological implications of incorporating negative events 
into the life story.  From a theoretical perspective, psychological functioning can be 
jeopardised when negative events are perceived as being a central component of one‟s 
identity and life story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003).  
Research in support of this claim is mixed, however.  In one study, undergraduate students 
who endorsed traumatic experiences as central to their identity and life story exhibited 
more symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) than did students who did not 
hold these beliefs (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007).  Similarly, symptoms of depression and 
PTSD were positively correlated with beliefs about the centrality of negative events in a 
sample of university students (Boals, 2010).  Yet a recent study found no difference in the 
extent to which depressed and never-depressed individuals rated the centrality of negative 
events (Newby & Moulds, 2011).  Investigating individual differences in the way that 
individuals construct narratives about experiences that are central to identity may help 
explain these divergent findings. 
Furthermore, given the theoretical role of autobiographical reasoning (both self-
event connections and sophistication of meaning) in the development of identity, it seems 
reasonable to expect more of this type of processing in relation to events that are 
subjectively appraised as more rather than less central to identity.  This assumption raises 
questions about the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning, however.  That is, if autobiographical reasoning is more prevalent in 
narratives of highly central negative events and, in turn, the centrality of negative events is 
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associated with poorer psychological functioning, then we might expect the amount of 
autobiographical reasoning in narratives of highly central negative events to be associated 
with poorer psychological functioning.  This scenario, however, does not take into account 
the way individuals‟ reason about themselves during this process of reflection.  Consistent 
with the research reviewed earlier (e.g., Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; Pals, 2006), it is 
possible that psychological functioning will not be compromised for individuals who make 
many positive connections to the self in the context of negative events that are perceived to 
be central to identity.  I tested this hypothesis by examining whether the relationship 
between the centrality of life story low points and psychological functioning was 
moderated by individual differences in the propensity to reason about the self in positive 
ways.  I predicted that endorsing low points as central to the life story and identity would 
not be associated with poor psychological functioning for young adults who tended to 
connect these experiences to positive characteristics or developments in the self.  For 
young adults who were less likely to connect these experiences to positive characteristics 
of the self, I predicted that endorsing low points as central to identity would be associated 
with poor psychological functioning. 
In summary, the aims of the current study were three-fold.  First I aimed to clarify 
and extend previous research by investigating associations between the amount/complexity 
of autobiographical reasoning, autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological 
functioning.  Second, I examined whether the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning (amount and complexity) and psychological functioning was moderated by the 
extent to which young adults reasoned about positive or negative characteristics of the self 
in narratives of life story high and low points.  Third I examined whether the extent to 
which young adults reasoned about positive characteristics of the self in narratives of life 
story low points moderated the relationship between beliefs about the centrality of these 
negative events and psychological functioning.   
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 98 undergraduate students (72% female) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
Participants received credit towards a course requirement of participation in research.  
Ages ranged from 17 to 28 years (M = 19.4 years, SD=2.1 years).  Seventy percent of 
participants identified as New Zealand European/Pakeha, 17 percent as New Zealand 
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Maori, 7 percent as Pasifika, and 21 percent as other (one in five participants identified 
with more than one ethnic background).   
Overview of Procedure 
Each session lasted for one hour and took place in psychology laboratories; 
participants (with numbers ranging between 2 and 8 per session) were seated at individual 
desks, separated by dividers.  Participants read a summary of the nature and purpose of the 
study and provided consent.  Following this, they completed a brief paper-based 
demographic questionnaire, measures of psychological distress and well-being, and an 
autobiographical narrative task through an online survey created by the researcher.  The 
order in which the autobiographical narrative task and psychological functioning measures 
were completed was counterbalanced.  The Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006) was completed after each written narrative, also through the online survey tool.   
Tasks and measures 
Psychopathology. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). This self-report questionnaire measures three related negative emotional 
states: depression, anxiety and stress, each on a 14-item subscale.  Participants rate on a 
four-point scale how much each symptom applied to them over the past week (0= Did not 
apply to me at all, 3= Applied to me very much, or most of the time).  Consistent with 
previous research (Crawford & Henry, 2003), a total DASS score was calculated by 
summing each of the subscales.  Internal consistency for the DASS total score within the 
current sample was .97. 
Psychological well-being. Ryff’s scales of psychological well-being (Ryff & 
Keyes, 1995). This self-report questionnaire measures six dimensions of psychological 
well-being; autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with 
others, purpose in life, self-acceptance.  Each subscale consists of 14 items, some which 
are positively and others that are negatively phrased.  Participants record their level of 
agreement with each statement on a 6-point Likert scale (1=Strongly disagree, 6=Strongly 
agree).  Consistent with previous research (see Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005), a 
mean psychological well-being score was calculated by aggregating across each of the six 
sub- scales.  Internal consistency for the composite well-being score in the current sample 
was .97.   
Autobiographical narrative task. Life story narratives were attained through an 
autobiographical narrative task.  Participants were asked to provide written narratives of 
two high- and two low-points from their life story,  modified from McAdams‟ guided 
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autobiography and widely used in previous research (McAdams, 2006; available 
athttp://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/guided/; see also McLean & Breen, 
2009; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008).  High points were defined as “moments or episodes in 
a person‟s life in which he or she feels a sense of happiness, joy, excitement, contentment 
or some other positive emotion”.  Low points were defined as “moments or episodes in a 
person‟s life in which he or she feels extremely negative emotions such as despair, 
disillusionment, guilt, shame etc.”  Participants were asked to describe each of the two 
high and low points in some detail, and to consider the following in their descriptions: how 
old they were when the event occurred, what happened in the event, who was involved in 
the event, what they were thinking, feeling, and wanting in the event, why they think that 
this is an important event in their life story and what the event says about who they are.  
All participants provided their written narratives in the following order: high point, low 
point, low point, high point. 
Centrality of narrated event. Centrality of Events Scale (7-item version) (CES-
7; Berntsen& Rubin, 2006). This self-report questionnaire measures the extent to which a 
remembered event is central to an individual‟s personal identity, a reference point for the 
meaning imbued onto other remembered events, and their life story.  After participants 
completed their written narratives, they were given the following instructions “Thinking 
about this event, please answer these questions by selecting a number from 1 to 5”.  
Participants then recorded their level of agreement with a series of seven statements on a 
5-point Likert scale (1=totally disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 5=totally agree).  
Questions included “I feel that this event has become part of my identity” and “This event 
has coloured the way I think and feel about other experiences”.  The short, 7-item 
centrality of events scale has been shown to have good psychometric properties 
(Cronbach‟s alpha = .88; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and internal consistency for the current 
sample was .89. 
Narrative coding 
All written narratives were separated from their centrality ratings and coded by the 
first author.  Twenty-two percent of narratives were coded by an independent coder who 
was blind to the hypotheses of the study.  Inter-rater reliability (Kappas) are reported for 
each code. 
Sophistication of meaning. Following McLean and Pratt (2006), each written 
narrative was coded according to a linear, 4-point scale, with higher scores reflecting 
greater complexity of meaning.  A score of zero was given when there was no explanation 
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of what the event meant for the individual.  A score of 1 was given if the narrative 
included mention of a specific lesson the individual learnt from the event, which had 
implications for future behaviour.  A score of 2 was given if the meaning of the event for 
the individual was mentioned, but vague in terms of detail.  For example, narratives given 
a code 2 may have mentioned a change or growth in the self, but the specific details were 
not clear. Finally, a score of 3 was given to narratives that described how the individual 
gained a clear emotional, psychological, or relational insight into the self as a result of the 
event.  Inter-rater agreement for the sophistication of meaning scale was kappa .80.  
Self-event connections. Following McLean and Fournier (2008), self-event 
connections were coded as any statements where participants explicitly linked an aspect of 
the narrated event to their sense of self. The number of self-event connections was 
calculated on a per narrative basis and inter-rater agreement for the total number of 
connections was kappa .81.  Each self-event connection was coded for valence according 
to a coding scheme developed by the first author. For the purposes of reliability coding, 
self-event connections that were identified by both coders (89% of connections identified 
by the first coder) were compared for valence. The coding scheme for valence consisted of 
four mutually exclusive categories (0=neutral connection; 1=positive connection; 
2=negative connection; 3=mixed positive and negative connection).  Self-event 
connections were coded as positive when the statement referred to a positive characteristic 
of the self, mentioned personal growth, or denoted a positive evaluation of the self (e.g., 
“This event made me stronger”).  Self-event connections were coded as negative when the 
statement referenced a negative characteristic of the self, or denoted a negative evaluation 
of the self (e.g., “this event is one of the main causes for the long term depression that I 
experience”).  Self-event connections were coded as neutral when there was no evaluation 
of the self, or the connection was not clearly positive or negative (e.g., “this experience 
changed how I think about the world”).  Self-event connections were coded as mixed when 
the connection involved elements of both positive and negative meaning. These were often 
situations where participants had learnt something (and thus could be considered an 
experience involving growth), but where the lesson learnt had negative connotations (e.g. 
“This experience taught me about the harsh realities of life”).   
Self-event connections were only recorded as positive or negative if: the self-
characteristic highlighted was explicitly referred to as positive or negative by the 
participant (e.g., “It was a great experience because it taught me how to be independent” – 
positive; “It has helped me over the last year, but in a negative way” - negative), or if it 
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satisfied common cultural understandings of desirable and undesirable characteristics (e.g., 
“I gained a lot of self-confidence” – positive, and “This [event] has made me more 
paranoid” – negative).  Inter-rater agreement for the valence of self-event connections was 
kappa .79. 
Results 
Overview of analysis 
This section first presents descriptive statistics relating to key measures followed 
by correlation, regression and moderation analyses for each of the hypotheses.  Second, 
results for the hypothesis that, reasoning about the self in positive and negative ways 
would moderate the relationship between autobiographical reasoning (amount and 
complexity) and psychological functioning are presented.  Results for the hypothesis that 
reasoning about the self in positive ways would moderate the relationship between beliefs 
about the centrality of negative events and psychological functioning are presented third.  
As the focus of this second hypothesis was on negative life experiences, only data 
pertaining to low points is presented. 
Descriptive statistics 
 On average, low point narratives (M = 410 words, SD = 181, range = 85-865 
words) were significantly longer than high point narratives (M = 361 words, SD = 156, 
range = 95-1,084 words; t (97) = 3.79, p < .05).   To maximise consistency with previous 
research (McLean et al., 2010; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 2010), the means and 
standard deviations for the narrative variables and centrality of event ratings are reported 
on a per narrative/event basis (Table 4.1).  Of note, participants made more sophisticated 
meaning in narratives of high points than in narratives of low points (t (97) = 3.75, p < 
.05), whereas the number of self-event connections was similar in narratives of low and 
high points (t (97) = 1.11, p > .05).  The majority of self-event connections in narratives of 
high points described a positive characteristic/outcome for the self (92%) and very few 
(3%) described a negative characteristic/outcome for the self. Slightly more than half 
(56%) of all self-event connections in narratives of low points described the self in a 
positive way while one-quarter (25%) described the self in a negative way.  Centrality 
ratings for high points and low points were similar (t (97) = .13, p > .05) and both were 
considered highly central to identity. 
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Table 4.1 
Means and percentages for narrative variables and centrality ratings across memory type 
 Low points High points Total 
1. Sophistication (0-3) 1.65 (.96) 2.00 (.92) 1.82 (.82) 
2. Number of self-event connections 1.50 (.99) 1.60 (.87) 1.55 (.83) 
3. Positive self-event connections (%) 56.0 91.8 74.1 
4. Negative self-event connections (%) 25.4 2.9 15.2 
5. Neutral self-event connections (%) 9.1 4.1 5.8 
6. Mixed self-event connections (%) 10.7 1.3 5.6 
7. Centrality of event (0-35) 27.73 (4.53) 27.80(4.83) 27.78 (3.77) 
 
Pearson correlations examined the associations amongst the key narrative variables 
(Table 4.2).  Neither the amount (number of self-event connections) nor the complexity 
(sophistication) of autobiographical reasoning found across narratives of high and low 
points (combined) correlated significantly with total DASS scores or total RYFF scores 
(all ps > .05).  The number of positive self-event connections was inversely associated 
with total DASS scores, and positively associated with mean RYFF scores.  In 
comparison, the number of negative self-event connections was positively associated with 
total DASS scores, and inversely associated with mean RYFF scores.  These findings 
suggest that making more positive self-event connections is associated with lower levels of 
psychopathology and higher levels of psychological well-being, while making more 
negative self-event connections is associated with higher levels of psychopathology and 
poorer well-being.  Controlling for verbosity (word count of narratives) did not alter the 
significance of any of these associations (rs = -.42 to .40, all ps < .05). 
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Table 4.2 
Correlations amongst narrative variables and psychopathology/well-being scales 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Sophistication -        
2. Number of connections (average)   .82** -       
3. Positive connections (average)   .68**   .88** -      
4. Negative connections (average)   .38** .35** -.08 -     
5. Neutral connections (average) .15 .14 .03 -.13 -    
6. Mixed connections (average) .19 .35** .21* .06 -.15 -   
7. Negative emotional states (DASS) -.03 -.11 -.28**   .39** -.16 .00 -  
8. Psychological well-being (RYFF)   .01   .09   .31** -.40** .06 -.12 -.64** - 
*p< .05, **p< .01 
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Predictors of psychological functioning 
Regression analyses assessed which narrative variables (positive and negative self-
event connections) in which context (narratives of positive and negative life events) were 
the strongest predictor of psychopathology and psychological well-being. Total DASS and 
RYFF scores were entered separately as dependent variables. The numbers of positive, 
negative, neutral and mixed connections found in high points and low points were entered 
as predictor variables using the stepwise method. Two predictors (number of positive and 
negative connections in low points) explained 19% of the variance in DASS scores 
(R
2
=.19, F(2,95) = 11.04, p <.01).  That is, young adults‟ experiences of psychopathology 
were predicted by higher numbers of negative connections and lower numbers of positive 
self-event connections in narratives of low points.  Three predictors (number of negative 
connections in low points, number of negative and positive connections in high points) 
explained 24% of the variance in RYFF scores (R
2
=.24, F(3,94) = 9.93,p <.01). That is, 
fewer negative connections in narratives of high and low points and higher numbers of 
positive connections in narratives of high points predicted young adults‟ psychological 
well-being.  Significant predictors are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
Table 4.3 
Stepwise regression of narrative variables in the prediction of DASS scores 
Predictors of psychological distress B SE B  
(Constant) 35.05 4.70  
Number of negative connections in low points  15.34 4.71 .31** 
Number of positive connections in low points -9.30 3.48 -.25** 
Notes: R
2
 = .19, (ps< .05),  **p< .01  
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Table 4.4 
Stepwise regression of narrative variables in the prediction of RYFF scores 
Predictors of psychological well-being B SE B  
(Constant) 59.16 1.89  
Number of negative connections in low points  -5.66 1.58 -.34** 
Number of negative connections in high points  -10.80 4.56 -.22** 
Number of positive connections in high points 3.11 1.10 .26** 
Notes: R
2
 = .24, (ps< .05),  **p< .01  
 
Moderation of relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning, by autobiographical reasoning valence 
Moderation analyses were conducted with the number of self-event connections 
and sophistication of meaning as main effects, proportion of positive/negative connections 
(relative to total) as the moderating variables, and psychopathology (DASS scores) and 
psychological well-being (RYFF scores) as the outcome variables.  Only those participants 
who made at least one self-event connection in low point narratives (n=85) and high point 
narratives (n=90) could be included in the analyses.  As neutral and mixed connections 
were not significantly associated with DASS or RYFF scores, only the proportion of 
positive (relative to total) connections and proportion of negative (relative to total) 
connections were included as moderating variables.  Moderation effects for low points are 
presented first, followed by high points.    
Narratives of life story low points. Amount/complexity of autobiographical 
reasoning and psychopathology (DASS). Hierarchical regression analyses first tested the 
hypotheses that the proportion of positive/negative connections would moderate the 
relationship between amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and DASS scores 
in the context of life story low points.  In the first set of analyses, number of self-event 
connections and sophistication ratings for narratives of low points were entered 
(separately) as main effects.  The proportion of negative self-event connections were also 
entered as a main effect.  The two-way interaction terms (number of connections x 
proportion negative connections and sophistication x negative connections) were entered 
in the second step.  There were no main effects for number of self-event connections (β = 
.01, p > .05) or sophistication of meaning (β = .11, p < .05); however, in both analyses, 
there were significant main effects for the proportion of negative self-event connections 
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(βs > .34, ps < .05), confirming the basic relationship that reasoning about the self in 
negative ways was associated with higher DASS scores.  There was also a significant 
interaction between number of connections and proportion negative connections (β = .25, p 
< .05), but no significant interaction between sophistication and negative connections at 
the 5% level (β = .20, p = .06).  
 To aid interpretation of these results, the interactions were graphed using 
ModGraph (Jose, 2004), a purpose-built tool for analysing moderation effects.  Simple 
slope statistics (Figure 4.1) revealed that in both sets of analyses, the slope for the high 
proportion of negative connections was significantly different from zero (slopes>10.09, ps 
< .05), while the slopes for medium and low proportion of negative connections were not 
different from zero (slopes = -9.17 to 4.28, ps > .05)
4
.  This finding suggests that for young 
adults who were more likely to link low point experiences to negative characteristics of the 
self, making more self-event connections and more sophisticated meaning in narratives of 
these experiences was associated with higher DASS scores.    
 
 
Figure 4.1. Moderation of the relationships between number of self-event connections, 
sophistication of meaning and DASS scores by proportion of negative self-event 
connections in narratives of low points 
  
                                                          
4
  Note, the slope for low proportion of negative self-event connections in the self-event connections to 
DASS relationship was significant at the 10% level (p=.08) 
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These analyses were then repeated for the proportion of positive self-event 
connections.  Consistent with the above analysis, there were no main effects for number of 
self-event connections or sophistication of meaning (βs < .16, ps > .05), but there were 
significant main effects for the proportion of positive self-event connections (βs > -.34, ps 
< .05), confirming the basic relationship that reasoning about the self in positive ways was 
associated with lower DASS scores.  A significant interaction was detected between 
number of self-event connections and proportion of positive connections (β = -.21, p < .05) 
but not between sophistication and positive connections (β = -.16, p > .05).  Further 
analysis with ModGraph showed that the proportion of positive connections moderated the 
relationship between DASS scores and sophistication of meaning, but not self-event 
connections.  Simple slope statistics revealed that the slope between sophistication and 
DASS scores for young adults who made the lowest proportion of positive connections 
was significantly different from zero (slope = 12.06, t(81) = 2.32, p < .05, remaining 
slopes = 0.46 to 6.26, ps > .05).  Although in the expected direction, none of the slopes 
between number of self-event connections and DASS scores were significantly different 
from zero (slopes = -5.89 to 9.39, ps > .05).  These findings suggest that for young adults 
who were the least likely to connect low point experiences to positive characteristics of the 
self, more sophisticated meaning in narratives of low points, but not more self-event 
connections, was associated with higher DASS scores. 
Amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and psychological well-being 
(RYFF scores).The above analyses were repeated with RYFF scores as the outcome 
variable
5
.  In contrast to the above findings for the DASS, significant moderation effects 
were detected for the proportion of positive, but not negative self-event connections.  
Simple slope analyses (Figure 4.2) revealed that for young adults who were the least likely 
to connect low point experiences to positive characteristics of the self, making more self-
event connections and more sophisticated meaning in narratives of low points was 
associated with lower RYFF scores (slopes < -3.19, ps < .05; remaining slopes = -2.20 to 
0.92, ps > .05).  Young adults‟ propensity to connect low point experiences to negative 
characteristics of the self did not alter the relationship between self-event 
connections/sophistication of meaning and RYFF scores (slopes = -2.89 to 1.34, ps > .05).   
  
                                                          
5
 In the interest of preserving space, the results for the regressions associated with these analyses are not 
discussed. 
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Narratives of life story high points. Each of the above analyses were then 
repeated for narratives of life story high points.  In contrast to the findings for narratives of 
low points, no significant moderation effects were detected for high points.  That is, young 
adults‟ propensity to make positive/negative self-event connections in narratives of life 
story high points did not alter the relationships between the amount (self-event 
connections) and complexity (sophistication) of autobiographical reasoning and DASS 
scores (all slopes = -6.43 to 4.21, ps > .05), nor did it alter the relationships between 
amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and RYFF scores (all slopes = -1.72 to 
3.26, ps > .05).   
 
 
Figure 4.2. Moderation of the relationships between number of self-event connections, 
sophistication of meaning and RYFF scores by proportion of positive self-event 
connections in narratives of low points 
In summary, reasoning about the self in positive/negative ways moderated the 
relationship between amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning in relation to low, but not high, points.  For young adults who demonstrated 
the strongest tendency to make negative self-event connections in narratives of low points, 
making more self-event connections and more sophisticated meaning was associated with 
higher DASS scores (psychological distress). Furthermore, for young adults who were the 
least likely to make positive self-event connections in narratives of low points, making 
more self-event connections and more sophisticated meaning was associated with lower 
RYFF scores (poorer psychological well-being).  The extent to which young adults 
reasoned about the self in positive or negative ways did not alter the relationships between 
amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning. 
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Moderation of relationship between centrality of event ratings for low points and 
psychological functioning, by autobiographical reasoning valence 
Pearson correlations first examined the associations amongst the narrative 
variables, centrality ratings for high and low points, and DASS and RYFF scores (Table 
4.5).  Centrality ratings for low and high points were positively associated with both 
sophistication of meaning and number of self-event connections.  This suggests that 
narratives containing more, and more complex, autobiographical reasoning were more 
likely to be considered central to identity.  Participants who rated low points as more 
central to identity made proportionately more negative (relative to total) connections than 
participants who rated low points as less central to identity.  Centrality of event ratings for 
low points were positively associated with DASS scores but not significantly related to 
RYFF scores, suggesting that centrality of event ratings for low points is a significant 
predictor of psychopathology but not psychological well-being.   
 
Table 4.5 
Correlations between centrality ratings for high and low points, narrative variables and 
psychopathology/well-being scales 
 Centrality of event ratings 
 Low points High points 
1. Sophistication   .31**   .27** 
2. Number of self-event connections   .30**   .34** 
3. Positive self-event connections (%) -.14 .06 
4. Negative self-event connections (%) .24* -.09 
5. Neutral self-event connections (%) .02 -.02 
6. Mixed self-event connections (%) -.12 .04 
7. Negative emotional states (DASS)   .30**   .03 
8. Psychological well-being (RYFF) -.13   .09 
*p< .05, **p< .01  
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Hierarchical regression analyses investigated the hypothesis that reasoning about 
the self in positive ways in the context of negative life events would moderate the 
relationship between the centrality of these events and DASS and RYFF scores.  
Moderation analyses were conducted with data from n=85 participants who made at least 
one self-event connection in their narratives of low points. In each regression, the two 
main effect variables - centrality of event ratings for low points and the proportion of 
positive self-event connections in low point narratives - were entered in the first step and 
the two-way (centrality x proportion of positive connections) interaction term was entered 
in the second step.  In each set of analyses, significant main effects for proportion of 
positive self-event connections (βs = -.32 to .43, ps < .05.) and significant (centrality x 
positive connections) interactions (βs = -.25 to .29, ps < .05) were found.  There was also a 
significant main effect for centrality of low points on DASS scores (β = .23, p < .05) but 
not RYFF scores (β = -.05, p > .05),  
Further analysis of these interactions with Modgraph revealed slightly different 
moderation effects for DASS and RYFF scores (Figure 4.3).  Simple slope statistics 
revealed that the slopes between centrality ratings and DASS scores were significantly 
different from zero for young adults who made the lowest proportion of positive self-event 
connections (slope = 3.15, t(81) = 5.04, p < .05) and medium proportion of positive self-
event connections (slope = 1.60, t(81) = 2.34, p < .05).  This finding suggests that for 
young adults who were the least likely, and who were moderately likely to connect low 
point experiences to positive characteristics of the self, greater centrality of event ratings 
were associated with higher DASS scores.  The slope for high proportion of positive self-
event connections was not significantly different from zero(slope = 0.05, t(81) = 0.07,  p > 
.05), suggesting that for young adults who demonstrated the strongest tendency to connect 
low point experiences to positive characteristics of the self, greater centrality of event 
ratings for low points were not associated with higher DASS scores. 
Simple slope statistics also showed that the slopes between centrality ratings and 
RYFF scores were significantly different from zero for young adults who made the lowest 
proportion of positive self-event connections (slope = -0.69, t(81) = -3.23, p < .05) and the 
highest proportion of positive connections (slope = 0.47, t(81) = 2.20, p < .05).  The slope 
for medium proportion of positive self-event connections was not significantly different 
from zero (slope = -0.11 , p > .05).  These findings suggest that greater centrality of event 
beliefs for low points were associated with higher RYFF scores for young adults who were 
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most likely to make positive self-event connections, and were associated with lower RYFF 
scores for young adults who were least likely to make positive self-event connections.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Moderation of the relationship between DASS scores, RYFF scores and 
centrality of event ratings for low points by proportion of positive self-event connections 
in narratives of low points 
 
In summary, endorsing life story low points as central to identity and the life story 
was associated with higher levels of psychopathology and poorer psychological well-
being, but not for young adults who were more likely to make self-event connections that 
described the self in positive ways in narratives of these experiences. For young adults 
who were the most likely to make positive self-event connections in narratives of low 
points, greater centrality of event beliefs were unrelated to psychopathology, and were 
associated with an increase in psychological well-being. 
 
Discussion 
The aims of the current study were three-fold.  The first aim was to clarify the 
relationships between amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning, autobiographical 
reasoning valence (positive/negative self-event connections) and psychological 
functioning.  The second aim was to investigate whether the individual differences in the 
propensity to make positive or negative self-event connections in narratives of high and 
low points moderated the relationship between autobiographical reasoning (amount and 
complexity) found in these narratives, and psychological functioning.  The third and final 
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aim was to explore whether the relationship between psychological functioning and the 
centrality of negative events was moderated by individual differences in the propensity to 
make positive self-event connections in narratives of these experiences.  
With respect to the first aim, findings showed that neither total number of self-
event connections nor sophistication of meaning across narratives of high and low points 
(combined) was associated with psychopathology (DASS scores) or psychological well-
being (RYFF scores).  Earlier findings regarding these relationships are mixed.  For 
example, McLean et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between sophistication of 
meaning and a combined measure of self-esteem and reverse scored depression for older 
adolescents.  Yet an earlier study found no relationship between sophistication of meaning 
and self-esteem for older adolescents (McLean & Breen, 2009).  The measures used in the 
current, and previous, studies did however, differ slightly (self-esteem and depression 
versus a broader measure of psychopathology and psychological well-being).  While low 
self-esteem is associated with psychopathology (Trzesniewski et al., 2006), the 
relationship is somewhat controversial (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).  
Thus the extent to which similar patterns of associations might be expected between 
autobiographical reasoning and these various measures is uncertain.  Overall however, the 
current findings suggest that the core processes of autobiographical reasoning (amount and 
complexity) are not associated with psychopathology and psychological well-being in 
young adulthood. 
Both the number of self-event connections and sophistication of meaning ratings 
were similar across narratives of high and low points.  This finding is consistent with 
earlier work (McLean, et al., 2010) and suggests that young adults may draw equally on 
high and low point events for identity development (McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008).  It is 
also important to note that the number of self-event connections in participants‟ narratives 
was slightly lower than that recorded in earlier work with younger adults (McLean & 
Fournier, 2008), possibly reflecting differences in the instructions used to elicit life story 
narratives.  Writing about „self-defining memories‟ as employed in these previous studies 
(McLean & Fournier, 2008; Singer & Moffit, 1991-1992) may highlight linkages between 
event and self more so than does than writing about high and low points from the life 
story.  One limitation of the current study was that gender differences could not be 
examined in any of the effects due to small group numbers.  Earlier work has highlighted 
gender differences in the length and detail of autobiographical narratives, and in the 
qualities of autobiographical reasoning found in autobiographical narratives (McLean & 
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Breen, 2009; Zaman & Fivush, 2011).  Further research comparing the relationships 
between the components of autobiographical reasoning examined in the current study and 
psychological functioning for males and females is required. 
Also with respect to the first aim, findings highlighted differences in the 
association between the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in narratives of high 
and low points and the two measures of psychological functioning.  Young adults who 
made more positive self-event connections and fewer negative self-event connections in 
narratives of low points experienced lower levels of psychopathology than did young 
adults who made fewer positive, and more negative, connections in relation to low points.  
In comparison, young adults who made fewer negative self-event connections in narratives 
of low and high points, and more positive connections in high points experienced higher 
levels of psychological well-being than did young adults who made more negative 
connections in low and high points, and fewer positive connections in high points.  These 
previously untested associations suggest that autobiographical reasoning valence is a valid 
predictor of psychological functioning in young adulthood, but that the exact nature of the 
relationships may depend on whether the narrated event is positive or negative.  These 
findings raise the possibility that psychological well-being is associated with the way 
young adults process information about the self in both positive and negative experiences, 
whereas psychopathology is associated primarily with the way information about the self 
is processed in relation to negative experiences.   
Does autobiographical reasoning valence moderate the relationship between 
amount/complexity of autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning? 
With respect to the second aim, the question of whether individual differences in 
the propensity to make self-event connections that described the self in positive or negative 
ways would moderate the relationship between autobiographical reasoning (amount and 
complexity) and psychological functioning was explored.  Individual differences in the 
propensity to make positive/negative self-event connections were calculated as the number 
of positive/negative self-event connections relative to total connections made.   
Significant moderation effects were detected in relation to narratives of low, but 
not high points.  Consistent with our predictions, for young adults who showed the 
strongest tendency to link their experiences to negative characteristics of the self, making 
more self-event connections and describing deeper insights into the self in narratives of 
low points was associated with higher levels of psychopathology.  This pattern was not 
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evident for young adults who showed a moderate or little tendency to reason about the self 
in negative ways.   
Although the correlational nature of our analysis prevents firm conclusions being 
drawn, there are at least three possible explanations as to why more, and more complex, 
autobiographical reasoning in the context of low points was associated with higher levels 
of psychopathology for young adults who reasoned about the self in predominantly 
negative ways.  First, from a constructionist perspective (see McLean et al., 2007; 
Pasupathi, 2001) forming a narrative whereby the self is assigned negative attributes may 
encourage the narrator to believe that they hold these attributes which, in turn, may induce 
negative emotional experiences and symptoms of psychopathology.  A second perspective 
is that young adults who experience high levels of psychopathology may simply be more 
likely to reflect on the negative aspects of themselves when asked to narrate a low point 
from their life story.  This interpretation is consistent with research showing that 
individuals who experience higher levels of psychological distress are more likely to 
favour negative views of the self and show a reduced capacity to derive positive 
information about the self from autobiographical memory (Blaney, 1986; Gara et al., 1993; 
Habermas et al., 2008; Mansell & Clark, 1999; Swales, Williams, & Wood, 2001; 
Williams et al., 2007).  A third, and perhaps most likely, possibility is that both of these 
scenarios exist in unison.  Young adults who experience psychological distress may be 
more likely to reason about the self in negative ways, which in turn fosters and maintains a 
negative view of the self that in turn contributes to negative emotional experiences.  This 
view is complemented by models of psychopathology that suggest depressed affect is 
intensified by the interaction between negative cognition (e.g. negative attribution style) 
and rumination (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007).  That is, young adults who experience 
psychological distress may ruminate about negative features of the self (through 
autobiographical reasoning), which in turn amplifies experiences of psychological distress.   
Experimental or longitudinal research is needed to ascertain which of these 
scenarios best accounts for the findings of the current study.  Future research could assess 
whether psychological functioning can be improved by encouraging participants to form 
positive, in place of negative, self-event connections.  Earlier writing studies aimed at 
encouraging cognitive processing of negative life events have had some success at 
improving physical well-being and mood symptoms following traumatic experiences with 
this methodology (see Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Smyth, Hockmeyer, & Tulloch, 2008).  
It is important to note, however, that age and the developmental stage of participants are 
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critical factors to consider in relation to such tasks, as unstructured narrative tasks have 
been shown to increase psychological distress in children who may lack the regulatory and 
narrative skills to engage in adaptive reflection (Fivush, Marin, Crawford, Reynolds, & 
Brewin, 2007).  Furthermore, Honos-Webb, Harrick, Stiles and Park (2000) found some 
preliminary evidence that expressive writing tasks may increase health centre visits for 
participants who are re-exposed to traumatic experiences and who are unable to resolve 
these experiences within the bounds of the study.   
While the findings did show that more and more complex reasoning was associated 
with poorer psychological functioning for young adults who were the least likely to make 
positive connections, there was no evidence that more and more complex forms of 
autobiographical reasoning were associated with positive psychological functioning for 
young adults who were the most likely to reason about the self in positive ways.  These 
findings may suggest that young adults who have a largely positive view of the self 
experience similar levels of psychological functioning regardless of the extent to which 
they reflect on these qualities in life story narratives.  This interpretation is consistent with 
earlier work which has shown that insight into the self, self-awareness of thoughts and 
emotions, but not self-reflection is associated with positive psychological well-being 
(Harrington & Loffredo, 2011). 
The absence of moderation effects for high points suggests that amount and 
complexity of autobiographical reasoning in narratives of positive events is not related to 
an increase/decrease in psychological functioning, even when analysed by individual 
differences in the propensity to link these experiences to positive or negative 
characteristics of the self.  This finding is consistent with earlier theoretical and empirical 
work suggesting that deriving meaning from negative events is more consequential for 
psychological functioning than deriving meaning from positive events (e.g. Lyubomirsky, 
Sousa & Dickerhoof, 2006; Pals, 2006; Park, 2008, 2010).  For example, Lyubomirsky et 
al. (2006) suggest that while savouring positive experiences is associated with 
psychological well-being, evaluating or reasoning about the meaning of positive 
experiences may force individuals to process the experience in an unhelpful way.  There is, 
however, an alternative methodological explanation for the absence of moderation effects 
for high points.  Almost all (92%) self-event connections found in narratives of high points 
were positive, which meant there was little variation between young adults who were the 
most and least likely to reason about positive/negative characteristics of the self in high 
points.   
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Does autobiographical reasoning valence moderate the relationship between 
centrality of negative events and psychological functioning? 
In relation to the third aim, findings showed that the tendency to make connections 
between negative experiences and positive characteristics of the self acted as a buffer 
against experiences of psychopathology and poor psychological well-being under 
conditions where these low points were considered central to identity.  That is, endorsing 
low points as central to identity was associated with higher levels of psychopathology and 
poor psychological well-being, but not for young adults who were most likely to make 
positive self-event connections in narratives of these experiences.   For young adults who 
were most likely to connect low points to positive characteristics of the self, greater 
centrality of event ratings were not related to psychopathology and were associated with an 
increase in psychological well-being. 
These findings may help to clarify previously mixed results reported in the 
literature.  While some earlier studies have reported a link between centrality of event 
ratings for negative or traumatic events and psychological distress (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006; Boals, 2010), other studies found no evidence for such a relationship (Newby & 
Moulds, 2011).  No previous work has taken account of the way in which individuals 
reason about the self in relation to these experiences.  In doing so, the current findings 
suggest that endorsing negative experiences as being a central component of one‟s identity 
and life story is not associated with poor psychological functioning if the experience is 
linked to predominantly positive characteristics or outcomes for the self.  These findings 
are also consistent with previous theoretical and empirical work that has highlighted the 
psychological benefits of identifying positive outcomes for the self when reflecting on 
negative life experiences (Davis et al., 1998; King et al., 2000; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 
2011; Pals, 2006; Stein et al., 1997). 
Of course, the correlational nature of our analysis again prevents any firm 
conclusions being made about the mechanisms underlying this moderation effect.  One 
possibility is that focusing on positive outcomes and characteristics of the self in the face 
of negative experiences is an adaptive strategy that individuals use to help them manage 
the difficult task of integrating these events into their life story/identity.   Alternatively, 
individuals who function well in the context of major difficult life events may be more 
likely to reason about positive developments and characteristics of the self in relation to 
these negative experiences, and endorsing these events as central to identity and the life 
story poses no threat to this level of functioning.   
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In summary, the results of the current study extend previous work by showing that 
the valence of autobiographical reasoning (linking experiences to positive/negative 
characteristics of the self) is an important predictor of psychological functioning.  
Furthermore, individual differences in the propensity to link negative experiences to 
positive/negative characteristics of the self influences two key relationships: first, the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning (amount and complexity) and 
psychological functioning and second, the relationship between the centrality of negative 
events and psychological functioning.  Future research into the association between life 
story development and psychological functioning will be enhanced by considering this key 
individual difference. 
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Chapter Five 
Study 1b: Does the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in life story 
narratives contribute to changes in psychological functioning over time? A pilot 
analysis 
Study 1b was designed to explore, in a preliminary manner, the issue of 
directionality in the relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and 
psychological functioning.  One of the major challenges for research investigating links 
between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning is determining where 
the direction of influence lies within the relationship between these factors (McLean & 
Mansfield, 2010).  This challenge has been addressed by a small number of studies which 
have employed longitudinal designs in favour of the cross-sectional designs, and have 
provided somewhat mixed findings (Pals, 2006; Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012).   
Sutin, Costa, Wethington, and Eaton (2010) asked adults participating in a wider 
longitudinal study to complete a general measure of psychological distress (measuring 
anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms and social dysfunction) at two time points ten 
years apart.  At the second time point, participants were asked to report the most stressful 
life event that had happened in their lives over the past ten years.  Participants then 
reported whether they had learnt a lesson from the experience.  Findings showed that 
learning a lesson from the experience was unrelated to psychological distress at Time 2 
(controlling for psychological distress at Time 1).  In explaining this unexpected finding, 
Sutin et al. (2010) suggested that for many participants, the stressful event may not yet 
have been fully resolved and thus the wider benefit of gaining important life lessons may 
not have been fully realised.  It is also important to note that the measure of lesson learning 
used in this study required a simple „yes‟ or „no‟ answer to the question of whether a 
lesson had been learnt.  This indicator is more restricted than, and represents the lowest 
level of meaning as described in, McLean and Thorne‟s (2003) original coding scheme.  
This study did not, therefore, address the question of whether changes in psychological 
distress over time are associated with more sophisticated forms of meaning.    
In contrast to the findings of Sutin et al. (2010), Tavernier and Willoughby (2012)
6
 
found that young adults who engaged in autobiographical reasoning (as measured by 
lesson learning and gaining insight into the self) in relation to turning point events 
                                                          
6
   The study by Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) is outlined in more detail in Chapter Two. 
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experienced better psychological functioning
7
after the event than young adults who 
demonstrated no evidence of autobiographical reasoning following turning point events.  
Differences in psychological functioning between young adults who engaged in reasoning 
and those who did not were present after controlling for baseline psychological 
functioning.  Findings also showed that psychological functioning at one time point did not 
predict whether young adults engaged in autobiographical reasoning following a turning 
point experience.  Two conclusions were drawn from these findings.  First, pre-existing 
levels of psychological functioning do not alter whether or not autobiographical reasoning 
occurs.  Second, the process of autobiographical reasoning itself may account for changes 
in psychological functioning over time.   
The findings of Study 1a showed that the valence of autobiographical reasoning, 
measured as self-event connections that describe positive and negative characteristics of 
the self, is a stronger predictor of psychological functioning than the amount of 
autobiographical reasoning found in life stories constructed by young adults.  Specifically, 
young adults who experienced more negative emotional states such as depression, anxiety 
and stress were more likely to reason about negative features of the self and less likely to 
reason about positive features of the self than young adults with better psychological 
functioning.  While these findings provide evidence of a concurrent relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning, the cross-sectional 
design of the study prevents any conclusions relating to the directionality of this 
relationship to be made. 
McLean, Pasupathi, and Pals (2007) suggest that at a theoretical level, the valence 
of autobiographical reasoning may actively contribute to positive psychological 
functioning.  Specifically, connecting past experiences to positive outcomes or 
characteristics of the self contributes to the development of a life story (and hence identity) 
that contains within it, positive qualities of the self (e.g. personal strength, increased self-
confidence).  This positive view of the self, as expressed through the life story, in turn 
promotes positive psychological functioning and can moderate the potential negative 
emotional impact of past, present and future events (McLean et al., 2007).   
Just one study to date has investigated the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning valence and psychological functioning over time.  Pals (2006) defined positive 
self-transformation as the combination of statements expressing an openness to exploring 
                                                          
7
   In this study, psychological functioning was defined in terms of reverse-coded symptoms of depression 
and anxiety, and self-esteem.   
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the effect of one‟s experience on the self, and statements describing positive outcomes 
from negative experiences
8
.  Adult women, who, at one time point, constructed life story 
narratives containing themes of positive self-transformation, were more satisfied with their 
lives and demonstrated greater self-understanding and emotional maturity almost ten years 
later.  This study did not, however, control for indicators of psychological functioning at 
time one which meant that themes of positive self-transformation could not be reliably 
linked to changes in psychological functioning over time.   
The current study was designed to address the lack of research examining issues of 
directionality in the relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and 
psychological functioning.  Before outlining the specific aims and hypotheses of this 
study, it is important to note that the sample for this study was drawn from the pool of 
participants who completed Study 1a.  Although all participants were invited to participate, 
only a small number (n = 21, 21% of the original sample) completed this study.  For this 
reason, the following study can be considered a pilot only.  
The aims of this study were two-fold.  The first aim was to examine whether 
engaging in autobiographical reasoning that describes the self in positive and negative 
terms remains stable over time or fluctuates according to varying levels of psychological 
distress.  Pasupathi (2012) notes that one of the key limitations of cross-sectional studies 
on autobiographical reasoning is that we, as researchers, only see a snapshot of this 
process at one point in time.  Rather, Pasupathi (2012) suggests that autobiographical 
reasoning is a process which likely evolves over time as individuals discuss events with 
others and gain new perspectives on past events (see also, Pasupathi, 2001).  In light of no 
prior work examining the stability of autobiographical reasoning valence, the question of 
whether positive and negative autobiographical reasoning would be correlated over time 
was left open.  A second aim of the current study was to explore key relationships between 
the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in young adults‟ life story narratives and 
changes in psychological functioning over time.   In accordance with the theoretical notion 
that engaging in positively/negatively valenced autobiographical reasoning would have a 
direct impact on psychological functioning, the following hypothesis was made.  After 
controlling for baseline levels of psychological distress, young adults who were more 
likely to reason about the self in negative ways (i.e. make more negative self-event 
connections) in life story narratives would experience an increase in psychological distress 
                                                          
8
   This study by Pals (2006) is described in more detail in Chapter Two 
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over the course of a year, while young adults who were more likely to reason about the self 
in positive ways (i.e. make more positive self-event connections) in life story narratives 
would experience a decrease in psychological distress over the course of a year.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants from Study 1a were invited to take part in a follow-up study 
approximately one year following participation in the initial study.  Approximately one-
fifth (21%, n=21) of participants from time one agreed to take part.  Table 5.1 compares 
demographic characteristics for the young adults who participated in Study 1b at Time 2 
with the characteristics of the total sample of participants who completed Study 1a.   
On average, participants who completed Study 1b at Time 2 were just over one 
year older than the total pool of participants who completed Study 1a one year prior (M = 
19.4 years at Time 1 and M = 20.8 years at Time 2, p < .05).  This significant difference is 
expected, and reflects the 12 month gap that existed between the two time points.  The 
majority of participants who participated in Study 1b at Time 2 were female (85%).  This 
is significantly higher than the 72% of participants who were female in Study 1a at Time 1 
(X
2
 = 8.05, p < .05).  There were no significant differences in the ethnicity of participants 
at Time 1 or Time 2 (X
2
= 2.33, p > .05).  There was no significant difference in the 
average number of self-event connections made by participants in Study 1a and Study 1b 
(t(31) = 1.16, p > .05) nor was there a significant difference in DASS scores between 
participants in Study 1a and Study 1b (t(32) = .303, p > .05).  Participants received 
vouchers to a local cinema as a token of appreciation for their participation. 
Overview of Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in the follow-up study via email and those 
who agreed to take part completed the follow-up session through an online survey created 
in Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT).  Participants first read a summary of the 
nature and purpose of the study and provided consent.  Following this, they completed the 
same autobiographical narrative task as completed at time one and also completed the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) as a measure of psychological distress.   
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Table 5.1 
Differences in participant characteristics and autobiographical reasoning measures at 
Time 1 and Time 2 (one year later) 
Measure Time 1 Time 2 
Age M = 19.4 yrs (SD = 2.1 yrs) M = 20.8 yrs (SD = 2.6 yrs) 
Gender 72% female 85% female 
Ethnicity 70% NZ European 70% NZ European 
Average number of     
self-event connections 
M = 1.55 (SD = .83) M = 1.33 (SD = .75) 
Total  DASS scores M = 32.94 (SD = 30.36) M = 30.95 (SD = 26.71) 
 
 
Tasks and measures 
 The tasks and measures used at time are described in more detail in Chapter Four. 
Psychological distress. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995).This self-report questionnaire measures three related negative emotional 
states: depression, anxiety and stress, each on a 14-item subscale.  Participants rate on a 
four-point scale how much each symptom applied to them over the past week (0= Did not 
apply to me at all, 3= Applied to me very much, or most of the time).  Consistent with 
previous research (Crawford & Henry, 2003), a total DASS score was calculated by 
summing each of the subscales.  Internal consistency for the DASS total score within the 
current sample of 21 participants was .97. 
Autobiographical narrative task. Life story narratives were attained through an 
autobiographical narrative task modified from McAdams‟ guided autobiography 
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/guided/.  Participants were asked to 
provide written narratives of two high points, “moments or episodes in a person‟s life in 
which he or she feels a sense of happiness, joy, excitement, contentment or some other 
positive emotion” and two low points, “moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which he 
or she feels extremely negative emotions such as despair, disillusionment, guilt, shame 
etc.” from their life story.   
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Narrative coding 
Self-event connections. Following the procedure outline in Study 1a (Chapter 
Four), self-event connections were coded as any statements where participants explicitly 
linked an aspect of the narrated event to their sense of self.  Fifty-two percent of narratives 
were coded by an independent coder.  Consistent with the approach taken in Study 1a, the 
number of self-event connections was calculated on a per narrative basis and inter-rater 
agreement for the total number of connections was kappa .86.  Each self-event connection 
was coded for valence (0=neutral connection; 1=positive connection; 2=negative 
connection; 3=mixed positive and negative connection).  As per Study 1a, self-event 
connections that were identified by both coders (91% of connections identified by the first 
coder) were compared for valence.  Inter-rater agreement for the valence of self-event 
connections was kappa .80. 
Results 
The following results should be treated as indicative only due to the small number 
of participants included in the analysis.  To examine the hypothesis that young adults‟ 
tendency to engage in autobiographical reasoning that describes the self in 
positive/negative ways would remain stable over time, Pearson correlations compared 
relationships between the number of negative self-event connections and the number of 
positive self-event connections found at the two time points.  The number of negative self-
event connections made at time one and time two were significantly correlated (r =.48, p < 
.05).  The number of positive self-event connections made at time one and time two were 
not significantly correlated (r =.34, p > .05).  Symptoms of psychological distress (DASS 
scores) at time one and time two were significantly correlated (r =.54, p < .05).   
To further examine the stability of the relationship between the number of negative 
self-event connections made at time one and time two, a partial correlation was conducted 
between the number of negative self-event connections made at time one and time two, 
controlling for change in DASS scores.  Controlling for change in DASS scores between 
the two time points, the relationship between number of negative self-event connections 
remained significant (r =.51, p < .05). 
To examine the hypothesis that the valence of self-event connections found in life 
story narratives would predict changes in psychological distress, hierarchical regression 
examined whether the number of positive and negative self-event connections made at 
time one predicted change in DASS scores approximately one year later.  DASS scores at 
time 1 were entered in the first step in order to control for participants‟ initial experiences 
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of negative emotional states.  The average number of positive and negative self-event 
connections at time 1 were entered in the second step to examine the extent to which the 
valence of autobiographical reasoning explained unique variance in the change of negative 
emotional states over time.   
Regression analyses demonstrated that just one predictor (DASS scores at time 
one) explained 33% of the variance in change in DASS scores over time (R
2 
= .23, F(3,17) 
= 8.53,  p < .05).  Participants who scored higher on the DASS at time one experienced 
less change (more stability) in DASS scores over time.  Neither the number of positive or 
number of negative self-event connections found in life story narratives of low and high 
points (combined) significantly predicted change in DASS scores over time (βs = -.12 to 
.12, ps < .05).   
Discussion 
Before discussing the findings of the current study, it is important to remember that 
the results should be treated as indicative only.  The small number of participants in the 
study prevents any firm conclusions being made from any of the findings.  The extent to 
which the sample in the current sample is representative of the sample at Time 1 is also 
questionable.  Participants in this study were more likely to be female and slightly older 
than participants overall at Time 1.  Prior work has shown that females tend to construct 
longer narratives and may include more expressive and emotional content in their 
narratives than do males (Bauer, Stennes, & Haight, 2003; Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & 
Goodman, 2000). 
The aims of this study were two-fold.  The first aim was to examine stability in the 
valence of autobiographical reasoning found in life story narratives constructed by young 
adults over the period of one year.  The second aim was to examine the relationships 
between autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning using a 
longitudinal design.  In using this methodology, the current study aimed to investigate 
whether constructing narratives containing positively and negatively valenced 
autobiographical reasoning would predict future psychological functioning.   
With respect to the first aim, findings showed that the number of negative, but not 
the number of positive, self-event connections young adults made in narratives of low and 
high points from the life story were significantly related at the two time points.  Thus, 
young adults who made more negative connections in narratives of life story high and low 
points at time one were also likely to make more negative connections in narratives of low 
and high points one year later.   This previously untested association suggests that making 
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negative self-event connections may be a relatively enduring pattern that fluctuates very 
little over time.  Further analysis showed that the relationship between negative self-event 
connections remained significant after controlling for changes in negative emotional states 
experienced between the two time points.  This finding suggests that the extent to which 
young adults‟ reasoned about the self in negative ways remained relatively stable in the 
context of fluctuations in negative emotional states.  This finding challenges the notion 
that fluctuations in autobiographical reasoning valence over time are related to changes in 
distress levels.   
The lack of a significant relationship between positive self-event connections made 
at time one and time two suggests that unlike making negative self-event connections, the 
extent to which young adults reason about the self in positive ways is more prone to 
fluctuate over time.  The consistency in making negative but not positive connections over 
time is interesting and requires explanation.  One possible explanation may be drawn from 
theory and research pertaining to self-schemas.  Self-schemas are mental representations of 
the self that contain information pertaining to an individual‟s beliefs about the type of 
person they are, characteristic behavioural patterns and internal experiences such as 
thoughts, emotions and physiological reactions (Beck, 1995; Welburn, Coristine, Dagg, 
Pontefract, & Jordan, 2002).  
Malle and Horowitz (1995) have argued that negative self-schemata are more 
tightly organised and consistently activated than positive self-schema.  In one study, young 
adults judged whether positive and negative self-descriptors „go together‟ (i.e. are often 
expressed together), are „opposites‟ (i.e. each time one trait is expressed the other is not 
expressed) or „independent (i.e. unrelated).  Findings showed that negative self-descriptors 
were more commonly judged as „going together‟ than were positive self-descriptors, thus 
suggesting that negative self-relevant information is organised more tightly in schematic 
form than is positive self-relevant information.  Further to this, Malle and Horowitz (1995) 
also found that individuals who were more likely to endorse negative self-descriptors did 
so more consistently across various measures than did individuals who were more likely to 
endorse positive self-descriptors.  These findings have two main implications.  First, 
negative self-relevant information may be more likely than positive self-relevant 
information to be perceived as highly inter-connected.  Second, this highly inter-connected 
negative self-schema is more likely to be activated in response to different cues than the 
corresponding positive self-schema. 
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What might these results mean for consistency in positive and negative self-event 
connections over time? If negative self-event connections are a part of an individual‟s 
negative self-schema, then following the findings of Malle and Horowitz (1995) a greater 
consistency in negative self-event connections over time would be expected.  That is, 
negative self-relevant information may be more likely to be activated by a life story task 
and be more consistently applied across a range of events than positive self-relevant 
information.  The link between positive/negative self-event connections and self-schema 
has not yet been tested and further research is needed to establish whether this is a viable 
explanation for the findings.   
With respect to the second aim, findings showed that neither the number of 
negative nor the number of positive self-event connections made at time one significantly 
accounted for the change in participants‟ experiences of negative emotional states over 
time.  Although these findings must be considered in the context of the limitations raised 
earlier, this finding suggests that the extent to which young adults reason about the positive 
or negative implications of past experiences for the self in the context of life story 
narratives does not actively enhance or diminish experiences of negative emotional states.  
This finding does not support the theoretical assertions made by McLean, Pasupathi, and 
Pals (2007), that making more positive self-event connections and reducing the number of 
self-event connections made in life story narratives over time can result in positive changes 
to psychological functioning.  Instead, the findings suggest that the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning remains may simply be 
a concurrent relationship.  Thus autobiographical reasoning valence may reflect co-
existing levels of, but does not actively impact, psychological functioning. 
An obvious limitation of the current study is the small sample size (n = 21).  This 
small sample size means that the analyses performed must be regarded as indicative only 
and require validation through future work with higher sample sizes.  Additionally, to 
reduce demands on participants, only one measure of psychological functioning was used; 
the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale.  The findings presented in Chapter Four show that 
positive self-event connections were associated with a broader measure of psychological 
functioning that included qualities such as autonomy, personal growth, mastery and 
positive relationships with others.  The possibility that an increase in positive self-event 
connections over time would be associated with increases in more global measures of 
psychological well-being cannot be discounted and requires further investigation.   
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An interesting area of investigation for future research is consistency in the valence 
of autobiographical reasoning found in relation to the same event over time.  In the current 
study, participants were not specifically asked to narrate the same events as narrated at 
Time 1.  points.  For most participants, the events narrated at time two were not the same 
events narrated at time one.  Pasupathi (2012) suggests that individuals process their life 
events over a significant amount of time, and the interpretations and understanding of 
these events is likely to change as individuals gain new experiences and perspectives on 
these events.  This is proposed to be especially true if the event is discussed with others 
and thus open to the influences of social construction (Pasupathi, 2001).  Although 
untested, this notion is also likely to apply to the extent to which individuals‟ reason about 
the self in positive and negative ways in relation to key events.  Consider the following 
example provided by one of the participants in the current study: 
 
When I was 12 years old ... there was a boy that I liked in my class and I 
thought he might like me too. I sent my friends over to ask him out for me. 
I was turned down much to my distress. I had found it very hard to get up 
the courage to even mention that I liked a boy let alone have him reject me 
via my friends ... I consider that to be a pivotal moment in my life. I was 
teased in primary school for being overweight and I felt that his rejection 
was a reflection on my physical appearance ... For my whole life after that 
point I am very guarded about my feelings.  This has been detrimental in a 
couple of relationships. 
This moment has obviously been influential in the young adults life and has had a 
lasting impact on her ability to share her emotional experiences with others.  It is possible, 
however, that this view of herself could change under certain conditions.  For example, 
entering into a supportive relationship where she is encouraged to share her feelings and is 
accepted for who she is may lead her to feel more positively about herself.  Under these 
conditions, we might expect this event that occurred many years ago to be interpreted in a 
different light.  That is, instead of the event being framed as a reflection of her own short-
comings, the young adult may identify that the boy may have turned her down for a 
number of reasons, none of which reflect judgements on her physical appearance.  
Tracking changes in autobiographical reasoning valence over time is an interesting 
question for future research.  Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine whether 
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shifts from negative to more positive or neutral statements about the self are associated 
with shifts in psychological functioning, and if so, whether these shifts are causally related 
or related to a third variable (e.g. entering a supportive relationship).   
In summary, this pilot study raised two interesting findings.  First, young adults‟ 
tendency to make negative self-event connections in life story narratives remains stable 
over time, possibly reflecting a negative self-schema that is activated when completing a 
lie story narrative task.  Second, young adults‟ tendency to make positive or negative self-
event connections at one time point did not predict changes in psychological functioning 
over time.  This latter finding suggests that autobiographical reasoning may not have a 
direct effect on psychological functioning, which was hypothesised.  The findings of the 
current pilot highlight a need to examine these questions with larger, more reliable sample 
sizes. 
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Chapter Six 
Study 2: An investigation into the relationships between autobiographical reasoning, 
cognitive response styles, meaning in life and psychological functioning 
The findings presented in Chapter Four reveal evidence of a relationship between 
psychological functioning and the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in the life 
story narratives of young adults.  That is, young adults who made more positive self-event 
connections in narratives of high and low points from their life story experienced better 
psychological well-being and fewer symptoms of psychological distress (depression, 
anxiety and stress) than young adults who made fewer positive self-event connections.  
Conversely, young adults who made more negative self-event connections experienced 
more symptoms of psychological distress and poorer well-being than young adults who 
made fewer negative connections.  These findings supplement a broader body of research 
which has shown that linking negative past experiences to positive features or 
developments in the self through autobiographical reasoning is associated with positive 
psychological functioning (King et al., 2000; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; McAdams, et 
al., 2001; Pals, 2006).  A number of key questions remain, however, regarding why this 
relationship exists.  The aim of this Chapter is to build on the knowledge gained in Chapter 
Four by exploring key factors that may be associated with the tendency to engage in 
positive and negative autobiographical reasoning in young adulthood. 
McLean and Mansfield (2010) note that the relationship between autobiographical 
reasoning and psychological functioning may be explained by an additional, or third, 
variables.  There are a great number of factors that may predict, or interact with, 
autobiographical reasoning valence.  This Chapter examined associations between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and a number of key factors derived from cognitive 
models of psychological distress and meaning-based models of psychological well-being.  
From the cognitive literature, these factors include explanatory style, rumination and 
cognitive reappraisal.  From the meaning-based literature, the key factor examined was 
meaning in life.  The current study had two main aims.  First, to investigate key 
relationships between the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in young adults‟ 
life story narratives and each of these cognitive and meaning-based factors.  These factors 
were chosen on the basis of their theoretical overlap to the autobiographical reasoning 
construct.  The second aim was to investigate whether, and how, these factors interact with 
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autobiographical reasoning valence to predict psychological functioning.  Consistent with 
Ryff and Singer (1996), psychological functioning in the current study was again defined 
in terms of psychological distress and psychological well-being.  Specific predictions, 
which will now be discussed, were made in relation to the cognitive and meaning-based 
factors and psychological distress and well-being. 
Outline of cognitive response styles 
Cognitive theories of psychological distress suggest that the manner in which 
individuals process information about events and the self can account for the development 
and maintenance of emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety (Beck, 1995).  
These theories propose that dysfunctional schema, cognitive frameworks of the self and 
the world, influence how one‟s experiences are interpreted (Welburn, Coristine, Dagg, 
Pontefract, & Jordan, 2002).  In certain contexts (e.g. stressful or negative life events), 
dysfunctional schema activate maladaptive thoughts and beliefs about the experience, the 
self and the world which in turn leads to experiences of emotional distress (Riskind & 
Alloy, 2006).  In the case of depression, schema are generally assumed to reflect an overly 
negative view of the world and the self, while in the case of anxiety, schema reflect a 
biased and inflated view of the world and environmental stimuli as dangerous and a 
relative inability to cope with these situations (Beck & Clark, 1997; Laidlaw & Davidson, 
2001; Segal, Hood, Shaw & Higgins, 1988).  
Certain cognitive vulnerability factors, styles of thinking about and interpreting 
one‟s experience, act in conjunction with dysfunctional schema to increase the likelihood 
of developing emotional disorders (Alloy et al., 1999; Riskind & Alloy, 2006).  Extant 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that two such factors, explanatory style and 
rumination, are among the strongest and most reliable predictors of the development and 
maintenance of emotional distress.  These two factors are conceptualised as 
„transdiagnostic‟ in that they underlie multiple indicators of psychological distress.  For 
example, each factor is proposed to play a key role in maintaining the highly comorbid 
conditions of depression and anxiety (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Watkins, 
2009).    Each of these factors will now be discussed in more detail.   
Explanatory style 
Explanatory or attribution style, first described by Abramson, Seligman and 
Teasdale (1978), refers to characteristic ways of accounting for, or attributing cause to, 
positive and negative life events.  Explanatory statements vary along dimensions of 
internality, i.e. „the event was caused by me‟ versus externality „the event was caused by 
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someone/something else‟, can be stable, i.e. „this cause will be around forever‟ or unstable 
„this cause is transitory‟, and can be global, i.e. „this cause will be present in all situations‟ 
or specific „this cause was just present in this situation‟ (Morris, 2007).  A negative 
explanatory style is defined as the tendency to attribute the cause of negative life events to 
internal, stable and global characteristics of the self (Abramson et al., 1978) 
Adopting a negative explanatory style is considered a risk factor for the 
development of depression and anxiety following negative or stressful life 
events (Abramson et al., 1978; Alloy et al., 1999; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Reardon & 
Williams, 2007).  Findings support this theoretical notion, and have found that adopting a 
negative explanatory style is associated with a greater number and recurrence of 
depressive episodes, trauma symptoms following traumatic experiences in both adults and 
children and negative affect and anxiety in college students (Luten, Ralph, & Mineka, 
1997; Mongrain & Blackburn, 2005; Palker-Corell & Marcus, 2004; Runyon & Kenny, 
2002).  Adopting a negative explanatory style has also been shown to predate, and predict, 
future depressive symptoms (Sanjuan & Magallares, 2009).  Although the link between 
psychological distress and the explanatory style used to explain positive events is more 
tenuous, there is some evidence that attributing positive experiences to internal, stable and 
global causes predicts decreases in hopelessness and recovery from depression (Johnson, 
Han, Douglas, Johannet & Russell, 1998; Needles & Abramson, 1990) whereas attributing 
positive events to external, unstable and specific causes is associated with higher levels of 
depressive symptomatology (Fresco, Alloy, & Reilly-Harrington, 2006).    
Rumination 
Rumination is defined as a response to psychological distress that is characterised 
by repetitive thoughts about the causes and consequences of the symptoms of 
psychological distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  Like negative explanatory style, 
rumination has been conceptualised as a cognitive vulnerability factor for experiences of 
psychological distress.  Rumination tends to be perseverative in nature.  That is, 
individuals tend to focus solely on their experience of distress and do so in a passive 
manner rather than taking an active problem solving approach to their distressed state 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  Thus while rumination maintains 
focus on distress symptoms, it does not lead to adaptive coping strategies or problem 
solving techniques that can alleviate distress.  Consistent with this notion, rumination has 
been shown to exacerbate the relationship between stressful life events and emotional 
distress (depression, anxiety and stress) in young adults (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010), 
85 
 
has been found to predict both depression and anxiety in a sample of adults with diagnosed 
mood disorders (Watkins, 2009) and has been associated with an increase in negative 
affect and depressive symptoms (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007).  Furthermore, 
rumination induction studies have shown that inducing a ruminative response style to 
negative life events causes transient increases in negative, and decreases in positive, affect 
(Grisham, Flower, Williams, & Moulds, 2011). 
Cognitive reappraisal strategies 
In contrast to the maladaptive cognitive processes of negative explanatory style and 
rumination, individuals can also use a number of adaptive cognitive processes to minimise 
experiences of emotional distress.  Cognitive reappraisal, defined as an emotion regulation 
strategy which involves changing the meaning of events in order to modify its emotional 
impact, is one such factor (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003).  From a theoretical 
perspective, cognitive reappraisal does not actively prevent the development and 
maintenance of emotional distress, but is an active strategy individuals can use to minimise 
the experience of negative emotions in relation to unwanted events (Gross & John, 2003).  
In support of this view, individuals who characteristically use reappraisal strategies 
experience lower levels of depression and negative emotion, are less likely to appraise 
themselves, their lives and their future in a negative way, and experience higher levels of 
positive emotion, satisfaction with life, self-esteem, psychological well-being than those 
less likely to use reappraisal strategies (Gross & John, 2003; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & 
Gross, 2007; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008).   
Similarities between cognitive response styles and autobiographical reasoning 
The three cognitive factors described above (explanatory style, rumination and 
cognitive reappraisal), share key conceptual similarities with the process of 
autobiographical reasoning.  According to key proponents of cognitive models of 
psychological distress (Beck, 1995; Riskind & Alloy, 2006), negative emotional states 
such as depression and anxiety are associated with the way individuals understand and 
interpret their experiences.   Autobiographical reasoning also refers to the process of 
interpreting and processing information about the self and one‟s experiences.  Despite this 
conceptual similarity, research has not yet investigated the relationships between cognitive 
response factors and the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in narratives of life 
story events.   
A small number of studies, however, have investigated whether key cognitive 
response styles can be observed within the life story.   Habermas, Ott, Schubert, Schneider 
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and Pate (2008) coded life story narratives of depressed and non-depressed individuals for 
indicators of negative cognitive biases and explanatory style.  Depressed individuals were 
more likely to draw on negative life events to construct their life story and adopt a negative 
explanatory style when narrating their experiences than were non-depressed individuals.  
While these findings suggest that expressions of a negative explanatory style can be found 
in life story narratives, this study did not specifically investigate differences in 
autobiographical reasoning between the depressed and non-depressed participants.   
An earlier study examined associations between negative explanatory style and 
McAdams et al‟s (2001) conceptualisation of contamination sequences (Adler, Kissel, & 
McAdams, 2006).  Adler et al. (2006) coded adults‟ life story narratives for expressions of 
a negative explanatory style using the Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations (CAVE; 
Peterson, Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1992).  The CAVE is a common tool used to 
assess explanatory style in narratives of personal experiences and provides a reliable 
alternative to other measurement tools for explanatory style which rely on hypothetical 
events (Peterson, 1991).  Life story narratives were also coded for contamination 
sequences, descriptions of positive events or states that are followed by a negative ending 
or outcome and participants completed measures of depression, self-esteem and life 
satisfaction.  As expected, symptoms of depression and lower levels of life satisfaction 
were associated with greater expression of a negative explanatory style and more 
contamination sequences.  While negative explanatory style was unrelated to 
contamination sequences, both of these variables (explanatory style and contamination 
sequences) explained unique variance in depressive symptoms.  In explaining the non-
significant relationship between negative explanatory style and contamination sequences, 
the authors note that these two measures represent different „cognitive categories‟.  That is, 
explanatory style reflects an individual‟s explanation of events, while contamination 
sequences describe a pattern of affective experiences.  Neither of these studies specifically 
examined the relationship between autobiographical valence and explanatory style, 
however.  Similarly, no prior work has investigated relationships between autobiographical 
reasoning valence and the remaining two factors: rumination and cognitive reappraisal.   
Part 1a: Relationship between positive/negative self-event connections and cognitive 
response styles 
The first area of investigation in the current study explored key relationships 
between the number of positive and negative self-event connections found in life story 
narratives and each of the three cognitive response factors: explanatory style, rumination 
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and cognitive reappraisal.  To investigate these relationships, young adults 18 to 28 years 
of age were asked to write about a high point, low point and turning point from their life 
story and to complete measures assessing explanatory style, rumination and their use of 
cognitive reappraisal strategies.  In light of the limited extant literature, three tentative 
hypotheses were made. 
First, I hypothesised that the number of negative self-event connections found in 
narratives of life story low points would be positively correlated with negative explanatory 
style and the number of positive self-event connections found in narratives of life story 
high points would be positively associated with positive explanatory style.  As turning 
point experiences can be negative or positive, the question of whether explanatory style 
would relate to positive/negative self-event connections found in narratives of these events 
was left open. 
Second, I hypothesised that rumination would be correlated with the number of 
negative self-event connections found in narratives of all event types.  This relationship 
was expected to occur across all event types as rumination is conceptualised as a general 
tendency to think about the causes of one‟s emotional distress, and is not tied to certain 
types of events.  I note, however, that negative events are likely to cause more distress and 
thus the relationship between rumination and negative autobiographical reasoning may be 
stronger in relation to narratives of low points.   
Third, I hypothesised that cognitive reappraisal strategies would be correlated with 
the number of positive self-event connections found in narratives of life story low points 
and unrelated to the number of positive self-event connections in narratives of high points.  
This hypothesis was set as cognitive reappraisal strategies are only expected to be 
activated in the context of events that elicit negative emotions.  Again, the question of 
whether reappraisal strategies would be associated with positive self-event connections 
found in narratives of turning points was left open.   
Part 1b: Relationships between positive/negative self-event connections, cognitive 
response styles and psychological distress 
The second set of hypotheses addressed the inter-relationships between individual 
differences in the use of the three cognitive response factors (explanatory style, rumination 
and cognitive reappraisal), positive/negative self-event connections and psychological 
distress.  These hypotheses were arranged in three steps.  First, before examining some of 
the more complex interactions between these variables, I expected to replicate the findings 
presented in Chapter Four, that increased levels of psychological distress would be 
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associated with a higher number of negative, and a lower number of positive, self-event 
connections in life story narratives overall.  The second hypothesis addressed the question 
of whether the narrative variables (number of positive/negative self-event connections) 
would explain unique variance in symptoms of distress over and above that explained by 
the cognitive factors (explanatory style, rumination and cognitive reappraisal).  In light of 
previous work highlighting the strong associations between cognitive response factors and 
psychological functioning, and the assumption that the three cognitive factors and 
autobiographical reasoning comprise similar processes, I predicted that neither positive nor 
negative self-event connections would explain unique variance in symptoms of 
psychological distress beyond what is accounted for by the three cognitive factors. 
Third, hypotheses were made to examine possible interactions between 
positive/negative self-event connections, the cognitive response styles and psychological 
distress.  Specifically, I was interested in whether the three cognitive factors would 
mediate and/or moderate the relationships between positive/negative self-event 
connections and psychological distress.  A mediating variable is one that explains or 
accounts for the relationship between two variables.  Mediation analysis utilises path 
diagrams to posit a potential causal chain between three variables and in doing so, attempts 
to answer the question of why the independent variable to dependent variable relationship 
exists (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  A moderating variable, on the other hand, is one that 
influences the strength of the relationship between an independent and dependent variable.  
Moderation analysis differs from mediation analysis in that it seeks to examine whether the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables differs in the context of 
varying levels of a third variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  From a theoretical perspective, 
variables can act as both a mediator and a moderator (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) so 
three sets of hypotheses were made. 
The first set of hypotheses explored the question of whether adopting a negative 
explanatory style would act as a mediator and/or a moderator in the relationship between 
negative self-event connections and psychological distress.  Psychological distress is 
associated with a negative representation of the self, which is easily accessed when making 
attributions about the cause of negative events (Bentall, Kinderman & Bowen-Jones, 
1999).  There is also some evidence that negative representations of the self are easily 
accessed during the construction of life story narratives for individuals experiencing a high 
level of psychological distress (Habermas et al., 2008).  In light of these findings, I 
predicted that the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of low and 
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turning points would interact with greater use of negative explanatory style to predict 
higher levels of psychological distress (moderation hypothesis).  The decision to include 
autobiographical reasoning that occurred in narratives of turning points (in addition to low 
points) reflects the fact that these events are frequently negative in nature (see Tavernier & 
Willoughby, 2012) and thus are the types of events that a negative explanatory style would 
be expected to appear in relation to.  I also predicted that young adults who made more 
negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points would be more 
likely to adopt a negative explanatory style, which in turn would be associated with an 
increase in psychological distress (mediation hypothesis). 
The second set of hypotheses examined whether rumination would mediate or 
moderate the relationship between negative self-event connections and psychological 
distress.  Rumination is a process by which individuals think about the cause of 
psychological distress in a perseverative and repetitive manner.  Greater recall of negative 
self-related information has been associated with post-event rumination in young adults 
(Mellings & Alden, 2000), although the direction of influence has not been well 
established.  In light of these findings, I predicted that young adults who made more 
negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points would be more 
likely to engage in a pattern of ruminative thinking, which in turn would be related to 
psychological distress (mediation effect).   As, from a theoretical perspective, rumination 
is more likely to occur in the context of distress caused by negative or stressful life events, 
these effects were examined in relation to autobiographical reasoning found in narratives 
of low points and turning points combined.  I also predicted that making negative self-
event connections in narratives of low and turning points would interact with rumination to 
predict higher levels of psychological distress.  That is, the relationship between making 
negative self-event connections and psychological distress would be stronger for 
individuals who tend to ruminate about the cause of their distress (moderation effect).   
The third set of hypotheses examined whether cognitive reappraisal strategies 
would mediate or moderate the relationship between positive self-event connections and 
psychological distress.  Cognitive reappraisal strategies result in the attachment of positive 
meaning to a negative emotion-eliciting event.  Such appraisals and the identification of 
positive outcomes from negative experiences have been associated with better 
psychological functioning in the years following the event (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Larson, 1998; Stein, Folkman, Trabasso & Christopher-Richards, 1997).  It is therefore 
possible that young adults who report greater use of general reappraisal strategies to 
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decrease negative emotional experiences would be more likely to link negative experiences 
to positive characteristics of the self in narratives of these experiences.  Thus I predicted 
that young adults who made more positive self-event connections in narratives of low and 
turning points would be more likely to report greater use of cognitive reappraisal 
strategies, which in turn would be related to lower levels of psychological distress 
(mediation effect).   As, from a theoretical perspective, cognitive reappraisal strategies are 
only activated in the context of negative or stressful life events, I examined these effects in 
relation to autobiographical reasoning in the context of low points and turning points 
combined.  I also predicted that making positive self-event connections in narratives of 
low and turning points would interact with cognitive reappraisal strategies to predict lower 
levels of psychological distress.  That is, the relationship between making positive self-
event connections and lower levels of psychological distress would be stronger for 
individuals who tend to engage in cognitive reappraisal strategies more generally 
(moderation effect).   
Introducing the concept of meaning in life 
 Contemporary well-being theorists have argued that positive psychological 
functioning consists of the absence of psychological distress and the presence of 
psychological well-being (Cowen, 1991; Ryff & Singer, 1996).  A key motivation for 
well-being theorists is the detection of psychological processes and outcomes that 
contribute to „optimal‟ psychological functioning.  In addition to the absence of negative 
psychological states, the notion of psychological well-being is defined in terms of 
constructs which engender a positive view of the self and one‟s life.   
 Ryan and Deci (2001) suggest that psychological well-being consists of both 
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being.  Where hedonic well-being is defined in terms of 
subjective well-being, and encompasses notions of happiness, positive and negative affect 
and a sense of satisfaction with one‟s life, eudaimonic well-being is defined in terms of 
leading a life that is fulfilling and meaningful (Ryan & Deci, 2001).  Eudaimonic well-
being has been operationalised in a number of ways, including individuals‟ subjective 
appraisals of meaning in life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) and in terms of the 
proposed components of a meaningful life.  These include self-acceptance, positive 
relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and personal 
growth (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).  Kashdan, Biwas-Diener and King (2008), however, argue 
that there is a large degree of overlap between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being and 
thus they should not be conceptualised as independent constructs.  Nonetheless, both Ryan 
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and Deci (2001) and Kashdan et al. (2008) agree that having a sense of meaning in one‟s 
life is an important component of psychological well-being.   
Meaning in life has been linked to a number of positive psychological outcomes.  
Zika and Chamberlain (1992) asked female adults and male and female older adults to 
indicate their level of satisfaction with their lives and complete a measure of general 
mental health which included aspects of positive well-being (e.g. cheerfulness, interest in 
and enjoyment of life) and aspects of poor mental health (e.g. depression and anxiety).  
Meaning in life was measured in terms of participants‟ subjective assessments of the extent 
to which they experience purpose in their lives, the degree to which participants had major 
life goals and the extent to which participants felt these goals were being achieved.  
Participants who reported greater meaning in life were more satisfied with their lives, 
experienced better psychological well-being and less psychological distress than 
participants who reported less meaning in their lives.   
Relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and meaning in life 
From a theoretical perspective, autobiographical reasoning is associated with the 
generation of meaning in one‟s life.  Baumeister and colleagues propose that people are 
inherently motivated to find meaning in their lives and that this motivation drives people to 
construct narratives of their experiences (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Baumeister & 
Wilson, 1996).  In the context of constructing life story narratives, McLean and Thorne 
(2003) define the achievement of meaning as “what one gleans from, learns, or 
understands from the event” (p. 636).   In defining meaning in this way, McLean and 
Thorne (2003) suggest that the process of „meaning-making‟ (i.e. that is achieved through 
autobiographical reasoning) involves considering the wider implications of events for the 
self and for one‟s life (see also McLean & Pratt, 2006; Singer, 2004). 
The extent to which the construction of meaning in relation to certain key events 
generalises to a broader sense of meaning in one‟s life has not yet been examined.  The 
current study aimed to address this gap in the literature by examining relationships 
between self-event connections made in life story narratives and young adults‟ perceptions 
regarding meaning in their lives.  From a theoretical perspective it is possible that the 
process of making positive, but not negative, self-event connections may be associated 
with a greater sense that one‟s life has meaning.  As noted earlier, Ryff and Keyes‟ (1995) 
scales of psychological well-being measure six components that have been conceptually 
linked to the establishment of a meaningful life.  These include self-acceptance, positive 
relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and personal 
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growth.  The content of positive self-event connections can readily be categorised into 
similar themes.  For example, McLean and Fournier (2008) found that a significant 
proportion of self-event connections made in young and older adults‟ narratives of self-
defining memories described personal growth, personal values, which may correlate with 
purpose in life, and dispositions, which may correlate with self-acceptance, autonomy and 
environmental mastery.   
Examples of positive self-event connections from Study 2 presented in Chapter 
Four also highlight the overlap between positive self-event connections and the proposed 
components of meaning in life.  These include: 
Themes of self-acceptance:  
“A high point for me was when I „came out‟ ... This is important to my 
life, because although I don't let my sexuality wholly dictate who I am it 
is an integral part of my identity” 
Themes of environmental mastery:  
“When I was 17 I went on an outdoors adventure camp ... At the end of 
the course I remember feeling a sense of accomplishment.   I felt  that I 
really could do whatever I wanted in life If I just tried and set my mind to 
it ... It showed me I can push myself and succeed”, 
Themes of purpose in life:  
“One high point in my life was the first gig that my band played back 
when I was 17 ... I am extremely passionate about music, and performing 
is one of my most enjoyable things ... my confidence and desire to go 
further in the music business has increased”,  
And themes of personal growth:  
“A low point for me was when I suffered from panic attacks and mild 
depression at age 16.... I believe this event was instrumental in my 
growth as a person ... I appreciate the good times even more”.   
Unlike positive self-event connections which seem to correlate well with the 
components of meaning in life, negative self-event connections may demonstrate the 
opposite relationship.  That is, negative self-event connections may be associated with a 
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relative absence of meaning in life.  For example, the following negative self-event 
connection is likely to be negatively associated with a number of Ryff‟s indicators, 
particularly self-acceptance, positive relations with others, and  environmental mastery: 
“I was bullied by a friend at school ...  This has made me more paranoid, 
and I find it incredibly difficult to trust people, even my closest friends”  
Part 2a: Relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and meaning in 
life 
The second area of investigation in the current study explored relationships 
between the number of positive and negative self-event connections found in life story 
narratives and young adults‟ subjective appraisals of meaning in their lives.  In light of the 
theoretical assumption that autobiographical reasoning is involved in the construction of 
meaning from our experiences (McLean & Thorne, 2003), and this meaning is in turn 
associated with a broader sense of meaning in life (Singer, 2004), the following hypotheses 
were made.  First, I predicted that young adults who reported greater meaning in their lives 
would make more positive self-event connections in narratives of all event types (high, 
low and turning points) than young adults who reported less meaning in life.  I predicted 
that the number of negative self-event connections found in life story narratives, on the 
other hand, would be inversely associated with meaning in life ratings. 
Part 2b: Relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence, meaning in life 
and psychological well-being 
A second set of hypotheses addressed the inter-relationships between 
positive/negative self-event connections, meaning in life and psychological well-being.  
Young adults‟ satisfaction with life was chosen as the measure of psychological well-being 
in the current study.  Satisfaction with life is conceptualised as individuals‟ subjective 
judgements about how well their life compares to their own notion of a quality life (Pavot 
& Diener, 1993).  Satisfaction with life was chosen as a measure of psychological well-
being over Ryff‟s scales of Psychological Well-Being used in Study 1a as these latter 
scales overlap considerably with the construct of meaning in life (Ryan & Deci, 2001).   
Before examining some of the more complex interactions between 
positive/negative self-event connections, meaning in life and psychological well-being, the 
question of whether the narrative variables (number of positive/negative self-event 
connections) explained unique variance in life satisfaction over and above that explained 
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by meaning in life was addressed.  I predicted that neither positive nor negative self-event 
connections would explain unique variance in satisfaction with life beyond what is 
accounted for by meaning in life.  This hypothesis was made in light of prior work 
highlighting a strong association between life satisfaction and meaning in life (Steger & 
Kashdan, 2007; Steger, Oishi, & Kesebir, 2011) and the theoretical notion that meaning in 
life is developed through autobiographical reasoning. 
To explore possible interactions between positive/negative self-event connections, I 
then addressed the question of whether meaning in life would both mediate and/or 
moderate the relationships between positive/negative self-event connections and life 
satisfaction.  In light of limited extant findings regarding the relationships between these 
key variables, the following predictions were made.   First, I predicted that young adults 
who made more positive self-event connections in life story narratives would be more 
likely to report meaning in their lives, which in turn would be associated with an increase 
in life satisfaction (mediation hypothesis).   Second, I predicted that the number of positive 
self-event connections in life story narratives and young adults‟ meaning in life ratings 
would interact to predict higher levels of satisfaction with life.  That is, the relationship the 
number of positive self-event connections and life satisfaction would be the strongest for 
individuals who report meaning in their lives (moderation hypothesis).  The opposite 
relationships were predicted for negative self-event connections.   
Summary of the current study 
In summary, the current study had two main areas of investigation.  The first area 
examined 1) whether autobiographical reasoning valence (as measured by positive and 
negative self-event connections) were associated with each of the three cognitive response 
factors, and 2) whether individual differences in the use of these cognitive styles would 
explain the relationship between positive/negative self-event connections and 
psychological distress.  The second area examined 1) whether positive and negative self-
event connections found in life story narratives would be related to meaning in life and 2) 
whether variations in meaning in life explained the relationship between positive/negative 
self-event connections and psychological well-being (as measured by satisfaction with 
life).  Young adults were selected for this study as this developmental period is considered 
a critical time for the development and consolidation of autobiographical reasoning skills, 
and the development of psychological distress is an important concern for this population 
group (Arnett, 2000; 2007).    
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 164 undergraduate students (69% female) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
Participants received credit towards a course requirement of participation in research.  
Ages ranged from 18 to 27 years (M = 19.1 years, SD = 2.3 years).  Seventy-two percent of 
participants identified as New Zealand European, 7 percent as New Zealand Maori, 3 
percent as Pasifika, and 10 percent as other (one in seven participants identified with more 
than one ethnic background).  Participants were drawn from a separate pool to those who 
took part in Study 1a and Study 1b.  Despite this, participants were similar to those who 
participated in Study 1a in terms of all demographic characteristics (age, gender and 
ethnicity). 
Overview of Procedure 
The study was conducted over one 60-minute and one 30-minute session.  The 
order in which participants completed the sessions was counterbalanced.  Each session 
took place in a psychology laboratory; participants (with numbers ranging between two 
and four per session) were seated at individual desks, separated by dividers.  At the start of 
the first session, participants read a summary of the nature and purpose of the study and 
provided consent.  In the 60-minute session, participants completed an autobiographical 
narrative task through an online survey created in Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, 
UT).  In the 30-minute session, also online through Qualtrics, participants completed 
measures of attribution style, rumination, use of cognitive reappraisal strategies and a 
measure of psychological distress (symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress). 
Tasks and measures 
Explanatory style. The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 
1982).  This task measures the extent to which individuals assign internal versus external, 
stable versus unstable and global versus specific causes to positive and negative events.  
Participants were given six hypothetical and six hypothetical negative events and asked to 
record the major cause for each event.  Participants are then asked to rate on a 7-point 
scale, the extent to which the cause of each event is internal (1 = “Totally due to other 
people or circumstances, 7 = “Totally due to me”), stable (1 = “Will never again be 
present”, 7 = “Will always be present”), and global (1= “Influences just this particular 
situation, 7 = “Influences all situations in my life).  Responses can then be summed for 
positive and negative events, with higher scores reflecting more internal, stable and global 
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attributions.   Higher scores for negative events reflect a negative explanatory style, and 
higher scores for positive events reflect a more optimistic explanatory style.  The ASQ has 
been found to have good reliability and validity, internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha) 
has been shown to be reasonable for each of the subscales (.75 for positive events and .72 
for negative events; Peterson et al., 1982).  
Rumination. Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003).  This scale is a 22-item self-report questionnaire which measures the 
extent to which individuals engage in repetitive, ruminative thinking and behaviour 
following feelings of distress.  Participants are told that “people do a range of things when 
they feel sad, blue or depressed” and are asked to record on a 4-point scale (1 = Almost 
never, 4 = Almost always), the extent to which they do each of the following items.  Items 
measure the extent to which participants act on, or think about, experiences of distress (e.g. 
“Go some place alone to think about your feelings”) and the extent to which participants 
think about the cause of their distress symptoms (e.g. “Think „why do I always react this 
way‟”).  Scores are summed to provide a composite RRS score, which has been shown to 
have excellent internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha .92; Treynor et al., 2003).   
Cognitive reappraisal.  Cognitive reappraisal subscale of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). Five items measured the extent to 
which individuals habitually use reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy.  Example 
items include “When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I‟m thinking about” and “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change 
the way I‟m thinking about the situation”.  Participants rate their level of agreement on a 7-
point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  Internal consistency for this 
subscale has been shown to be high (.82; Gross & John, 2003).  
Meaning in life. Presence of Meaning subscale of the Meaning in Life 
Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger, et al., 2006).  Five items measured the extent to which 
individuals perceive that their life has a sense of purpose and meaning.  Example items 
include :” I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful” and “My life has no 
clear purpose” (reverse-coded).  Participants rate how true each statement is for them on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = Absolutely untrue, 7 = Absolutely true).  The Presence subscale 
of the MLQ has been shown to have good psychometric properties (alpha reliability = .82; 
Steger et al., 2006). 
Symptoms of psychological distress. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). This self-report questionnaire measures three related 
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negative emotional states: depression, anxiety and stress, each on a 14-item subscale.  
Participants rate on a four-point scale how much each symptom applied to them over the 
past week (0= Did not apply to me at all, 3= Applied to me very much, or most of the 
time).  Consistent with previous research (Crawford & Henry, 2003), a total DASS score 
was calculated by summing each of the subscales.  Internal consistency for the DASS total 
score within the current sample was .98. 
Satisfaction with life.  Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen, & Griffen, 1985).  This 5-item questionnaire measures individuals‟ subjective 
appraisals of the degree to which they are satisfied with their lives.  Participants rate their 
level of agreement with each of the five statements on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  Example items include “I am satisfied with life” and “If I 
could live my life over, I would change almost nothing”.  The SWLS has demonstrated 
good psychometric properties including good internal consistency (.87; Diener et al., 
1985), test-retest reliability and convergent validity (Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 
1991) (Pavot & Diener, 1993). 
Autobiographical narrative task. Life story narratives were attained through an 
autobiographical narrative task modified from McAdams‟ guided autobiography and 
widely used in previous research (McAdams, 2006; available at 
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/guided/; see also McLean & Breen, 
2009; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008).  Participants were asked to provide written narratives 
of a high point, low point and turning point from their life story.  High points were defined 
as “moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which he or she feels a sense of happiness, 
joy, excitement, contentment or some other positive emotion”.  Low points were defined 
as “moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which he or she feels extremely negative 
emotions such as despair, disillusionment, guilt, shame etc.”  Turning points were defined 
as “episodes through which a person undergoes substantial transition or change with 
respect to their understanding of themselves”.   
Participants were asked to write about each event in some detail, and to consider 
the following in their descriptions: how old they were when the event occurred, what 
happened in the event, who was involved in the event, what they were 
thinking/feeling/wanting in the event, why they think that this is an important event in 
their life story and what the event says about who they are.  The order in which 
participants wrote about their high point, low point, and turning point was counter-
balanced. 
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Narrative coding 
Self-event connections. Following McLean and Fournier (2008), self-event 
connections were coded as any statements where participants explicitly linked an aspect of 
the narrated event to their sense of self.  Consistent with the procedure outlined in Study 1a 
(Chapter Four),all written narratives were coded for self-event connections by the first 
author.  Twenty-four percent of the narratives were coded by an independent coder who 
was blind to the hypotheses of the study.  Consistent with the approach taken in Study 1a, 
the number of self-event connections was calculated on a per narrative basis and inter-rater 
agreement for the total number of connections per narrative was kappa .82. 
Self-event connections were also coded for valence.  Following the coding scheme 
described in Study 1a (Chapter Four),  self-event connections were coded as positive when 
the statement referred to a positive characteristic of the self, mentioned personal growth, or 
denoted a positive evaluation of the self (e.g., “This event made me stronger”).  Self-event 
connections were coded as negative when the statement referenced a negative 
characteristic of the self, or denoted a negative evaluation of the self (e.g., “this event is 
one of the main causes for the long term depression that I experience”).  Self-event 
connections were coded as neutral when there was no evaluation of the self, or the 
connection was not clearly positive or negative (e.g., “this experience changed how I think 
about the world”).  Self-event connections were coded as mixed when the connection 
involved elements of both positive and negative meaning. These were often situations 
where participants had learnt something (and thus could be considered an experience 
involving growth), but where the lesson learnt had negative connotations (e.g. “This 
experience taught me about the harsh realities of life”).   
Self-event connections were only recorded as positive or negative if the self-
characteristic highlighted was explicitly referred to as positive or negative by the 
participant (e.g., “It was a great experience because it taught me how to be independent” – 
positive; “It has helped me over the last year, but in a negative way” - negative), or if it 
satisfied common cultural understandings of desirable and undesirable characteristics (e.g., 
“I gained a lot of self-confidence” – positive, and “This [event] has made me more 
paranoid” – negative).  Self-event connections that were identified by both coders (89% of 
connections identified by the first coder) were compared for valence.  Inter-rater 
agreement for the valence of self-event connections was kappa .82. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
 On average, narratives of low points (M = 199 words, SD = 118 words, range = 33 
– 623 words) and narratives of turning points (M = 202 words, SD = 116 words, range = 
28 – 654 words) were significantly longer than narratives of high points (M = 165 words, 
SD = 84 words, range = 34 – 443 words; t (163) = 4.86, p < .05 and t (162) = 4.646, p < 
.05 respectively).  Consistent with the approach taken in prior research, the total number of 
self-event connections for each event type, and the mean, standard deviation and range of 
the number of self-event connections per narrative type is presented in Table 6.1 (McLean 
et al., 2010; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals, 2010).  On average, more self-event 
connections were found in narratives of low points (M = 1.50, SD = 1.00; t (163) = 3.32, p 
< .05) and narratives of turning points (M = 1.60, SD = .90; t (162) = 4.57, p < .05) than in 
narratives of high points (M = 1.20, SD = .95 words).  The average number of self-event 
connections found in each event type were slightly lower than the number identified in 
prior work (McLean & Fournier, 2008), yet this is consistent with the number of self-event 
connections reported in Study 1a
9
. 
Of note, participants made more positive self-event connections overall than they 
did negative self-event connections, (t(163) = 16.25, p < .05).  Where they were made, 
negative self-event connections were more likely to be found in narratives of low points 
than they were in narratives of turning points, (t(163) = 2.31, p < .05), and narratives of 
high points, (t(163) = 4.83, p < .05).  Positive self-event connections were more likely to 
be made in narratives of turning points than in narratives of low points, (t(163) = 3.02, p < 
.05), but equally likely to be made in narratives of high points. 
One point of comparison of note between the participants in the current study and 
those who participated in Study 1a is the levels of reported psychological distress.  On 
average, participants in the current study reported significantly lower levels of 
psychological distress (M = 23.65, SD = 19.90) than participants from Study 1a (M = 
32.60, SD = 29.65; t(118) = 2.74, p < .05). 
 
                                                          
9
   See Chapter Four, page 63 for a possible explanation 
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Table 6.1 
Means, standard deviations and ranges for self-event connections across memory type 
 Self-event connections 
 Positive Negative 
 Sum    M (SD) Range Sum M (SD) Range 
High points 184 1.12 (.94) 0-4 6 .04 (.22) 0-2 
Low points 160 .98 (.97) 0-4 48 .29 (.63) 0-3 
Turning points 203 1.24 (.87) 0-4 27 .16 (.50) 0-3 
1. Total 547 3.34 (1.96) 0-10 81 .49 (.90) 0-5 
 Self-event connections 
 Neutral Mixed 
 Sum    M (SD) Range Sum M (SD) Range 
High points 3 .02 (.17) 0-2 3 .02 (.13) 0-1 
Low points 13 .08 (.27) 0-1 22 .13 (.41) 0-2 
Turning points 14 .09 (.28) 0-1 19 .12 (.34) 0-2 
2. Total 30 .18 (.45) 0-3 44 .27 (.52) 0-2 
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Correlations between autobiographical reasoning valence, cognitive response styles and 
meaning in life 
Pearson correlations examined the hypotheses that the number of positive and 
negative self-event connections found in young adults‟ life story narratives would be 
associated with the three cognitive response factors and meaning in life ratings (Table 6.2).  
As predicted, the number of positive self-event connections found in narratives of low points 
was associated with adopting a positive explanatory style and greater use of cognitive 
reappraisal strategies.  Also as predicted, the number of negative self-event connections 
found in narratives of low points was positively associated with rumination and inversely 
associated with adopting a positive explanatory style and less use of cognitive reappraisal 
strategies.  Finally, as predicted, the number of negative self-event connections found in 
narratives of turning points were also positively associated with rumination and inversely 
associated with use of cognitive reappraisal strategies.  Contrary to predictions, neither the 
number of positive nor the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of 
high, low and turning points were associated with meaning in life ratings.  The total number 
of negative self-event connections made across all event types however (high, low and 
turning points combined) was associated with less meaning in life. 
Pearson correlations then examined key associations between positive/negative self-
event connections, the cognitive variables, meaning in life and the two indicators of 
psychological functioning; DASS scores and Satisfaction with life ratings (Table 6.3).  These 
correlations were performed to a) establish expected relationships between cognitive response 
styles and psychological distress, relationships between meaning in life and psychological 
well-being and b) to replicate the relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence 
and psychological functioning found in Study 1a.  As predicted, symptoms of psychological 
distress were positively associated with a negative explanatory style and rumination, and 
inversely associated with use of cognitive reappraisal strategies and meaning in life.  Also as 
predicted, satisfaction with life ratings were positively associated with meaning in life.  
Satisfaction with life ratings were also positively associated with positive explanatory style 
and use cognitive reappraisal strategies, and inversely associated with a negative explanatory 
style and rumination.   
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Table 6.2 
Correlations amongst narrative and cognitive variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Negative explanatory style -             
2. Positive explanatory style -.03 -            
3. Rumination  .25** -.06 -           
4. Cognitive reappraisal -.16* .28** -.11 -          
5. Meaning in life -.23** .22** -.27** .31** -         
Positive connections:              
6. Turning points -.24** .08 -.06 .14 .14 -        
7.  Low points -.08 .21** -.08 .19* .08 .27** -       
8. High points -.10 .09 .10 .11 .03 .14 .33** -      
9.  Total positive -.19 .18* -.02 .21** .11 .65** .77** .70** -     
Negative connections:              
10. Turning points .12 -.10 .19* -.18* -.17 -.23** .02 .06 -.06 -    
11.  Low points .11 -.26** .18* -.21** -.15 -.13 -.23** .12 -.12 .22** -   
12.  High points -.05 -.04 .01 -.03 -.13 -.01 .12 .01 .06 .00 -.08   
13. Total negative .13 -.25** .23** -.25** -.23** -.22** -.12 .12 -.10 .71** .80** .19*  
*p< .05, **p< .01 
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Replicating the findings of Study 1a, symptoms of psychological distress were 
positively associated with the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives 
of turning points and low points (and the number of negative connections found overall).  
Similar associations were found in relation to satisfaction with life.  Satisfaction with life 
ratings were inversely associated with the number of negative self-event connections found in 
narratives of low and turning points.  Unlike symptoms of psychological distress, satisfaction 
with life ratings were also positively associated with the number of positive self-event 
connections found in narratives of low points.   
 
Table 6.3 
Correlations amongst narrative variables and psychopathology/well-being scales 
 
Psychological distress 
(DASS scores) 
Psychological well-being 
(Satisfaction with life ratings) 
1. Negative explanatory style .29** -.22** 
2. Positive explanatory style -.10 .31** 
3. Rumination .62** -.38** 
4. Cognitive reappraisal -.16* .28** 
5. Meaning in life -.29** .54** 
Positive connections:   
6. Turning points -.03 .15 
7.  Low points -.14 .16* 
8. High points .01 .03 
9.  Total positive -.08 .16* 
Negative connections:   
10. Turning points .22** -.24** 
11.  Low points .16* -.27** 
12.  High points -.02 -.02 
13. Total negative .23** -.33** 
*p< .05, **p< .01 
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Significant predictors of psychological distress 
Multiple regression analyses were employed to examine the hypothesis that 
positive/negative self-event connections made in narratives of high, low and turning points 
would not explain unique variance in psychological distress (DASS scores) over and above 
that which is explained by the cognitive response factors.  The three cognitive variables 
(negative explanatory style, rumination, cognitive reappraisal) and the self-event connections 
with a significant association to DASS scores (negative connections in turning points and low 
points) were entered simultaneously as predictor variables.  Only those self-event connections 
that were significantly associated with DASS scores in Table 6.3 were included in the 
analysis to minimise the risk of over-fitting the regression equation.  Total DASS scores were 
entered as the dependent variable.   
Two predictors (negative explanatory style and rumination) explained 40% of the 
variance in DASS scores (R
2 
= .40, F(2,161) = 53.95, p < .05).  In this sample of young 
adults, symptoms of psychological distress were predicted by greater endorsement of a 
negative explanatory style (β = .14, p < .05) and higher levels of rumination about the causes 
of emotional distress (β = .58, p < .05).  The number of negative self-event connections found 
in narratives of turning points and low points did not account for unique variance in DASS 
scores. 
Significant predictors of psychological well-being (satisfaction with life) 
Multiple regression also examined the hypothesis that the number of positive and 
negative self-event connections made in narratives of high, low and turning points would not 
explain unique variance in psychological well-being (satisfaction with life ratings) over and 
above that which is explained by participants appraisal of meaning in their lives.  Again, as 
this analysis was exploratory in nature, meaning in life scores and the self-event connections 
with a significant association to psychological well-being (negative connections in turning 
points and low points and positive connections in low points) were entered simultaneously as 
predictor variables.  Only those self-event connections that were significantly associated with 
well-being scores in Table 6.3 were included in the analysis to minimise the risk of over-
fitting the regression equation.  Satisfaction with life was entered as the dependent variable.   
Two predictors (meaning in life and negative self-event connections found in 
narratives of low points) explained 43% of the variance in Satisfaction with life ratings (R
2 
= 
.33, F(2,160) = 38.99, p < .05).  In this sample of young adults, satisfaction with one‟s life 
were predicted by higher levels of meaning in life (β = .51, p < .05) and lower numbers of 
negative self-event connections in low point narratives (β = -.20, p < .05).  The number of 
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positive self-event connections found in narratives of low points did not account for unique 
variance in satisfaction with life scores. 
The relationship between negative self-event connections and psychological distress – 
mediating and/or moderating role of negative explanatory style? 
Moderation analyses tested whether negative explanatory style moderated the 
relationship between negative self-event connections made in narratives of low and turning 
points and symptoms of psychological distress (DASS scores).  The first step in exploring the 
moderation effect was to conduct a regression analysis, with the number of negative self-
event connections found in narratives of low and turning points in the first step (main effect), 
negative explanatory style entered in the second step (moderating variable).  The two-way 
interaction (negative self-event connections x negative explanatory style) was entered in the 
third step and total DASS scores were entered as the dependent variable.   Consistent with the 
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), each variable was centred before being entered 
into the regression model.  
Significant main effects were found for negative self-event connections (β = .16, p < 
.05) and negative explanatory style (β = .25, p < .05), confirming the basic relationships that 
making negative connections in narratives of low turning points and adopting a negative 
explanatory style were both individually associated with more symptoms of psychological 
distress.  The interaction between negative self-event connections and negative explanatory 
style was significant at the 10% level (β = .15, p = .06).  Since moderation effects were 
predicted, a decision was made to graph the findings and conduct simple slope analyses.  
Simple slope analysis (Figure 6.1) revealed that adopting a negative explanatory style 
exacerbated the relationship between the number of negative self-event connections in 
narratives of low and turning points and DASS scores.  The slopes for the high and moderate 
use of a negative explanatory style were significantly different from zero (slopes = 2.16 to 
3.33, ps < .05) showing that for young adults who were the most likely (and moderately 
likely) to adopt a negative explanatory style, making more negative self-event connections in 
narratives of low and turning points was associated with higher levels of psychological 
distress symptoms.  The slope for the low use of a negative explanatory style was not 
significantly different from zero (slope = 0.23, p> .05) showing that for young adults who did 
not characteristically adopt a negative explanatory style, making more negative self-event 
connections in narratives of low and turning points was not associated with an increase in 
symptoms of psychological distress. 
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Figure 6.1. Moderation of relationship between number of negative self-event connections 
found in narratives of low and turning points and psychological distress, by negative 
explanatory style 
 
Mediation analysis then explored whether negative explanatory style acted as a 
mechanism through which the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives 
of low and turning points predicted psychological distress.  The first step in the mediation 
analysis was to conduct correlations between the three variables (negative explanatory style, 
number of negative self-event connections in low and turning points combined, and 
psychological distress).  All three variables were significantly correlated at the 10% level (rs 
= .14 to .29, ps < .07).  When entered into a mediation model however, no significant 
mediation effect was detected (Sobel’s z = 1.59, p > .05).  The indirect path from negative 
self-event connections through negative explanatory style to DASS scores was non-
significant (.04).  The direct path between negative self-event connections and DASS scores 
remained significant when negative explanatory style was included in the analysis (r = .20, p 
< .05).  
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The relationship between negative self-event connections and psychological distress – 
mediating and/or moderating role of rumination? 
Regression analyses tested whether the relationship between the number of negative 
self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning points and psychological 
distress was moderated by rumination.  The number of negative self-event connections found 
in narratives of low and turning points was entered in the first step, rumination was entered in 
the second step, and the two-way interaction (negative self-event connections x rumination) 
was entered in the third step.  Total DASS scores were entered as the dependent variable.   A 
significant main effect was found for rumination (β = .59, p < .05), confirming the basic 
relationship that symptoms of psychological distress are significantly higher among young 
adults who tend to ruminate more.  There was no main effect for the number of negative self-
event connections and nor was there a significant interaction between the number of negative 
connections and rumination (βs = .08, ps > .05).  As no significant interaction was detected, 
graphing of moderation effects were not pursued.   
Mediation analysis then explored whether rumination acts as a mechanism through 
which the number of negative self-event connections made in narratives of low and turning 
points predicts symptoms of psychological distress.  All three variables (number of negative 
self-event connections in low and turning points combined, rumination and psychological 
distress) were significantly correlated (rs = .24 to .62, ps < .07).  As shown in Figure 6.2, 
rumination significantly mediated the relationship between the number of negative self-event 
connections and symptoms of psychological distress (Sobel’s z = 2.94, p < .05).  The indirect 
path from the number of negative self-event connections, through rumination, to symptoms of 
psychological distress was found to be significant (.14).  This path shows that making more 
negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points predicted higher levels 
of rumination, which in turn predicted higher levels of psychological distress.  The direct path 
from number of negative self-event connections to psychological distress was reduced to non-
significance when rumination was accounted for within the model (r = .10, p > .05).  This 
result suggests that the number of negative self-event connections made in low and turning 
point narratives was unrelated to DASS scores when rumination was included in the model.   
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Note: The numbers presented in the model are beta weights.  **p< .05 
Figure 6.2. Mediation of the relationship between the number of negative self-event 
connections in narratives of low and turning points and psychological distress, by rumination 
 
The relationship between positive/negative self-event connections and psychological 
distress – mediating and/or moderating role of cognitive reappraisal strategies? 
Regression analyses then tested whether the relationship between the number of 
positive self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning points and symptoms 
of psychological distress were moderated by use of cognitive reappraisal strategies.  The 
number of positive self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning points was 
entered in the first step, use of cognitive reappraisal strategies was entered in the second step, 
and the two-way interaction (negative self-event connections x cognitive reappraisal) was 
entered in the third step.  Total DASS scores were entered as the dependent variable.  No 
significant main effects were found for number of positive connections in narratives of low 
and turning points or for cognitive reappraisal strategies (βs = -.12 to -.10, ps > .05), nor was 
a significant interaction (positive connections x cognitive reappraisal) found (β = .07, p > 
.05).  As no significant main effects or an interaction were detected, graphing of the 
moderation effect was not pursued. 
Mediation analysis then explored whether cognitive reappraisal strategies acted as a 
mechanism through which the number of positive self-event connections made in narratives 
of low and turning points predicted lower levels of psychological distress.  A precondition for 
testing mediation effects is that all variables involved in the mediation should be significantly 
correlated.  This precondition precluded the mediating effect of cognitive reappraisal 
strategies on the positive connections to DASS relationship being tested as the number of 
0.24** 
(0.10NS) 
Negative self-event 
connections 
Psychological distress 
(DASS scores) 
Rumination 
 
0.62** 
(0.60**) 
0.24** 
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positive self-event connections made in narratives of low and turning points was not 
significantly associated with DASS scores (r = -.11, p > .05).   
The relationship between positive self-event connections and psychological well-being – 
mediating and/or moderating role of meaning in life? 
Regression analyses then tested whether the relationship between the number of 
positive self-event connections found in narratives of high, low and turning points 
(combined) and psychological well-being (as measured by Satisfaction with life) was 
moderated by meaning in life.  The total number of positive self-event connections found in 
narratives of high, low and turning points was entered in the first step, meaning in life was 
entered in the second step, and the two-way interaction (positive self-event connections x 
meaning in life) was entered in the third step.  Total Satisfaction with Life ratings were 
entered as the dependent variable.    
Significant main effects were found for positive self-event connections (β = .14, p < 
.05) and meaning in life (β = .51, p < .05), confirming the basic relationships that making 
positive connections in narratives of high, low turning points and the perception that one‟s 
life has meaning are both individually associated with increased levels of satisfaction with 
life.  The interaction between positive self-event connections and meaning in life was 
significant at the 10% level (β = -.12, p = .09), so moderation effects were pursued.  Simple 
slope analysis (Figure 6.3) revealed that for young adults who report an absence or small 
amount of meaning in life, making more positive self-event connections in narratives of high, 
low and turning points from the life story was associated with higher life satisfaction  (slopes 
= 2.06 to 2.15, ps < .05). The slope for the high level of meaning in life was not significantly 
different from zero (slope = 0.11, p > .05) showing that for young adults who reported a high 
level of meaning in life, making more positive self-event connections in narratives of high, 
low and turning points was not associated with higher satisfaction with life.   
This moderation analysis was then repeated for the total number of negative self-event 
connections found in narratives of high, low and turning points (combined).  The total 
number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of high, low and turning points 
was entered in the first step, meaning in life was entered in the second step, and the two-way 
interaction (positive self-event connections x meaning in life) was entered in the third step.  
Total DASS scores were entered as the dependent variable.   Significant main effects were 
found for negative self-event connections (β = -.22, p < .05) and meaning in life (β = .49, p 
<.05), confirming the basic relationships that making negative connections in narratives of 
high, low turning points was associated with lower levels of satisfaction with life and the 
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perception that one‟s life has meaning was associated with increased levels of satisfaction 
with life.  The interaction between negative self-event connections and meaning in life was 
not significant (β = -.01, p > .05), so moderation effects were not further pursued.   
 
 
Figure 6.3. Moderation of relationship between number of positive self-event connections 
found in narratives of high, low and turning points and satisfaction with life, by meaning in 
life 
Mediation analysis then explored whether meaning in life acted as a mechanism 
through which the number of positive self-event connections made in narratives of high, low 
and turning points (combined) predicted satisfaction with life.  The precondition for testing 
mediation effects in relation to positive connections was not met as the total number of 
positive self-event connections made in narratives of high, low and turning points was not 
significantly associated with meaning in life ratings (r = .11, p > .05).   
The precondition for testing mediation effects in relation to negative connections was 
met however.  All three variables (number of negative self-event connections in high, low 
and turning points combined, meaning in life ratings and satisfaction with life) were 
significantly correlated (rs = -.33 to .54, ps < .05).  As shown in Figure 6.4, meaning in life 
partially mediated the relationship between the number of positive self-event connections and 
satisfaction with life ratings (Sobel’s z = -2.75, p < .05).  The indirect path from the number 
of negative self-event connections, through meaning in life, to satisfaction in life was 
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significant (-.11).  This path shows that young adults who made fewer negative self-event 
connections in narratives of high, low and turning points reported more meaning in life, 
which in turn was associated with increased satisfaction with life.  The direct path from 
number of negative self-event connections to satisfaction in life was reduced, but not to non-
significance when meaning in life was included in the model (r = -.22, p> .05).  This suggests 
that meaning in life ratings partially accounted for the relationship between fewer negative 
self-event connections made in high, low and turning point narratives and satisfaction with 
life.   
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The numbers presented in the model are beta weights.  **p< .05 
Figure 6.4. Mediation of the relationship between negative self-event connections in 
narratives of high, low and turning points and Satisfaction with Life ratings by meaning in 
life ratings 
Discussion 
There were two main areas of investigation in the current study.  The first area 
examined whether autobiographical reasoning valence (as measured by positive and negative 
self-event connections) was related to each of the three cognitive response factors and 
meaning in life.  The second area examined whether cognitive response factors and meaning 
in life ratings mediated and/or moderated the relationship between the valence of 
autobiographical reasoning found in young adults‟ life story narratives and psychological 
functioning. By examining these associations, I aimed to investigate whether our 
understanding of the link between psychological functioning and autobiographical reasoning 
valence could be enhanced by considering additional factors that may be involved in this 
relationship.  Before considering findings in relation to these aims, the question of whether 
the basic relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological 
functioning outline in Study 1a was replicated will be addressed. 
-0.33** 
(-0.22**) 
Negative self-event 
connections 
Satisfaction with life 
Meaning in life 
 
0.54** 
(0.49**) 
-0.23** 
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Relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning 
In the current study, participants were asked to narrate a third event type, turning 
points, in addition to low and high points.  Turning points may demonstrate a stronger 
relationship to autobiographical reasoning than low or high points because they involve a 
substantial change to the individual or their life and such changes, in a theoretical sense, are 
likely to be explained by autobiographical reasoning (McAdams et al., 2001; McLean & 
Pratt, 2006).   
As predicted, the overall number of negative self-event connections found in young 
adults‟ life story narratives (high points, low points and turning points combined) was 
positively associated with symptoms of psychological distress.  When analysed by event type, 
symptoms of psychological distress were only associated with the number of negative self-
event connections found in narratives of low points and turning points.  This is consistent 
with prior work highlighting that the manner in which negative events are processed has 
greater implications for psychological functioning than the processing of positive events (e.g. 
Lyubomirsky, Sousa & Dickerhoof, 2006; Pals, 2006).   
Unexpectedly, the number of positive self-event connections made in narratives of 
high, low, and turning points (both separately and combined), was unrelated to symptoms of 
psychological distress.  These findings contradict those presented in Study 1a, which showed 
that symptoms of psychological distress were lower among young adults who made more 
positive self-event connections.  This inconsistency in findings may reflect differences in the 
level of distress reported by each of the two samples.  Participants in Study 1a reported 
higher scores on the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
and a higher range of scores than participants in the current study (average score of 33 in 
Chapter Three, and 23 in the current study).   The limited range of DASS scores present in 
the current study may have limited the extent to which relationships between positive 
connections and distress symptoms could be observed.   
Relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence, cognitive response styles 
and psychological functioning 
Negative explanatory style. 
Consistent with prior work, adopting a negative explanatory style was positively 
associated with symptoms of psychological distress (depression, anxiety and stress 
combined) (Luten at al., 1997; Mongrain & Blackburn, 2005; Palker-Corell & Marcus, 2004; 
Runyon & Kenny, 2002).  Unexpectedly, adopting a negative explanatory style was unrelated 
to the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning 
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points from the life story.  Relatedly, negative explanatory style did not mediate the 
relationship between the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of 
low and turning points and psychological distress.  Although direct comparisons to prior 
work cannot be made due to unique style of coding self-event connection valence used in this 
study, the non-significant relationship between negative self-event connections and negative 
explanatory style is consistent with the non-significant relationship between negative 
explanatory style and contamination sequences found by Adler et al. (2006).  These findings 
converge on the notion that autobiographical reasoning and explanatory style represent 
different cognitive processes.   
Pasupathi, Mansour and Brubaker (2007) made the distinction between self-event 
connections that describe a change in the self as a result of an experience and self-event 
connections that explain why an event happened (i.e. a stability connection).  These two types 
of self-event connections are highlighted in the following examples:   
“My grandmother died when I was around 13 years old ... I was very close 
to her even though she lived four hours away ... this event kinda made me 
numb to pain ... I think this has a negative impact on my life though because 
I find it hard to care about other people even when in relationships with 
them” (change connection) 
 
“I was 19 when I drunkenly smashed a window walking home by myself 
and had to spend a night in hospital so that my hand could be sewn up ... I 
felt embarrassed and ashamed that I'd lost control and that I couldn't take 
care of myself, or couldn't responsibly manage my own drinking. It 
probably happened because I can be immature in approaching certain 
situations and not think through some decisions properly” (stability 
connection) 
 
In considering the difference between these two types of self-event connections, it is 
clear that adopting a negative explanatory style is similar to making stability connections.  In 
the above example, the young adult attributes the event (smashing a window while drunk) to 
internal, stable and global characteristics of the self (immaturity and impulsivity – not 
thinking through one‟s decisions).  In the example of a change connection, however, the 
young adult does not make an attribution regarding the cause of the event, but instead makes 
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a causal link between the event and the development of a self-characteristic (emotional 
disengagement from others) which they appraise as being negative.  The non-significant 
relationship between negative explanatory style and negative self-event connections may 
therefore reflect the notion that adopting a negative explanatory style is expressed as stability 
connections, but is unrelated to explain connections.  Informal observations of the current 
data suggest that self-event connections describing self-change were more common than self-
event connections that describe stable characteristics of the self.  The small number of 
negative self-event connections that described stability in the self and attribute the event to 
these stable features of the self would limit the likelihood of such an association being 
detected.   
Adopting a negative explanatory style did, however, moderate the relationship 
between the number of negative self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning 
points and symptoms of psychological distress.  For young adults who showed the strongest 
tendency to attribute the cause of negative events to internal, stable and global aspects of the 
self, making more negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points was 
associated with an increase in symptoms of psychological distress.  For young adults who 
were less likely to attribute the cause of negative events to internal, stable and global aspects 
of the self, making more negative self-event connections was not related to an increase or 
decrease in symptoms of distress.   
The significant moderation effect suggests that although adopting a negative 
explanatory style and making negative self-event connections are not related to each other, 
psychological distress is significantly predicted by the interaction of these factors.   
Individuals who adopt a negative explanatory style have been shown to demonstrate an 
attentional bias towards negative self-relevant information.  In one study, individuals who 
scored highly on a measure of negative explanatory style attended better to negative 
adjectives (e.g. failure) than neutral words when attentional resources were low (Romens, 
MacCoon, Abramson, & Pollak, 2011).  This heightened attention to negative information 
about the self may thus present as an additional risk factor for psychological distress, as 
negative self-related information becomes more salient than neutrally valenced information.  
Following this, making negative self-event connections may be attended to more strongly for 
young adults who tend to adopt a negative explanatory style, while other aspects of the event 
receive comparably less attention.  This increased heightened focus on, and subsequent 
salience of, negative information about the self may account for the increase in psychological 
distress for these individuals.    
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Positive explanatory style. 
Adopting a positive explanatory style was not related to symptoms of psychological 
distress.  The absence of a significant relationship is not surprising given that the positive 
explanatory style is not as conceptually sound, and has not demonstrated as strong a 
relationship to psychological distress, as its negative counterpart (Johnson, et al., 1998; 
Needles & Abramson, 1990).  Young adults who were more likely to adopt a positive 
explanatory style did however, make more positive self-event connections in narratives of 
low points relative to young adults who tended not to use a positive explanatory style.  
Limited research investigating positive explanatory style has shown an association between 
this cognitive factor and positive appraisals regarding the outcome of negative or traumatic 
events.  Specifically, Ho, Chan, Yau and Yeung (2011) found that adopting a positive 
explanatory style is associated with post-traumatic growth, defined as beliefs about positive 
outcomes for the self e.g. personal strength as a result of negative experiences.  In explaining 
these findings, Ho et al, (2011) suggest that a tendency to adopt a positive explanatory style 
aids the development of a “habitual reflex” which enables individuals to cope with difficult 
experiences in a positive way (i.e. perceive positive changes from negative experiences).  
Following this interpretation, making positive self-event connections in narratives of difficult 
life experiences (low and turning points) may be associated with a habitual tendency to think 
about the self in generally positive terms.   
The association between positive explanatory style and positive self-event 
connections in low points, but not high points, is somewhat surprising given that a positive 
explanatory style is defined in terms of attributing the causes of positive events to internal, 
global and stable characteristics of the self.  As highlighted by the findings of the current 
study and those presented in Study 1a (Chapter Four) however, self-event connections are 
much less likely to be made in narratives of high points than they are in narratives of low 
points.  The low number of self-event connections made in narratives of high points likely 
limited the extent to which such an association could be detected.   
Rumination. 
Consistent with a large body of previous research (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010; 
McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Watkins, 2009), rumination was strongly and 
significantly associated with symptoms of psychological distress.  Young adults who were 
more likely to ruminate in response to feelings of distress made more negative self-event 
connections in turning and low point narratives than young adults who do not tend to 
ruminate.  Rumination also significantly (and fully) mediated the relationship between the 
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number of negative self-event connections made in narratives of low and turning points and 
symptoms of psychological distress.  This full mediation effect suggests that young adults 
who make more negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points tend 
to ruminate more about their feelings of distress, which in turn is associated with higher 
levels of psychological distress.  Highlighting the full mediation effect, the direct relationship 
between negative self-event connections and symptoms of psychological distress was reduced 
to non-significance when rumination was entered into the model.  This finding suggests that 
negative self-event connections are not uniquely associated with distress symptoms outside of 
the relationship which includes rumination. 
One possible interpretation of these findings is that rumination is an underlying 
mechanism which explains why young adults who make negative self-event connections 
experience symptoms of psychological distress.  That is, young adults who make more 
negative self-event connections in narratives of low and turning points may experience more 
psychological distress because they ruminate about the cause of their distress.  The content of 
negative self-event connections may become entwined in the process of rumination as 
individuals may attribute the cause of their distress, at least in part, to the negative 
characteristics of the self described in negative self-event connections.  This interpretation is 
consistent with prior work showing that for individuals experiencing psychological distress, 
ruminative self-focus is associated with an increase in negative judgements about the self 
(Rimes & Watkins, 2005).   
It is important to note that the mediation model tested in the current study is just one 
way of presenting the directionality of the relationship between negative self-event 
connections, rumination and psychological distress.  The cross-sectional nature of the data 
precludes firm conclusions being made about the direction of causality between these three 
variables.  From a theoretical perspective, another mediation model in which rumination 
leads to an increased number of negative self-event connections being made in life story 
narratives, which in turn may relate to an increase in distress symptoms, is possible.  
Longitudinal data is needed to compare the model tested in the current study with alternative 
models that conceptualise negative self-event connections as the mediating variable.   
Rumination did not moderate the relationship between the number of negative self-
event connections in narratives of low and turning points and psychological distress.  The 
absence of a moderation effect suggests that the relationship between the number of negative 
self-event connections found in narratives of low and turning points did not depend, or was 
not altered by, different levels of rumination.  This finding is surprising in light of cognitive 
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models of psychopathology which suggest that depressed affect is intensified by the 
interaction between negative cognitions about the self and rumination (Ciesla& Roberts, 
2007).  Ciesla and Roberts (2007) found a positive association between dysphoric affect and 
dysfunctional (negative) attitudes when rumination was also present, while no such 
association was found when rumination was absent.    
There are, however, some obvious differences between the current study and that of 
Ciesla and Roberts (2007).  In the latter study, dysfunctional attitudes were assessed as an 
indicator of negative schematic content.  The measure of dysfunctional attitudes used by 
Ciesla and Roberts (2007) assesses rigid beliefs commonly held by distressed individuals 
(e.g. “People will think less of me if I make a mistake”) but do not necessarily assess 
negative thoughts about one‟s qualities or characteristics.  Thus negative self-event 
connections and dysfunctional beliefs as assessed by the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (see 
de Graaf, Roelofs, & Huibers, 2009) may not be measuring the same construct.  Second, 
Ciesla and Roberts (2007) induced rumination via an experimental manipulation whereas the 
current study assessed young adults‟ self-reported engagement in rumination.  Thus the 
moderating effect of rumination on the relationship between negative cognition and 
psychological distress may be observed in „real-time‟ measurement of rumination, but not in 
self-reported assessments of one‟s general tendency to ruminate which are retrospective in 
nature.  One way of exploring this possibility in future research would be to substitute the 
self-report measure of rumination with a rumination induction task such as that used by 
Ciesla and Roberts (2007).   
Cognitive reappraisal strategies. 
Consistent with previous findings, young adults who characteristically engaged in 
cognitive reappraisal strategies experienced fewer symptoms of psychological distress than 
those who tend not to use these strategies.  As expected, the number of positive self-event 
connections made in narratives of low points was positively associated with use of cognitive 
reappraisal strategies.  This finding is consistent with previous work showing that individuals 
who characteristically use cognitive reappraisal strategies express more positive views of 
themselves and their lives in general, than do non-appraisers (Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008).  
These findings are also consistent with earlier work highlighting an association between 
reappraisal strategies and maintenance of a positive self-concept and self-esteem (Webster & 
Tiggeman, 2003).   
Cognitive reappraisal strategies did not moderate nor mediate the relationship 
between positive self-event connections and symptoms of psychological distress.  There are a 
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number of reasons for the absence of such effects.  First, the current study found that 
psychological distress was related to negative, but not positive, self-event connections.  In 
cognitive models of psychological distress, positive thoughts and beliefs about the self are not 
implicated in the development and maintenance of negative emotional states in the same way 
that are negative thoughts and beliefs about the self.  While individuals who experience 
negative emotional states may concurrently experience some positive thoughts about the self, 
the impact of these thoughts may differ to that of negative self-related thoughts.  For 
example, Ross, Mueller, and De Le Torre (1986) found that young adults who experienced 
moderate levels of depression perceived negative traits as distinct to themselves but did not 
perceive positive traits in the same way.  Therefore, one possibility is that positive self-event 
connections are over-shadowed by any negative self-event connections made, as these 
negative statements about the self take on more self-relevant meaning than positive 
statements.   
Predicting psychological distress from cognitive and narrative variables 
The findings of the current study showed that symptoms of psychological distress 
were predicted by negative explanatory style and rumination, but not the number of negative 
self-event connections made in life story narratives.  These findings suggest that the 
relationships between the valence of self-event connections found in life story narratives and 
indicators of psychological distress may be better accounted for by cognitive response styles.   
Due to the cross-sectional nature of the study, the findings do not allow any 
conclusions about causality to be made.  One possibility is that cognitive response factors 
such as explanatory style, rumination and cognitive reappraisal strategies pre-date and play a 
causal role in the use of autobiographical reasoning to draw negative/positive self-event 
connections.  From a developmental perspective, there is evidence that two of the three 
cognitive response factors (explanatory style and rumination) are exhibited by children as 
young as 8 or 9 years old (Joiner & Wagner, 1995).  Although evidence regarding use of 
cognitive reappraisal strategies is more limited, young adolescents 13 years of age and over 
have demonstrated use of reappraisal as an emotion-regulation strategy (Rood, Roelofs, 
Bögels, & Arntz, 2012).  From both a theoretical perspective and according to limited 
empirical data, autobiographical reasoning capabilities increase in sophistication during late 
adolescence (McLean & Breen, 2009).  Thus it seems plausible that cognitive response styles 
develop first and potentially predispose young adults to reason about the self in positive or 
negative ways during construction of the life story.  It is important to note, however, that the 
patterns between the cognitive response factors and psychological functioning in childhood 
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mirror those observed in adults.  That is, children who demonstrate a negative explanatory 
style and engage in rumination are more likely to have developed depressive symptoms by 
the time they reach young adulthood.  As discussed in Chapter Four, these depressive 
symptoms are reciprocally likely to impact on young adults‟ thoughts and emotions about 
themselves, which in turn is likely to impact the autobiographical reasoning process. 
Relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence, meaning in life and 
psychological functioning 
As expected, young adults who reported greater meaning in their lives also reported 
greater levels of satisfaction with their lives.  This is consistent with prior work highlighting a 
strong association between meaning and satisfaction in life (Steger &Kashdan, 2007; Steger, 
Oishi, & Kesebir, 2011).  Unexpectedly, meaning in life was unrelated to the number of 
positive self-event connections found in narratives of high points, low points or turning points 
from the life story (separately and combined).  This non-significant finding raises questions 
about whether the construction of meaning in relation to single life events relates to a broader 
sense of meaning in one‟s life.  King, Hicks, Krull and Del Gaiso (2006) noted the difference 
between making a global assessment of the extent to which one‟s life has meaning and the 
subjective experience of a single day (or days) as being meaningful.  These authors found that 
individuals‟ judgements about the meaningfulness of a given day were more strongly related 
to the amount of positive affect the individual experienced on the day than it was to global 
assessments of meaning in their lives.  While the daily assessments of meaning were not 
limited to a single event, these findings highlight the possibility that individuals may not refer 
to memories of single events or days when making global assessments of meaning in life.  In 
a similar way, deriving meaning from a life story event may be only part of the information 
individuals use when assessing the overall meaning of their lives (see Morgan & Farsides, 
2009 for other factors which may be involved in assessments of global meaning in life).   
Although positive self-event connections were unrelated to meaning in life ratings, 
moderation analysis showed that in the absence of meaning in one‟s life, making positive 
self-event connections in narratives of high, low and turning points from the life story was 
associated with an increase in life satisfaction.  Even with this increase in life satisfaction, 
however, young adults who reported the lowest levels of meaning in life were less satisfied 
with their lives than young adults who reported higher levels of meaning in life.  These 
findings may suggest that even those young adults who believe that their life has little 
meaning overall can experience greater life satisfaction by deriving positive meaning from 
single experiences.  A high degree of caution is needed in making this interpretation due to 
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the cross-sectional nature of the data.  Another likely possibility is that young adults who 
experience slightly higher life satisfaction, despite a relative absence of meaning in their 
lives, are simply more able to make positive self-event connections than young adults with 
comparatively lower levels of life satisfaction.   
As predicted, the number of negative self-event connections in narratives of high, low 
and turning points (combined) was associated with the sense that one‟s life does not have 
meaning.  Further, highlighting the strength of the association between negative connections 
and life satisfaction, both negative self-event connections and meaning in life ratings 
explained unique variance in satisfaction with life.  These findings suggest that psychological 
well-being reflects not only having meaning in one‟s life, but also the absence of negative 
self-event connections in life story narratives.  Individual differences in meaning in life were 
also shown to significantly mediate the relationship between the number of negative self-
event connections in life story narratives and low life satisfaction.  That is, young adults who 
made more negative self-event connections in life story narratives reported less meaning in 
life which in turn was associated with lower levels of satisfaction with life.  Again due to the 
correlational nature of our analysis, no firm conclusions can be made about the mechanisms 
underlying this mediation effect.  One possibility is that making negative self-event 
connections reduces young adults‟ sense of meaning in life which in turn reduces life 
satisfaction.   Alternatively, young adults who perceive their lives to be low on meaning may 
be more likely to make negative self-event connections when narrating life story events.   
Due to the relatively small sample size, each of the moderation and mediation effects 
was examined separately.  While this was acceptable given the exploratory nature of the 
study, the use of structural equation modelling to examine these effects in combination would 
provide a clearer picture of how all of these variables interact.  In past research and in the 
current study, many of the cognitive, narrative and meaning variables were significantly 
associated with each other, and with both indicators of psychological functioning (Chang & 
Sanna, 2007; Gross and John, 2003).  Incorporating a number of these variables into a path 
model using structural equation modelling would enable key (potentially) causal variables to 
be identified, thus leading to a more refined model of the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning.  This limitation with the 
current study could be easily addressed by further research with larger sample sizes.   
In summary, the results of the current study extend previous narrative identity 
research by showing that the valence of autobiographical reasoning found in life story 
narratives of young adults is associated with a number of cognitive response styles 
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(explanatory style, rumination and use of cognitive reappraisal strategies).  The results of the 
current study also suggest that the relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence 
and psychological functioning may be better understood when additional variables such as 
cognitive response factors and meaning in life are taken into account.   
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Chapter Seven 
Study 3: An investigation into the relationships between autobiographical reasoning, 
psychological functioning and the visual recall perspective and subjective distance of life 
story memories 
 Across the three studies presented thus far (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2), psychological 
distress in young adulthood has been shown to be associated with a greater tendency to make 
negative self-event connections in life story narratives.  In two of the three studies (Study 1a 
and Study 1b), positive psychological functioning, or an absence of psychological distress, 
has been associated with a greater tendency to make positive self-event connections.  Study 2 
identified a number of cognitive factors that are associated with young adults‟ tendency to 
make negative and positive self-event connections.  These findings show that broader 
patterns of thinking about the world and one‟s experiences are associated with the way young 
adults reason about the self in the context of the life story.  Study 2 and the current study, 
Study 3, share the same aim in that both seek to explore key factors that may be associated 
with the tendency to engage in positive and negative autobiographical reasoning in young 
adulthood.  Study 3 extends this exploration to a slightly different component of the 
experience of constructing a life story, namely, the phenomenology of autobiographical 
memories included in the life story. 
 The justification for examining links between autobiographical reasoning and 
autobiographical memory phenomenology, the way memories are consciously experienced 
(Rubin & Siegler, 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2007), was two-fold.  First, very little research has 
examined the phenomenology of autobiographical memories included in the life story and to 
date no research has examined links between phenomenology and autobiographical 
reasoning.  Second, autobiographical memory phenomenology has been shown to be related 
to psychological functioning (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b; D‟Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004; Kuyken and Howell, 2006; Lemogne et al., 2006).  The current study aimed to assess 
two phenomenological qualities of life story memories that, from a theoretical perspective, 
may relate to autobiographical reasoning.  These two phenomenological qualities include the 
visual perspective from which life story events are recalled and the subjective distance 
individuals experience from life story events.  Within this broad aim, the current study 
examined two previously untested associations: 1) whether autobiographical reasoning found 
in life story narratives was related to the visual perspective from which life story events were 
recalled and the subjective distance experienced from these events, and 2) whether and how, 
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visual perspective and subjective distance interact with autobiographical reasoning valence to 
predict psychological functioning.  Before each of these areas of investigation are outlined, 
the two phenomenological characteristics - visual perspective and subjective distance - will 
be discussed. 
Visual perspective 
 Visual perspective, first described by Nigro and Neisser (1983), is defined as the 
perspective from which individuals view a remembered event while recalling the experience.  
Memories recalled from a first-person or „field perspective‟ are recalled through the 
individuals‟ own eyes, as if they were re-experiencing the event.  Memories recalled from a 
third-person or „observer perspective‟ are remembered from an external vantage point, as if 
the individual were watching the event unfold from the position of a spectator.   
From a theoretical perspective, the mental imagery associated with each of the field 
and observer perspectives alters the relationship between the self and one‟s environment 
during the recall process (Libby & Eibach, 2011).  The imagery associated with recalling an 
event from the field perspective provides the individual with a sense that they are reliving the 
experience and interacting with their environment in the same way that they did during the 
actual event (akin to the „experiential‟ conception of self; Libby & Eibach, 2011).  Consistent 
with this notion, first-person memories tend to contain more emotional and sensory 
information than do observer memories (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Sutin & Robins, 2010).  For 
example, McIsaac and Eich (2004) found that individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) who recalled the traumatic event from the field perspective recalled more emotional 
reactions, physical sensations and psychological states from the event than did participants 
who recalled the event from the observer perspective.  Although there were no differences in 
PTSD symptoms across the two groups, participants who recalled the traumatic memory from 
the field perspective rated the memory as more emotional and anxiety provoking than did 
participants who recalled the experience from the observer perspective.  Similar findings 
have been detected in relation to non-traumatic memories (Terry & Horton, 2007-2008). 
In contrast, the mental imagery associated with recalling an event from the observer 
perspective allows individuals to observe and analyse themselves as if from the perspective 
of another person (Libby & Eibach, 2011; Sutin & Robins, 2008).  This perspective 
potentially enables individuals to derive more descriptive and abstract information about the 
self and to analyse the performance and characteristics of the self in the broader context of 
the event (the „conceptual‟ representation of the self; Wilson & Ross, 2003; Libby & Eibach, 
2011).   
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 Consistent with the theoretical views of Libby and Eibach (2011), there is some 
evidence that the observer perspective increases the focus on descriptive and abstract 
information about the self during the recall process.  In an early study (Frank & Gilovich, 
1989), undergraduate students were asked to engage in a conversation with another 
participant, and to rate their own behavior along four dimensions: friendliness, dominance, 
nervousness and talkativeness.  At two time points (both at the time of the study and three 
weeks later), participants rated the extent to which their behaviour during the conversation 
was caused by personal characteristics of their self (e.g. personality, personal style) or 
situational factors (e.g. the topic of conversation, the other participant‟s behavior).  Visual 
recall perspective was manipulated at time two.  During the second session, participants were 
asked to either the recall the conversation from an observer or field perspective.  Participants 
who were asked to recall the event from the observer perspective made more dispositional 
attributions and fewer situational attributions for their behavior at Time 2 than they did at 
Time 1.  Findings were reversed for the field perspective condition. Participants who were 
asked to recall the conversation from a field perspective made fewer dispositional and more 
situational attributions at Time 2 relative to Time 1.  These findings suggest that the observer 
perspective actively promotes a focus on dispositional attributes (the „conceptualised‟ self-
representation) in favour of situational factors. 
 There is also evidence that observer memories are associated with events in which 
one‟s knowledge about the self is particularly prominent.  Crawley and French (2005) asked 
undergraduate students to recall two types of childhood events; those that they remembered 
themselves and those that they had no conscious recollection of but knew had happened 
(because family members had recounted the event etc.).  Participants were also asked to 
record, when visualising the event, whether the event was recalled using the field or observer 
perspective.  Findings showed that remembered events were more likely to be recalled from a 
field perspective, whereas events based only on knowledge about the self (e.g. transmitted 
through parents and close others) were more likely to be recalled from an observer 
perspective.  
 In summary, recalling past events from the observer perspective has been associated 
with an increased tendency to derive abstract and descriptive information about one‟s self-
characteristics.  Recalling events from the field perspective, on the other hand, has been 
associated with an increased sense of „reliving‟ the event held in memory, in which the 
internal experiences one had at the time are re-experienced during the process of recall.  
125 
 
 
 
These features of the observer and field recall perspectives will be revisited later in this 
chapter.  
Subjective distance 
 Subjective distance is defined as the extent to which an individual feels subjectively 
close to, or far away from, a recalled past event (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  Memories that are 
perceived as more distant tend to be associated with a subjective sense that the person the 
individual was at the time of the recalled event is different to the person they are at the time 
of recall, with the opposite being true for a subjective sense of closeness (Sutin & Robins, 
2007).   
 According to Temporal Self-Appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 
2001; 2003), individuals can influence the way they feel about themselves by altering the 
way they relate to memories involving „past selves‟.  Particularly, positive emotions about the 
self and a sense of self-improvement can be attained by actively comparing positive aspects 
of the current self (attributes, skills, strengths) with a past self that did not possess these 
characteristics (Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009).  Guided by the assumption that individuals are 
driven to feel positively about themselves, temporal self-appraisal theory proposes that 
individuals can enhance positive self-regard by retaining a sense of closeness to past selves 
that are viewed favourably and maximising the distance to past selves that are viewed 
disparagingly (Wilson & Ross, 2001; 2003). 
 There is some evidence that subjective distancing serves to support favourable views 
of the current self.  Wilson and Ross (2001) manipulated participants‟ subjective sense of 
distance to a past event by altering the instructions given regarding recall of the event.  
Participants who were induced to feel close to the remembered event were asked to recall a 
“time in the recent past, the beginning of this [university] term” while participants who were 
induced to feel distant from the event were asked to “think all the way back to the beginning 
of the [university] term” (p. 580).  Participants were then asked to evaluate their current self 
and past self (the self that was represented in the memory) on a number of positive (e.g. 
social skills, confidence) and negative (e.g. immature, naïve) characteristics.  Although the 
actual time that had elapsed between the event and the time of the study was the same across 
conditions, participants in the „close‟ condition rated their past and present selves similarly, 
while participants in the „distant‟ condition rated their current selves more positively than 
their past selves.  These findings are consistent with the notion that a sense of subjective 
distance from past events may maintain the individual‟s perception that they are improving 
and developing over time (see also Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009).. 
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Visual perspective and psychological distance of life story events 
 Very little is known about the visual perspective from which events included in the 
life story are recalled or the subjective distance individuals experience from life story events.  
With regard to visual perspective, Kuyken and Howell (2006) asked adolescents aged 
between 12 and 18 years to describe two self-defining memories and to state whether they 
recalled the event from an observer or field perspective.  Just under 70% of all self-defining 
memories were recalled from the field perspective, with the remainder recalled from the 
observer perspective.  This is consistent with earlier findings showing that approximately 
one-third of autobiographical memories in general are recalled from the observer perspective 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  In terms of subjective distance, Sutin (2008) asked young adults to 
write narratives of self-defining memories and rate the sense of subjective distance they 
experienced in relation to each of these events.  The average subjective distance ratings were 
centered around the mid-point of the scale, suggesting that self-defining memories may not 
be perceived as particularly close nor distant from the self. 
 The first aim of the current study was to replicate and extend findings regarding the 
visual perspective and subjective distance of personally significant events by examining these 
phenomenological characteristics in the context of events that are specifically included in the 
life story.  With very little prior research on which to base hypotheses, the following two 
were made: 1) the majority of events included in the life story (high points, low points and 
turning points) would be recalled from the field perspective and 2) participants would 
perceive a moderate degree of distance between the memory/the self that is represented in the 
memory for the event. 
Relationships among visual perspective, subjective distance and autobiographical 
reasoning found in life story narratives 
 In light of limited research regarding the phenomenology of life story memories, no 
research to date has examined whether the visual perspective of, and subjective distance 
from, life story memoires relate to the process of autobiographical reasoning.  From a 
theoretical perspective, there is reason to expect that such relationships may exist.  Narratives 
of autobiographical memories included in the life story often contain evidence of 
autobiographical reasoning.  As described in earlier chapters, autobiographical reasoning is 
defined as a process through which individuals make connections between a past experience 
and an aspect of their current self.   
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 By definition, autobiographical reasoning involves deriving descriptive and abstract 
information about the self from a past event.  For example,  
“A high point in my life was walking across the stage at my high school 
graduation. I was feeling very proud ... it showed me that yes, if you do work 
hard and stay focused you will succeed in whatever you do and it shows that I 
am a committed and very determined person” 
In this example, the young adult remembers key details from the event: „walking across the 
stage‟ and „feeling proud‟ and through autobiographical reasoning, links the memory for the 
event to two pieces of abstract information: a life lesson „if you work hard you can achieve 
anything‟ and dispositional characteristics of themselves „I am a committed and determined 
person”.   
 The second aim of the current study was to explore key relationships between visual 
perspective used to recall life story events and autobiographical reasoning.  Given the 
proposed role of the observer perspective in promoting self-evaluative thinking, and prior 
research showing that the observer perspective is associated with an increased tendency to 
identify dispositional characteristics and abstract information relating to the self, it is possible 
that autobiographical reasoning would be more common in narratives of memories that are 
recalled from the observer perspective than in narratives of memories recalled from the field 
perspective.  In light of no prior research on the relationship between the visual perspective 
used when recalling life story events and autobiographical reasoning in narratives of these 
events, the following hypothesis was tentatively made: across all event types (low points, 
high points and turning points) and controlling for the age of the memory, use of the observer 
perspective would be positively associated with the amount of autobiographical reasoning 
found in narratives of these events. 
 The relationship between subjective distance and autobiographical reasoning may be 
more complex.  Subjective distance from a remembered event is defined by the extent to 
which the memory represents a self that is similar or different from the person the individual 
believes they are today.  As noted by Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker (2007), 
autobiographical reasoning can either describe stability or changes in the self over time.  
Autobiographical reasoning that describes self-stability occurs when a characteristic of the 
self causes an event or explains why an event has occurred.  For example: 
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“When I was 18 I left home, moved away and started university ... I was anxious 
to leave as I knew I would miss my friends and family ... the fact that I moved 
anyway shows that I am an independent young woman that can make her own 
choices and knows when to grow up” 
Autobiographical reasoning that describes change in the self as the result of an experience 
can either involve gaining a new insight or the development of personal characteristics or 
gaining a new awareness of existing characteristics.  For example: 
“I went to Zimbabwe at the beginning of this year. I was seventeen at the time ... 
It was such a new experience to me and I loved every minute of it ... My time in 
Zimbabwe taught me a lot about what we take for granted here in New Zealand 
such as power, and safety and I developed a greater sense of culture awareness” 
 The third aim of the current study was to explore relationships between subjective 
distance from life story events and autobiographical reasoning.  In light of the theoretical 
notion that memories for events that reflect a changed feature of the self are experienced with 
greater subjective distance from the current self, it is reasonable to expect that narratives of 
life story events perceived as distant to the current self will contain more autobiographical 
reasoning that describes how the self has changed than events perceived as closer to the self.  
The following prediction was made to explore this previously untested relationship: across all 
event types (low points, high points and turning points), greater subjective distance from the 
event would be positively associated with autobiographical reasoning that describes changes 
in the self. 
Relationships among visual perspective and psychological functioning 
As noted earlier, aspects of autobiographical memory phenomenology, such as visual 
perspective and subjective distance, have also been linked to psychological functioning.  
Specifically, experiences of negative emotional states (depression and anxiety) have been 
associated with an increased tendency to recall autobiographical memories from an observer 
(third-person) perspective.  The study by Kuyken and Howell (2006) described above 
compared the visual perspective used when recalling self-defining memories and 
autobiographical memories recalled in response to positive and negative cue words by 
adolescents who met diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and non-depressed 
adolescents.  Depressed adolescents were more likely to recall both positive and negative 
autobiographical memories and self-defining memories from an observer (third-person) 
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perspective than non-depressed adolescents.  Furthermore, among adolescents who had never 
been diagnosed with depression, symptoms of depressive states and symptoms were 
associated with an increased tendency to recall autobiographical memories from an observer 
perspective. 
 One theoretical explanation for the link between psychological distress and the 
observer recall perspective is that the observer perspective reduces emotional engagement 
with past experiences (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Lemogne et al., 2006).  As noted earlier, the 
imagery associated with recalling an event from the field perspective provides the individual 
with a sense that they are reliving the experience (Libby & Eibach, 2011).  According to 
Berntsen and Rubin (2006) and Lemogne et al. (2006), individuals who are experiencing 
psychological distress demonstrate a preference for the observer recall perspective as they are 
motivated to avoid the aversive internal experiences associated with many of their life events.   
While this may serve an avoidance function for experiences of distress in the short term, it 
may prevent these individuals from reliving past events with positive emotional content.   
 This theoretical notion is supported by prior work showing that recalling positive 
experiences from the field perspective allows individuals to engage fully with the positive 
emotions associated with these enjoyable events, which in turn increase positive affect.  
Holmes, Coughtry and Conner (2008) asked participants to listen to descriptions of events 
that had positive outcomes or elements and imagine the event from the field perspective 
(group 1), observer perspective (group 2) or with a focus on verbal comprehension (control 
group).  Participants also completed a measure of positive affect before and after listening to 
the event descriptions.  Findings showed that participants who imagined the events from the 
field perspective demonstrated an increase in positive affect over the course of the exercise.  
In comparison, positive affect decreased in participants who imagined the events from the 
observer perspective and participants in the verbal condition.  A reduced ability to engage 
with the emotional content of positive events via the field perspective has been 
conceptualised as a risk factor for psychological distress.  In one indirect test of this claim, 
Bergouignan et al. (2008) found that euthymic individuals in remission from depression (who 
may remain at higher risk of relapse than never-depressed individuals) were less likely to 
recall positive experiences from a field perspective than were never-depressed controls.     
 The fourth aim of the current study was to examine this theoretical link between the 
observer perspective and psychological functioning in the context of positive and negative 
events from the life story.  Following the theoretical notion that the observer perspective may 
be one key strategy adopted by psychologically distressed individuals to reduce emotional 
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engagement with difficult experiences, I predicted that young adults who recalled low points, 
high points and turning points from the life story from the observer perspective would 
experience more negative emotional states (symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress) than 
young adults who recalled these events from the field perspective. 
 An alternative theoretical explanation for the relationship between the observer 
perspective and psychological distress is that the increased focus on self-evaluation afforded 
by the observer perspective increases the salience of negative self-perceptions that are 
typically held by psychologically distressed individuals.  In the case of depression, beliefs 
about the self tend to be negative in nature (e.g. “I‟m useless”) and maintained by ruminative 
thoughts about the self and the cause of one‟s distress (Kuyken & Howell, 2006).  The 
observer perspective, given that it promotes self-evaluative thinking and an increased 
tendency to identify dispositional and abstract information about the self, increases the 
salience of negative thoughts and self-beliefs that distressed individuals hold about 
themselves.  In support of this claim, Kuyken and Moulds (2009) asked depressed adults to 
recall autobiographical memories in response to positive, negative and neutral cue words and 
to indicate the visual perspective from which the event was recalled.  Participants also 
completed the self-evaluation subscale of the Depressed States Checklist (DSC; Teasdale 
&Cox, 2001), which contains 14 negative self-evaluations associated with dysphoria.  
Participants who endorsed more negative self-evaluations were more likely to recall 
autobiographical memories from an observer perspective.  While this provides indirect 
evidence of an association between negative self-evaluation and the observer perspective, it 
should be noted that these authors did not control for depressive symptoms nor does the 
cross-sectional design allow any statements regarding the directionality of the relationship to 
be made.   
 Similar to the findings of Kuyken and Moulds (2009), relationships have also been 
established between the observer perspective and symptoms of anxiety, where negative self-
perceptions are also common.  Sutin and Robins (2010) found that undergraduate students 
who scored highly on a measure of trait anxiety were more likely to adopt a general third-
person retrieval style and recall specific self-defining memories from the observer 
perspective than students scoring lower on trait-anxiety.  Similarly, D‟Argembeau, Van der 
Linden, d‟Acrement, and Mayers (2006) asked participants with clinical diagnoses of social 
anxiety and control participants with no history of anxiety disorders to recall specific 
autobiographical memories of positive and negative events involving social and non-social 
situations.  There were no differences in the use of the observer perspective for non-social 
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events between socially anxious and non-anxious individuals.  Socially anxious individuals 
were, however, more likely than non-anxious controls to recall social situations from an 
observer perspective.  Interpreting these findings in relation to the self-evaluation hypothesis 
is consistent with cognitive models of social anxiety, which suggest that socially anxious 
individuals experience a heightened sense of focus and are susceptible to making negative 
judgements about themselves and their performance during social situations (Rapee & 
Heinberg, 1997).    
 The fifth aim of the current study therefore, was to examine this theoretical notion in 
the context of memories included in the life story and autobiographical reasoning found in 
narratives of these events.  As described in earlier chapters, autobiographical reasoning can 
either describe the self in positive, negative or neutral/mixed ways.  For example, positive 
autobiographical reasoning may describe positive characteristics or qualities held by the 
current self: 
“When I was 17 I made the decision to go to boarding school in another city 
away from home for my final year of school ... I have never been put under 
pressure to make a decision about something so important before ... I became 
more confident in myself and independent in a sense” 
Negatively valenced autobiographical reasoning on the other hand, describes negative 
features or qualities of the current self: 
“My mum moved to [Country], when I was 12. I felt extremely abandoned ... 
and I still struggle to form close relationships with others to this day” 
If the observer perspective and psychological distress are accounted for by the increased 
salience of negative self-evaluations, then we would expect to find a relationship between use 
of the observer perspective to recall life story events and the amount of negative 
autobiographical reasoning found in narratives of these events in young adults experiencing 
higher levels of depression.  To examine this possibility, I hypothesised that among young 
adults with higher levels of depressive symptoms, use of the observer perspective to recall 
life story events would be associated with a greater amount of autobiographical reasoning 
that describes the self in negative ways in narratives of these events.  This same relationship 
between the observer perspective and negative autobiographical reasoning was not expected 
to be present for young adults with lower levels of depressive symptoms who were thus not 
likely to be making many negative self-event connections. 
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The relationship between subjective distance and psychological functioning 
 The link between the subjective distance of autobiographical memories and 
psychological functioning is more tenuous.  There is evidence that psychologically healthy 
individuals demonstrate a tendency to perceive positive events in general as subjectively 
closer than negative events (D‟Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).  Furthermore, and as 
outlined above, psychologically distancing oneself from past experiences may serve a self-
enhancement function (Wilson & Ross, 2001).  That is, individuals may perceive events that 
portray the self in a negative way as more psychologically distant, and experience 
psychological closeness to an event that portrays the self in a positive or favourable way.  
This theoretical assumption stems from evidence that psychologically healthy individuals, at 
least in Western cultures, are motivated to think about themselves in positive ways (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988).   
 Although it has not been directly tested, there is an assumption that individuals who 
experience poor psychological functioning do not demonstrate these same self-enhancing 
tendencies.  For example, Ross and Wilson (2002) asked undergraduate students to record 
either their best or worst grade from the previous academic term, record how distant or close 
that university course felt to them, and complete a measure of self-esteem.  Findings showed 
that young adults who scored high on self-esteem perceived less subjective distance to their 
best grade than they did their worst grade.  Young adults who scored low on self-esteem did 
not show this bias.  That is, young adults with low self-esteem felt just as close to worst 
grades as they did to best grades.  This effect was replicated in a second study, which showed 
that young adults who scored highly on the measure of self-esteem felt closer to past selves 
that were evaluated in a positive way and further away from past selves that were evaluated 
in a negative way.  Young adults who scored low on the measure of self-esteem did not 
demonstrate this bias, that is, past selves were perceived as equally distant regardless of 
whether the self was evaluated positively or negatively.   
 The sixth and final aim of the current study was to examine key relationships between 
psychological distance, the valence of autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning.  In light of the findings of Ross and Wilson (2002), several tentative hypotheses 
were made.  The first prediction was that negative emotional states would be positively 
associated with perceived distance to high points from the life story and inversely associated 
with perceived distance from low points from the life story.  That is, young adults who felt 
subjectively close to high points, and subjectively more distant to low points would 
experience fewer negative emotional states (symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress) than 
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young adults who felt subjectively close to low points, and more distant from high points.  As 
turning points can be negative or positive in nature, the question of whether subjective 
distance to turning points would be associated with negative emotional states was left open. 
 The second prediction, made in accordance with the self-enhancement hypothesis, 
was that young adults with lower levels of depressive symptoms would experience greater 
distance from past experiences that led to positive changes in the self (as measured by 
autobiographical reasoning that describes positive change). Conversely, this relationship 
would not be present for young adults who experienced higher levels of depression and who 
would thus be less likely to make positive change connections overall.   
Method 
Participants 
 The method used to recruit participants was identical to that adopted in Chapter Four.  
Participants were 103 undergraduate students (68% female) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  Participants received 
credit towards a course requirement of participation in research.  Ages ranged from 18 to 25 
years (M = 19.5 years, SD = 1.2 years).  Eighty-three percent of participants identified as 
New Zealand European, 10 percent as New Zealand Maori, 5 percent as Asian, 4 percent as 
Pasifika, and 11 percent as other (one in ten participants identified with more than one ethnic 
background).   
Overview of Procedure 
The study was conducted over one 60-minute session.  Each session took place in a 
psychology laboratory; participants (with numbers ranging between one and four per session) 
were seated at individual desks, separated by dividers.  At the start of the first session, 
participants read a summary of the nature and purpose of the study and provided consent.  In 
the 60-minute session, participants completed the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) and an autobiographical narrative task through an online 
survey created in Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT).  Immediately after completing 
each written narrative, participants answered a series of questions examining the centrality of 
the event, the visual perspective from which the event was recalled when writing the 
narrative and participants‟ sense of subjective distance from the event.  The order in which 
participants completed the DASS and the autobiographical narrative task was 
counterbalanced.   
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Tasks and measures 
Symptoms of psychological distress. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).  This self-report questionnaire measures three related negative 
emotional states: depression, anxiety and stress, each on a 14-item subscale.  Participants rate 
on a four-point scale how much each symptom applied to them over the past week (0= Did 
not apply to me at all, 3= Applied to me very much, or most of the time).  Consistent with 
previous research (Crawford & Henry, 2003), a total DASS score was calculated by summing 
each of the subscales.  Internal consistency for the DASS total score within the current 
sample was .97. 
Visual perspective and Subjective distance.  Memory Experiences Questionnaire 
(MEQ; Sutin& Robins, 2007).  Two subscales from the MEQ were used to measure visual 
perspective (6 items) and subjective distance (6 items).  Participants rated on a 5-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) how much they agree with each item.  The visual 
perspective subscale comprised three items that measured the extent to which the memory 
was recalled through the field perspective and three items that measured the extent to which 
the memory was recalled from the observer perspective.  A total „visual perspective‟ score 
was calculated by summing the observer and (reverse-scored) field items.   The subjective 
distance subscale comprised three items that measured the extent to which the person they 
were in the experience was perceived to be the same and three items that measured the extent 
to which the person they were in the experience was perceived to be different.  A total 
„subjective distance‟ score was calculated by summing the „same‟ and (reverse-scored) 
„different‟ items. 
Autobiographical narrative task. Life story narratives were attained through an 
autobiographical narrative task modified from McAdams‟ guided autobiography and widely 
used in previous research (McAdams, 2006; available at 
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/guided/; see also McLean & Breen, 
2009; McLean &Lilgendahl, 2008).  Participants were asked to provide written narratives of 
a high point, low point and turning point from their life story.  High points were defined as 
“moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which he or she feels a sense of happiness, joy, 
excitement, contentment or some other positive emotion”.  Low points were defined as 
“moments or episodes in a person‟s life in which he or she feels extremely negative emotions 
such as despair, disillusionment, guilt, shame etc.”  Turning points were defined as “episodes 
through which a person undergoes substantial transition or change with respect to their 
understanding of themselves”.   
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Participants were asked to write about each event in some detail, and to consider the 
following in their descriptions: how old they were when the event occurred, what happened 
in the event, who was involved in the event, what they were thinking/feeling/wanting in the 
event, why they think that this is an important event in their life story and what the event says 
about who they are.  The order in which participants wrote about their high point, low point, 
and turning point was counter-balanced. 
Narrative coding 
Self-event connections.  
Following McLean and Fournier (2008), self-event connections were coded as any 
statements where participants explicitly linked an aspect of the narrated event to their sense 
of self.  Consistent with the procedure outlined in the previous three studies (Study 1a, 1b, 
and Study 2),all written narratives were coded for self-event connections by the first author.  
Twenty-eight percent of the narratives were coded by an independent coder who was blind to 
the hypotheses of the study.  Consistent with the approach taken in the previous three studies 
(Study 1a, 1b, and Study 2), the number of self-event connections was calculated on a per 
narrative basis and inter-rater agreement for the total number of connections per narrative 
was kappa .83. 
Consistent with the procedure outlined in the previous three studies (Study 1a, 1b, and 
Study 2),self-event connections were also coded for valence.  Self-event connections were 
coded as positive when the statement referred to a positive characteristic of the self, 
mentioned personal growth, or denoted a positive evaluation of the self (e.g., “This event 
made me stronger”).  Self-event connections were coded as negative when the statement 
referenced a negative characteristic of the self, or denoted a negative evaluation of the self 
(e.g., “this event is one of the main causes for the long term depression that I experience”).  
Self-event connections were coded as neutral when there was no evaluation of the self, or the 
connection was not clearly positive or negative (e.g., “this experience changed how I think 
about the world”).  Self-event connections were coded as mixed when the connection 
involved elements of both positive and negative meaning. These were often situations where 
participants had learnt something (and thus could be considered an experience involving 
growth), but where the lesson learnt had negative connotations (e.g. “This experience taught 
me about the harsh realities of life”).   
Self-event connections were only recorded as positive or negative if: the self-
characteristic highlighted was explicitly referred to as positive or negative by the participant 
(e.g., “It was a great experience because it taught me how to be independent” – positive; “It 
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has helped me over the last year, but in a negative way” - negative), or if it satisfied common 
cultural understandings of desirable and undesirable characteristics (e.g., “I gained a lot of 
self-confidence” – positive, and “This [event] has made me more paranoid” – negative).  
Self-event connections that were identified by both coders (90% of connections identified by 
the first coder) were compared for valence.  Inter-rater agreement for the valence of self-
event connections was kappa .80. 
Self-event connections were also coded as either a change connection or a stability 
connection.  Self-event connections were coded as a change connection when the link 
between event and self clearly outlined how the event had caused a change in terms of the 
characteristics or qualities of the individual (e.g. I was a secluded person and minded my own 
business but now I am more outgoing).  Self-event connections were coded as a stability 
connection when the link between event and self clearly outlined a continuation of the 
individuals qualities and characteristics from the past event to the current moment (e.g. [this 
event] shows that I am a committed and determined person).  Inter-rater agreement was 
kappa  .84 for change/stability connections.   
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
 Means and standard deviations for the measure of visual perspective and subjective 
distance are reported for each event type in Table 7.1.  The average subjective distance rating 
was close to the mid-point (on the 1 – 5 point scale) for all three event types (high, low and 
turning points).  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that participants would 
perceive a moderate degree of distance between the memory/the self that is represented in the 
memory for the event. 
 Of note, memories for life story high points were appraised as subjectively closer than 
memories for life story low points (t (102) = 7.72, p < .05), and memories of turning points (t 
(102) = 6.64, p > .05).  There were no significant differences in the subjective distance of low 
and turning points from the life story (t (102) = 1.49, p > .05).   
 Although the differences were small, high points were more likely to be recalled from 
the field perspective than were low points (t (102) = 3.15, p > .05) and turning points (t (102) 
= 2.27, p > .05).  On average however, all event types (high points, low points and turning 
points) scored below the mid-point on the field-observer scale, suggesting a greater overall 
tendency to recall these events from the field perspective.   
 Participants‟ visual perspective ratings for each memory were then grouped according 
to whether they favoured the observer perspective (scores above the mid-point of 2.5 on the 
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1-5 scale), the field perspective (scores below the mid-point of 2.5) or neither perspective 
over the other (scores equalling the mid-point of 2.5).  Almost all high points (98%) were 
recalled from the field perspective, in addition to the majority of low point events (91%) and 
turning point events (93%).   In total, n = 18 out of n = 309 life events narrated by 
participants during the study (6% in total) were recalled from the observer perspective.  
These findings supported the hypothesis that the majority of events included in the life story 
(high points, low points and turning points) would be recalled from the field perspective. 
 
Table 7.1 
Means, standard deviations and ranges for visual perspective and subjective distance ratings 
for each memory type 
 Visual perspective Subjective distance 
 M SD M SD 
High points 2.1 .71 2.1 .73 
Low points 2.3 .89 3.0 .93 
Turning points 2.3 .75 2.8 .86 
 
Relationship between visual perspective and negative emotional states 
 The majority (n = 84, 82%) of young adults in the current sample recalled all three life 
story events from the field perspective.  A small number (n = 13, 13%) of young adults 
recalled one or more life story event from the observer perspective.  Of these participants, 
nine (9%) recalled one out of three events from the observer perspective, three participants 
recalled two of three events from the observer perspective and just one participant recalled all 
three events from the observer perspective.  Although the intention was to examine 
differences in psychological distress by use of the observer perspective across different event 
types (low points, high points etc.), a decision was made to collapse observer memories 
across all event types due to the low number of events recalled from the observer perspective. 
 To examine whether use of the observer perspective was associated with symptoms of 
psychological distress, a one-way ANOVA examined whether young adults who recalled at 
least one life story event from the observer perspective (n = 13) experienced more negative 
emotional states than young adults who recalled all life story events from the field 
perspective (n = 84).  Participants who did not recall any of the three life story events from 
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the observer or field perspective (n = 6) were excluded from the analysis.  Although in the 
expected direction, no significant effect for observer perspective was found, F(1, 95) = 
1.77, p > .05.  That is, although participants who recalled at least one life story event from the 
observer perspective experienced higher levels of negative emotional states (M = 28.9, SD = 
27.6) than participants who did not recall any events from the observer perspective (M = 21.4, 
SD = 17.2), this difference was non-significant.  A series of one-way ANOVAs then 
examined whether differences existed for each of the distress states separately (depression, 
anxiety and stress).  Again, no significant differences in symptoms of depression, anxiety or 
stress were detected between the two groups (Fs = .52 to 2.30, ps > .05).  Thus the hypothesis 
that psychological distress would be associated with the observer recall perspective was not 
supported.   
Relationship between visual perspective and autobiographical reasoning  
 To test the hypothesis that use of the observer perspective would be positively 
associated with the amount of autobiographical reasoning found in narratives of these events, 
Pearson correlations tested the associations between visual perspective and number of self-
event connections in narratives of life story low, high and turning points.  Across all event 
types, there were no significant relationships between the visual perspective used to recall the 
event and the number of self-event connections found in narratives of these experiences (rs = 
.11 to .17, ps > .05).  Thus no support was found for the hypothesis that autobiographical 
reasoning would occur more frequently in narratives of memories recalled from the observer 
perspective.    
Relationship between visual perspective, autobiographical reasoning and negative 
emotional states 
 Pearson correlations then tested the hypothesis that among young adults with higher 
levels of depressive symptoms, use of the observer perspective to recall life story events 
would be associated with a greater amount of autobiographical reasoning that describes the 
self in negative ways.  The first step in this analysis was to categorise participants into groups 
depending on their level of reported depression symptoms.  Following the DASS manual 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), participants‟ scores on each of the DASS subscales were first 
categorised according to severity.  Depression scores were initially categorised as normal 
(DASS score = 0-9), mild (DASS score = 10-12), moderate (DASS score = 13-20), severe 
(DASS score = 21-27) and extremely severe (DASS score = 28+).  As proportionately few 
participants scored within each of the clinical ranges, the mild, moderate, severe and 
extremely severe groups were combined to form a broader „clinical‟ group for each of the 
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three emotional states.  Thus participants were categorised into two groups for Depression 
(„normal‟, scores = 0-9; „elevated‟, scores=10+).  Due to the small number of events recalled 
from the observer perspective, participants‟ ratings on the 5-point visual perspective subscale 
were used for the following correlations.  As few participants rated their visual perspective 
above the mid-point (i.e. towards the observer perspective), higher ratings reflect not only a 
stronger observer perspective, but also a weaker field perspective. 
 Table 7.2 presents the correlations between the visual perspective used to recall high 
points, low points and turning points, and the number of negative self-event connections 
made in narratives of these events for individuals in the „normal‟ and „elevated‟ symptoms of 
depression groups.  For individuals in the normal category, visual perspective was unrelated 
to the number of negative self-event connections made in narratives of high, low or turning 
points (rs = -.01 to .11, ps > .05).  For young adults experiencing elevated levels of 
depression however, the number of negative self-event connections made in narratives of low 
points was associated with an increased tendency to recall these events from the observer 
perspective (or a decreased tendency to recall events from the field perspective) (rs = -.08 to -
.01, p > .05).   Negative self-event connections in narratives of high and turning points were 
unrelated to the visual perspective from which these events were recalled (rs = -.08 to -.01, ps 
> .05) for young adults in the „elevated‟ category.   
 
Table 7.2 
Correlations between the number of negative self-event connections made in narratives of 
low points and use of the observer recall perspective 
  Use of observer recall perspective 
Number of negative 
connections 
„Normal‟ depression 
symptoms 
„Elevated‟ depression 
symptoms 
Turning points  -.11   -.01  
 Low points  -.01   .44*  
High points   .01   -.08  
*p< .05, **p< .01 
  
140 
 
 
 
Relationship between subjective distance and negative emotional states 
 To test the prediction that negative emotional states would be positively associated 
with perceived distance to high points from the life story and inversely associated with 
perceived distance from low points from the life story, Pearson correlations examined these 
key relationships.  Negative emotional states were significantly and positively associated with 
perceived distance from life story high points (r = .24, p < .05).  Thus, young adults who 
perceived greater distance between their current self and the self represented in high points 
from the life story experienced more negative emotional states than young adults who felt 
closer to these positive experiences.  There were no significant relationships between 
perceived distance from low points and turning points from the life story and negative 
emotional states (rs = -.09 to -.06, ps > .05). 
Relationship between subjective distance and autobiographical reasoning  
 Partial correlations were then performed to test the predicted associations between 
subjective distance and the amount of autobiographical reasoning in narratives of life story 
low, high and turning points that described a change in the self.  Across all event types, there 
were no significant relationships between the subjective distance between the event and the 
amount of autobiographical reasoning describing self-change in narratives of these 
experiences (rs = -.10 to .04, ps > .05).  Thus contrary to predictions, there was no evidence 
that autobiographical reasoning describing self-change occurred more frequently in narratives 
of memories that were appraised as more distant to the current self.    
Relationship between subjective distance, autobiographical reasoning and negative 
emotional states 
 Lastly, Pearson correlations were performed to test the hypothesis that subjective 
distance from high points, low points and turning points from the life story would be related 
to the number of self-event connections depicting positive change made in narratives of these 
events.  These correlations were examined for young adults in the „normal‟ depression range 
and the „elevated‟ depression range separately.  For individuals in the „normal‟ category, 
subjective distance from high, low or turning points was unrelated to the number of self-event 
connections depicting positive self-change made in narratives of these experiences (rs = -.05 
to .18, ps > .05).  For young adults in the „elevated‟ depression range, subjective distance 
from high, low or turning points was also unrelated to the number of self-event connections 
depicting positive self-change (rs = -.10 to -.04, ps > .05).  Thus no support was found for the 
hypothesis that subjective distance from high points, low points and turning points from the 
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life story would be related to the number of self-event connections depicting positive change 
made in narratives of these events. 
Discussion 
Very little research has examined the phenomenology of autobiographical memories 
included in the life story.  The broad aims of the current study were to 1) extend life story 
research by assessing two aspects of memory phenomenology; visual perspective and 
subjective distance in memories for events included in the life story, and 2) explore some of 
the key relationships between these phenomenological characteristics, autobiographical 
reasoning (amount and valence) and psychological functioning.   
As expected, the majority of life story events narrated by young adults in the current 
study were recalled from the field perspective.  The proportion of events recalled from the 
field perspective was, however, much higher than previous assessments of self-defining 
memories and general autobiographical memories elicited via the Autobiographical Memory 
Test (Kuyken & Howell, 2006; Sutin, 2008).  Young adults reported an average degree of 
subjective distance from life story events which, consistent with prior work, suggests that 
they do not feel particularly close or distant from these experiences (Sutin, 2008).  On 
average, young adults in the current study perceived greater distance from low point and 
turning point events from the life story than they did from high points.  Findings relating to 
visual perspective, followed by key findings related to subjective distance will now be 
discussed. 
Visual perspective 
Unexpectedly, there was no evidence of a relationship between use of the observer 
perspective to recall events from the life story and negative emotional states.  That is, young 
adults who recalled one or more life story events from the observer perspective did not 
experience significantly higher levels of psychological distress (as measured by total DASS 
score and in relation to each of the distress types; depression, anxiety and stress) than young 
adults who solely recalled events from the field perspective.   
One explanation for these non-significant findings is that the relationship between the 
observer perspective and psychological distress depends on a magnitude of distress 
symptoms that were not present among participants in the current study.  Much of the 
previous work on the relationship between the observer perspective and psychological 
distress has been with individuals with clinical diagnoses such as Major Depressive Disorder 
(Kuyken& Howell, 2006).  Only a small proportion of young adults who participated in the 
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current study experienced clinical levels of psychological distress, which may not have 
allowed significant differences to be detected.  The findings of Kuyken and Howell (2006) 
challenge this view, however, as even among young adults whose symptoms were within a 
„normal‟ range, an increase in symptoms of depression were associated with an increased use 
of the observer perspective.   
A more likely explanation for the non-significant relationship between the observer 
perspective and psychological distress is that the overwhelming proportion of life story 
events reported in the current study were recalled from the field perspective.  This also 
unexpected finding may be associated with a number of methodological issues.  In the current 
study, participants‟ use of the observer and field recall perspective was measured by the 
visual perspective subscale of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 
2007) which was completed after participants had written narratives of life events.  There are 
two possible problems with using this scale in relation to life story events, particularly when 
it is administered after participants had written narratives of these experiences.  First, the 
wording of some of the items on the visual perspective sub-scale may be misconstrued by 
participants.   
A number of items in the visual perspective subscale of the MEQ use the terms 
„perspective” and “through my own eyes” to assess the visual perspective adopted when 
imagining the remembered event (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  Example items include “I see the 
experience in the memory through my own eyes” and “When I visualize this memory, I 
clearly see this event from my own perspective” (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  Another definition 
of perspective, however, relates to the state of one‟s knowledge or perceptions one holds in 
relation to an experience e.g. “I can see it now from their perspective”, “In my eyes, I was in 
the right all along”.  Constructing narratives about life experiences, which often include one‟s 
thoughts and reflections on the event, may have primed participants to think about these 
events in more abstract terms thus increasing the likelihood that they would interpret the 
terms „perspective‟ and „in my own eyes‟ in the latter way.  That is, participants may have 
been more likely to interpret „perspective‟ as denoted „from my point of view‟.  An 
alternative method of eliciting visual perspective used in prior research involves describing 
each of the observer and field perspectives and asking participants to state which perspective 
they use when recalling the event.  This method has been successfully used in prior work 
(Crawley & French, 2005; Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Libby & Eibach, 2011) and may be 
preferable in situations where post-event processing (e.g. the construction of life story 
narratives) has recently occurred. 
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Assessing memory phenomenology after the construction of life story narratives may 
not be a suitable or reliable measure of the true phenomenological characteristics of these 
memories for another reason.  Most life story narratives reference a specific past event but, 
through the process of narration, often incorporate details about what was happening before 
the event, details about what impact the event had on the person subsequent to the event and 
often, as observed through autobiographical reasoning, what the impact on the event is on the 
individual in the present.  This combination of past and present details can be observed in the 
following example: 
“A turning point in my life would have to be when I met my friend [name] 
when I was 16 years old. Prior to this I was really struggling with my faith 
and reconciling traditional perceptions of Catholicism with what I thought 
was morally right. [Name] showed me was it means to live out in action that 
Catholic faith. Through his encouragement and cheerfulness he revitalised 
my spirituality ... I now feel extremely connected to the people in my faith, 
more confident in myself and more enthusiastic to change what I believe is 
detrimental to the Church” 
In this example, the memory for the past event (i.e. meeting a friend) was blended with 
details about what was happening before (struggling with faith), what happened after the 
event (her spirituality was revitalised) and what the lasting impact of the event is now 
(connected to faith, more confident and enthusiastic).  This combination of details and points 
in time may obscure the visual perspective from which the memory for the original event 
(e.g. “the day I met my friend) would be recalled and/or prevent participants from clearly 
seeing the event from any one perspective.  Future research could address this possible 
methodological limitation by altering the order in which the autobiographical narrative task 
and visual perspective assessment are completed.  That is, first participants would be asked to 
elicit memories for events that would be included in the life story, imagine the event and 
record the visual perspective from which it is recalled, and then construct a narrative of the 
experience.   
Findings with respect to the relationship between the observer perspective and 
autobiographical reasoning were mixed.  No significant associations were found between use 
of the observer perspective and the overall amount of autobiographical reasoning found in 
narratives of life story high, low and turning points.   When analysed in the context of levels 
psychological distress (depression) however, an interesting trend emerged.  For young adults 
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experiencing elevated levels of depression, the more negative self-event connections they 
made in narratives of low points the more likely they were to recall these events from the 
observer perspective.  No such relationship existed for young adults who were not 
experiencing depressive symptoms.   
These findings are consistent with the theoretical notion that depressed individuals 
may, in part, experience higher levels of distress because the observer perspective is 
associated with the processes of self-evaluation and self-description which, in depressed 
individuals, tends to be of a negative nature (D‟Argembeau, Van der Linden, d‟Acrement & 
Mayers, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009).  The fact that this relationship existed in the context 
of low points from the life story but not high points or turning points is not surprising given 
that in distressed individuals, negative information about the self is more readily activated in 
relation to negative events than events of a more positive nature (Riskind & Alloy, 2006).   
The lack of a significant association between use of the observer perspective and the 
overall amount of autobiographical reasoning found in life story narratives may reflect 
differences in the concepts of autobiographical reasoning and self-evaluation/description.  In 
one study showing that inducing the observer recall perspective led to an increase in self-
descriptors (Frank & Gilovich, 1989), participants were specifically asked to report 
attributions (dispositional or situational) for their behaviour.  Autobiographical reasoning 
encompasses a wider range of self-descriptors than dispositional traits, however.  That is, 
autobiographical reasoning can also be employed to describe an individual‟s goals, 
achievements, and qualities of relationships they have with others (McLean & Fournier, 
2008).  One possibility is that the observer perspective may be associated with an increased 
focus on internal characteristics of the self (dispositions) but unrelated to aspects of the self 
that are centered outside the individual (e.g. a close bond with a family member).    
In discussing these findings, it is important to remember that a very small number 
(6%) of life story events narrated by participants in the current study were recalled from the 
observer perspective.  This limitation is likely to have significantly reduced the opportunity 
for significant differences to be detected.  Future research with a larger sample of events 
recalled from the observer perspective is needed to delineate whether the small number of 
observer memories in the current study contributed to the non-significant findings. 
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Subjective distance 
Overall, young adults in the current study rated high point events from the life story as 
subjectively closer than low point and turning point events.  The extent to which high points 
were perceived as subjectively distant however, was significantly associated with 
psychological distress.  That is, young adults who felt subjectively closer to the memory of 
high points from the life story experienced fewer negative emotional states than young adults 
who felt subjectively more distant from these memories.  This finding is consistent with 
earlier research showing that psychologically healthy individuals typically experience less 
subjective distance from positive events than they do from negative events (D‟Argembeau& 
Van der Linden, 2004; Wilson & Ross, 2001).    
There was no evidence that the amount of autobiographical reasoning describing 
change in the self found in life story narratives was associated with the subjective distance 
participants experienced from these events.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that life 
story events which resulted in positive self-change (as described by autobiographical 
reasoning), were viewed as more distant than events that did not result in positive self-
change.   These non-significant findings were surprising in light of previous theoretical and 
empirical work showing that a) greater subjective distance from past events is observed when 
the individual perceives the person they are now is different to the person they were during 
the remembered event and b) psychologically well-functioning individuals may perceive 
greater distance from events in which positive self-change has occurred to preserve the view 
that they are improving over time (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005).   
The absence of the hypothesised relationships between subjective distance and 
autobiographical reasoning describing self-change may also be explained in terms of the 
methodological constraints and qualities of life story narratives mentioned earlier.  As with 
the measure of visual perspective, participants completed the subjective distance subscale of 
the MEQ after constructing narratives of their experiences.  As discussed earlier, narratives of 
life story events often blend details of the past event with details about what was happening 
before the event, what happened after the event, and what the lasting impact the event has for 
the individual now.  This focus on both the past and present within life story narratives means 
that both past and current selves are represented.  This combination of past and present focus 
is likely to have altered the way participants relate to items measuring subjective distance 
such as “I don‟t have much in common with the person in the memory” as „the person in the 
memory‟ includes both the past and present self.  Again, changing the order in which 
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participants complete the subjective distance measure and autobiographical narrative task 
may address this concern in future research.   
In summary, the current study has highlighted a number of methodological concerns 
that require consideration when examining the phenomenology of autobiographical memories 
included in the life story.  Despite these limitations, the current study also highlighted a 
number of interesting findings.  First, for young adults who were experiencing clinically 
significant symptoms of depression, the recall of life story events from the observer 
perspective was associated with an increase in autobiographical reasoning that described the 
self in negative ways.  Second, young adults who felt subjectively more distant from life 
story high points experienced higher levels of negative emotional states than young adults 
who perceived less distance from life story high points.  These findings suggest that the 
phenomenology of autobiographical memories included in the life story may be a relevant 
construct to future investigations into the relationship between life story development and 
psychological functioning. 
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Chapter Eight 
General Discussion 
This aim of this thesis was to contribute to the growing body of work examining the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning.  Although 
not directly examined, this thesis was based on the theoretical premise that autobiographical 
reasoning is the primary process through which the life story is developed (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000).  The current thesis extended prior work by introducing the concept of 
autobiographical reasoning valence as measured by positive, negative, neutral and mixed 
valence self-event connections.  Over four main studies, a number of key questions regarding 
the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning in young 
adulthood were addressed.   
The first study explored the question of whether the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning was altered by the extent to which 
young adults linked past events to positive or negative characteristics of the self.  The second 
study addressed the question of whether autobiographical reasoning predicted changes in 
psychological functioning over time.  Although not a true test of causality and constrained by 
the small sample size, this pilot study illustrated how the use of a longitudinal design may be 
used in future research to assess how these two factors might be related over time.  The third 
and fourth studies aimed to explore relationships between autobiographical reasoning valence 
and three sets of additional psychological constructs: cognitive response styles; meaning in 
life; and autobiographical memory phenomenology.  These factors were selected on the basis 
of theoretical evidence suggesting they may be related to the process of autobiographical 
reasoning.  Inter-relationships between these factors (cognitive response styles; meaning in 
life; and autobiographical memory phenomenology), autobiographical reasoning valence, and 
psychological functioning were also explored. 
Key findings 
The studies presented in this thesis show that the valence of autobiographical 
reasoning found in life story narratives constructed by young adults predicts psychological 
functioning in this population group.  Table 8.1 shows associations between the overall 
number of positive and negative self-event connections found in life story narratives and 
indicators of psychological functioning across the three main studies (Study 1a, Study 2 and 
Study 3).  Across two studies (Study 1 and Study 2), young adults who made a greater 
number of positive self-event connections in narratives of life story events experienced better 
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psychological well-being and were more satisfied with their lives than young adults who 
made fewer positive self-event connections.  In two out of three studies (Study 1 and Study 
3), young adults who made more positive self-event connections in life story narratives also 
experienced fewer symptoms of psychological distress than young adults who made fewer 
positive connections
10
.  Conversely, in all three main studies, young adults who made a 
greater number of negative self-event connections in life story narratives experienced more 
symptoms of psychological distress relative to young adults who made fewer negative self-
event connections. 
 
Table 8.1 
Correlations between positive and negative self-event connections and psychological 
functioning across three studies 
 Psychological distress 
(DASS) 
 Psychological well-being 
(RYFF scales) 
 Satisfaction with life 
Study # of 
positive 
connections 
# of 
negative 
connections 
 # of 
positive 
connections 
# of 
negative 
connections 
 # of 
positive 
connections 
# of 
negative 
connections 
1 -.28** .39**  .31** -.40**    
2 -.08 .23**     .16* -.33** 
3 -.29** .22*       
** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Earlier theoretical and limited empirical work suggested that the process of 
autobiographical reasoning may reflect positive psychological functioning in young 
adulthood because of its proposed role in the development of narrative identity (McAdams, 
2001; McLean, 2005; 2008; McLean & Breen, 2009; McLean & Pratt, 2006).  The findings 
of Study 1a (presented in Chapter Four) showed that more autobiographical reasoning (as 
measured by the number of self-event connections) and more complex forms of 
autobiographical reasoning (as measured by sophistication of meaning ratings) found in 
young adults‟ life story narratives were unrelated to psychological functioning.  Rather, the 
                                                          
10
     In Chapter Five, the significantly lower DASS scores recorded by participants in Study 2 relative to 
participants in Study 1a was offered as a possible explanation for the non-significant relationship between the 
number of positive self-event connections and DASS scores.  The mean DASS score recorded by participants in 
Study 2 was not significantly different to the mean DASS score recorded in Study 3 (in which a significant 
association between positive self-event connections and DASS scores was found).  As such, the absence of a 
relationship between positive connections and DASS scores in Study 2 remains unexplained. 
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valence of self-event connections found in young adults‟ life story narratives predicted 
whether the amount and/or complexity of autobiographical reasoning was associated with 
positive or poor psychological functioning.  These results highlight the importance of 
autobiographical reasoning valence in the relationship between life story development and 
psychological functioning during the developmental period of young adulthood.   
Due to the wide scope of questions and issues examined in the remainder of this 
thesis, key findings are presented in two sections.  First, findings regarding the relationship 
between life story development and positive psychological functioning are discussed, 
followed by findings regarding the relationship between life story development and poor 
psychological functioning.   
The development of the life story and positive psychological functioning 
As the current thesis coded autobiographical reasoning valence in a novel way, the 
relationship between positive self-event connections and positive psychological functioning 
observed in the current studies cannot be directly compared to earlier research.  This 
relationship, however, generally conform to prior work highlighting an association between 
psychological well-being and „adaptive‟ (i.e. positive) forms of autobiographical reasoning 
and meaning-making within life story narratives more generally (King, et al., 2000; 
Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; McAdams et al., 2001; Pals, 2006). 
The relationship between positive self-event connections and positive psychological 
functioning was most salient in the context of narratives of difficult or negative events from 
the life story.  By their nature, negative events can jeopardise individuals‟ well-being and 
cause psychological distress (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Lyubomirsky, et al, 2006; Pals, 
2006) have suggested that individuals are particularly vulnerable to experiences of 
psychological distress when negative life events become a central part of the life story.  The 
findings presented in Study 1a (Chapter Four) suggest that making positive self-event 
connections in narratives of highly central, yet negative, life events may protect individuals 
from such psychological distress.  That is, the relationship between psychological distress and 
endorsement of negative events as central to identity was reduced to non-significance for 
young adults who were most likely to make positive self-event connections in narratives of 
low points.   Furthermore, young adults who made more positive self-event connections in 
narratives of central low points experienced better psychological well-being than young 
adults who made fewer positive self-event connections in narratives of highly central low 
points.  These findings are consistent with a broader body of work which has shown that 
reflecting on positive outcomes or aspects of negative experiences moderates the relationship 
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between the experience and negative psychological outcomes (Davis, et al, 1998; King, et al., 
2000; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; McAdams, et al., 2001; Pals, 2006; Stein, et al., 1997). 
Findings from Study 1a (Chapter Four) also suggest that for young adults who are less 
likely to make positive self-event connections in narratives of negative life events, engaging 
in the process of autobiographical reasoning may be associated with lower levels of 
psychological well-being.  Pasupathi (2012) suggests that autobiographical reasoning is likely 
to be a dynamic process, such that connections drawn between past event and current self 
may change over time.  As noted earlier, the cross-sectional nature of the data in Study 1a 
preclude firm conclusions being drawn.  One possibility, however, is that for young adults 
who made fewer positive self-event connections in narratives of life story low points, more 
and more complex forms of autobiographical reasoning were associated with poorer 
psychological well-being because they were still in the process of searching for positive 
meaning (Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009).   
Relatedly, the findings of Study 2 (Chapter Five) showed that the number of positive 
self-event connections made in life story narratives (high, low and turning points combined) 
was unrelated to the degree to which young adults reported having meaning in their lives.  
However, for young adults who reported a relative of absence of meaning in their lives, 
making more positive self-event connections in life story narratives was associated with an 
increase in life satisfaction.  The absence of a relationship between positive self-event 
connections and meaning is life was surprising given that autobiographical reasoning is 
conceptualised as a process by which individuals garner meaning from their experiences 
(McLean & Thorne, 2003).  One possible explanation for this finding may be, however, that 
for young adults who reported a relative of absence of meaning in their lives, making positive 
self-event connections is associated with the search for meaning in one‟s experiences.  These 
possibilities highlight the clear need for future research examining changes in 
autobiographical reasoning in relation to important (particularly negative) life events and 
changes in reported meaning in life and psychological functioning over time. 
The limited data presented in Study 1b provide some support for the notion that 
patterns of autobiographical reasoning may not remain stable over time.  In Study 1b, there 
was no relationship between the number of positive self-event connections found in young 
adults‟ life story narratives at two time points.  That is, young adults who made more positive 
self-event connections at one time point were no more or less likely to make more positive 
self-event connections one year later.  Furthermore, positive self-event connections did not 
predict changes in psychological functioning (as measured by symptoms of distress) over 
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time
11
.  As the events narrated at the two time points were not held constant in Study 1b, no 
conclusions can be made about changes in positive self-event connections in relation to single 
events over time.  Unlike the findings for negative self-event connections (discussed later), 
however, these findings suggest that the tendency to make positive self-event connections in 
life story narratives may not be a stable individual difference.  In the absence of evidence that 
making positive self-event connections is stable over time, it may be worth considering the 
possibility that this type of autobiographical reasoning is associated with coping efforts 
employed to regulate difficult emotional experiences on an „as needed‟ basis.  Theories of 
stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) may be useful to consider in relation to this 
possibility. 
Lazarus (1993a) defines coping as “cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage 
psychological stress” (p. 237).  From a theoretical perspective, coping efforts are activated in 
contexts that individuals‟ appraise as harmful, threatening or challenging to their well-being 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; 1993b).  Negative events that are perceived as 
central to one‟s life story and identity may conceivably fit into this category.  Coping 
strategies can be differentiated according to whether they are „problem-focused‟ or „emotion 
focused‟ (Carver, Schier, & Weintraub, 1989).  Problem-focused coping‟ involves modifying 
the environment or one‟s behaviour in order to alter appraisals of the significance and 
emotional impact of the situation.  Emotion focused coping in contrast can involve either 
altering the level of attention given to the situation (e.g. avoidance) or consciously altering 
the appraised meaning of the situation (Lazarus, 1995).  Making positive self-event 
connections in relation to challenging events corresponds well to the latter component of 
emotion-focused coping.  To illustrate this point further, consider the following example: 
“A low point which I have experienced in my life was when my parents moved 
from NZ to Australia. I was 20 when this event occurred. My parents decided 
that they wanted to live the rest of their lives in Australia instead of here. They 
had to sell the house in my home town and make a new life in Aus. At the time 
I was very upset of the thought of losing my parents and not having them in 
NZ. I was also sad to see the house I had grown up in being sold. I wanted my 
parents to stay but then I also wanted them to do the things in life that they 
wanted to and be happy. This shows that I am a caring and loving person who 
considers the feelings of others. I have developed over time because it made 
                                                          
11
   Changes in psychological well-being over time were not measured in these preliminary data.   
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me realise that my loved ones will always be there for me no matter how far 
away. It also made me think that I should consider the reasons as to why people 
make the choices in life they do before making any prejudgments” 
This low point from the young adult‟s life story was rated as being highly central to 
their life story and identity (rating of 4.6 out of 5).  Overall, this young adult demonstrated 
almost no symptoms of psychological distress and a high level of psychological well-being 
(an average sub-scale score of 63 out of 84).  As evidenced in the written narrative of this 
experience, the young adult also made a number of positive self-event connections.  These 
include links between the experience and a number of positive qualities they hold (“I am a 
caring and loving person who considers the feelings of others”) and a number of positive 
insights and lessons they gained as a result of the experience (“I realise my family will 
always be there for me” and “I should always take others‟ perspectives into account before 
judging them”).  As with the majority of autobiographical reasoning research, and the 
majority of studies in this thesis, the cross-sectional nature of the data prevents firm 
conclusions being made about causality.  One possible explanation for these relationships, 
however, is that young adults‟ tendency to make positive self-event connections reflects a 
broader tendency to engage in emotion-focused coping strategies of which one component is 
to reappraise situations in a way that highlights positive characteristics of the self.   
The relationship between cognitive reappraisal strategies and positive self-event 
connections is certainly consistent with this claim.  As shown in Study 2, young adults who 
made more positive self-event connections in narratives of life story low points were more 
likely to engage in adaptive emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal) than were 
young adults who made fewer positive self-event connections in these narratives.  
Interestingly, the use of cognitive reappraisal strategies did not explain the relationship 
between positive self-event connections in narratives of difficult (low and turning point) 
experiences and psychological distress.  This finding suggests that making positive self-event 
connections and cognitive reappraisal strategies are related but distinct constructs, with each 
being uniquely associated with psychological functioning. 
Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen and DeLongis (1986) suggest that the use of positive 
reappraisal strategies is a reasonably stable coping trait.  From a theoretical perspective, 
however, coping efforts change over time in response to situational and contextual demands 
(Lazarus, 1993b).  Thus, the lack of stability in positive self-event connections found at two 
time points (Study 1b) may reflect participants‟ need to engage in coping rather than their 
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general tendency to use positive self-event connections as a coping strategy per se.  That is, 
young adults who demonstrate a stronger tendency to make positive self-event connections in 
general may construct life story narratives containing many positive self-event connections 
when actively attempting to regulate the impact of negative experiences and fewer when the 
impact of the negative experience is less severe. 
An important area of future research would be to investigate these claims in more 
depth.  An important starting point would be research examining links between the number of 
positive self-event connections observed in life story narratives and individuals‟ self-reported 
use of emotion-focused coping strategies.  Measures such as the Ways of Coping Checklist 
(WCCL; Folkman and Lazarus, 1980) and some subscales of broader measures of coping 
strategies (e.g. the COPE Inventory; Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989) may be particularly 
helpful in assessing these relationships.  If these basic relationships are established, future 
work could also examine the coping hypothesis via the use of an intervention-based study.  A 
number of previous studies have had success in facilitating use of emotion-focused coping 
strategies among adults and children have found subsequent increases in positive adjustment 
(Kaluza, 2000; Pincus & Friedman, 2004).  Any resultant change in the number of positive 
self-event connections made in narratives of difficult events post-intervention (assuming 
increases in the use of emotion-focused coping strategies are observed) would provide 
support for the notion that these two processes are causally related.  Furthermore, examining 
changes in psychological functioning pre- and post-intervention would illustrate whether 
these processes are in turn linked with mental health. 
The development of the life story and poor psychological functioning 
The studies in this thesis identified two main indicators of poorer psychological 
functioning.  The first indicator was the number of negative self-event connections found in 
young adults‟ life story narratives.  Young adults who made a greater number of negative 
self-event connections in narratives of life story events experienced more psychological 
distress (symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress), poorer psychological well-being and 
were less satisfied with their lives than were young adults who made fewer negative self-
event connections (Table 8.1).  With the exception of McAdams et als‟. (2001) 
„contamination‟ sequences, autobiographical reasoning of a negative nature has not really 
been examined in the context of life story research.  The relationship between negative self-
event connections and poor psychological functioning does fit, however, with the broad 
finding of McAdams et al. (2001), that narrating negative outcomes from life events through 
the life story reflects poor psychological functioning.   
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The second indicator of poor psychological functioning highlighted in this thesis was 
young adults‟ perception that low points from the life story are a central part of their life story 
and identity.  Interestingly, narratives of events that were considered central to the life story 
and identity contained more self-event connections than narratives of non-central events.  
Although not directly tested in the current thesis, these findings highlight a potentially 
negative cycle for young adults who are more likely to make negative self-event connections.  
In this proposed cycle (Figure 8.1), making more negative self-event connections in 
narratives of low points is associated with a stronger perception that these events are central 
to identity, which is associated with increased symptoms of psychological distress.   
 
 
Figure 8.1. Hypothesised relationship between negative self-event connections, centrality of 
negative events and psychological distress 
 
The findings of Study 1a showed that the process of autobiographical reasoning and 
life story development was associated with poor psychological functioning for some young 
adults, namely, those who demonstrated the strongest tendency to make negative self-event 
connections.  For these young adults, engaging in more autobiographical reasoning (i.e. 
making more self-event connections) and more complex autobiographical reasoning (i.e. 
reporting more sophisticated insights into the self) was associated with increased 
psychological distress.  This pattern was only observed in narratives of life story low points 
however, which highlights the important link between the way negative events are processed 
and psychological functioning (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006; Pals, 2006).   
In Appendix B, I present data showing that young adults who made more negative 
self-event connections in life story narratives were more likely to report that completing the 
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life story task was a negative experience, and one that made them feel bad about themselves 
(see Table B1).  These findings raise an ethical concern for research involving the 
construction of life story narratives.  As life story researchers, we need to be aware that the 
tasks and measures we use may be unpleasant for some participants and may inadvertently 
cause them distress.  Although the proportion of participants for whom completing the life 
story task was unpleasant was relatively small
12
, the balance between the need for scientific 
knowledge and the potential risk to participants must be considered.  In the course of the 
current studies, I ensured that potential participants were aware that they would be asked to 
construct life story narratives in these studies and were given the option to withdraw their 
participation at any time.  This was indicated in the participant consent information and 
communicated verbally to participants prior to participation.  Participants who completed the 
studies were given a comprehensive verbal debriefing at the conclusion of the study.  These 
debriefings were ideally completed one-on-one with participants and, where this was not 
possible, in small groups (i.e. two or three participants).  Participants were also given a list of 
support services they could access and were encouraged to contact these services if they were 
experiencing distress.  Ideally, future research should follow similar processes, ensuring 
adequate pre-participation information and post-participation debriefing information is 
provided, to reduce the potential negative impact of life story tasks on vulnerable 
participants.  
The studies in this thesis broaden our understanding of the relationship between 
negative self-event connections and psychological distress by identifying a number of 
additional variables that relate to, and interact with, these constructs.  The findings of Study 2 
showed that young adults who made more negative self-event connections in narratives of 
difficult or challenging experiences (low and turning points) and adopted a negative 
explanatory style to explain negative events demonstrated more distress than young adults 
who demonstrated one or neither of these tendencies.  Young adults who made more negative 
self-event connections in life story narratives overall, were less likely to engage in adaptive 
cognitive strategies (e.g. cognitive reappraisal) to regulate difficult emotions and tended to 
ruminate more about the cause of their distress.  The level of rumination demonstrated by 
these young adults, in fact, accounted for the relationship between making negative self-event 
connections and symptoms of distress.    
                                                          
12
   10% of young adults who participated in Study 2 reported that completing the life story task was a negative 
experience and 9% reported that the task made them feel bad about themselves.   
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The significant mediation of the negative self-event connections to symptoms of 
distress by rumination raises the question of what are we measuring when we capture 
instances of autobiographical reasoning.  One possibility is that current measures of 
autobiographical reasoning are, in part, measuring cognitive processes that explain the 
relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning.  From a 
theoretical perspective, autobiographical reasoning is distinguished from other forms of 
cognitive processing on the basis that it appears only in relation to the development of the life 
story.  A small number of studies suggest that cognitive factors which influence the way 
individuals process their experiences can be readily detected in the way individuals describe 
events in their life story (Abela, Auerbach, Sarin and Lakdawalla, 2009; Adler, Kissel, & 
McAdams, 2006).  Abela et al., (2009) suggest that the influence cognitive factors such as 
core beliefs have on information processing can be observed through “spontaneous 
verbalisations on topics of personal significance” (p. 50).  Furthermore, expressions of a 
negative explanatory style have been observed in narratives of life story events (Adler et al, 
2006; Habermas et al, 2008).  Although Abela et al., (2009) focused on the identification of 
core beliefs in narratives of life story events, a similar explanation may apply for a broader 
set of cognitive processes.  In the case of rumination, one possibility is that negative self-
event connections are, in part, narrative products of the ruminative process.  Individuals who 
ruminate spend more time thinking about their distress and difficulties (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  When this type of processing is engaged in relation to events 
that are included in the life story, it may increase the likelihood that negative self-event 
connections will be made and subsequently included in life story narratives.  This notion 
raises the question of whether autobiographical reasoning reflects core cognitive processes 
that are not unique to the life story, but happen to be observed in life story narratives.   
Future research using experimental manipulations of cognitive processes such as 
rumination may be used to highlight such effects.  Rumination induction studies have had 
some success in increasing participants‟ use of maladaptive ruminative processes (Donaldson 
& Lam, 2004; Hilt & Pollak, 2012).  Furthermore, rumination induction tasks have been 
shown to impact recall of autobiographical memories, highlighting the causal relationship 
between ruminative processing and autobiographical memory deficits associated with 
psychological distress (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).  Future work that involves participants 
completing either a rumination induction or control (distraction) task before constructing life 
story narratives would allow differences in the number of negative self-event connections to 
be related back to this core cognitive process.  In light of preliminary evidence that the 
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tendency to make negative self-event connections remains stable over time (Study 1b), 
controlling for the number of negative self-event connections made at an earlier time point 
would give this design greater predictive power.  Such future research should, of course, 
consider the ethical issue discussed earlier, namely the negative impact completing life story 
tasks may have on individuals who are prone to making negative self-event connections. 
Can Relational Frame Theory (RFT) explain the relationship between negative self-
event connections and psychological distress? 
 As highlighted in this discussion of findings, young adults who experienced 
symptoms of distress were more likely to construct life story narratives containing negative 
self-event connections.  This is a new and interesting finding in light of prior work, which has 
largely focused on positive, rather than negative forms of autobiographical reasoning 
(Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; Pals, 2006).  In earlier Chapters, I introduced the theoretical 
notion that the life story comprises and individual‟s narrative identity (McAdams, 1988; 
1993).  If narrative identity is the life story, and poor psychological functioning in young 
adulthood is associated with the construction of a life story that contains negative 
autobiographical reasoning, then we may conclude that poor psychological functioning 
reflects also, the construction of narrative identity that highlights negative views or 
statements about the self.  This theoretical assertion shares a number of conceptual 
similarities with a related theory of psychological functioning that has been gaining 
increasing prominence in the field of clinical psychology, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  In the following section, I will outline Relational 
Frame Theory and consider whether and how this theory may explain the relationship 
between negative self-event connections and psychological distress. 
The central tenet of Relational Frame Theory is that verbal humans possess the ability 
describe, explain, evaluate, interpret and rationalise their behaviour through language 
(Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  Through relations of stimulus 
equivalence, language develops the ability to represent actual and imagined objects.  These 
equivalence relations between language and object are, in their most simple form, 
bidirectional.  For example, when we see a cat or a picture of a cat, we might verbalise, 
visualise or hear the word “cat” in our mind.  Likewise, when we hear the word “cat” or see 
the word “cat” written down, we imagine an actual cat.  The concepts that come to be 
represented through language are not limited to concrete objects, but also include abstract 
concepts that may be used to describe a person such as “stupid”, “funny” and “intelligent”.  
In the same way that the word “cat” represents an actual cat, abstract terms such as the word 
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“intelligent” represents a certain characteristic that a person can have (or not have).  As 
children develop, they learn through their environment, that it is appropriate to label their 
own and others‟ behaviours in terms of these abstract concepts.  For example, a behaviour 
such as performing well on a test may be labelled as evidence of “intelligence”.  When we 
too begin to relate to our own behaviour through language by labelling past and present 
behaviours in terms of abstract terms we develop a conceptualised self – a network of self-
descriptions and self-evaluations that we use to explain our behaviour (Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayes, & Dymond, 2001). 
 Unlike concrete objects, the truth (or true existence of) abstract concepts that 
comprise the conceptualised self are difficult to verify (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, &Dymond, 
2001).  It is much harder to verify that someone is “stupid”, given the obvious difficulties 
associated with defining and operationalising, let alone measuring, this concept, than it is to 
verify that cats actually exist.  Our minds do little to address differences in the veridicality of 
these equivalence relations, however, and abstract self-descriptors can exert the same degree 
of control over our behaviour as can concrete terms.  For example, upon hearing someone say 
“look, a cat!”, we may turn our heads and perhaps even walk up to pat the cat.  Verbalising 
abstract self-descriptors, either internally or verbally to others can act in a similar way.  For 
example, the student who thinks to themselves “I failed that test because I‟m stupid” will 
believe that they are in fact, a „stupid‟ person.  As a result, this student may feel distressed 
and hopeless and decide not to sit the end-of-year exam because they expect to fail.   
From a theoretical perspective, the conceptualised self can be problematic for 
psychological functioning when verbal descriptions of the self are largely negative in nature, 
rigid and pervasive, and gain a greater control over one‟s behaviour than environmental 
contingencies (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005; Kanter, Busch, Weeks, & Landes, 2008).  Negative 
self-descriptions can become pervasive and rigid as relational networks of negative internal 
states, thoughts, memories, behaviours and environmental cues increase in strength via 
repeated pairings.  Again, consider the example of the student who thinks “I‟m stupid” in 
relation to a failed test.  This student is likely to be exposed to future situations which have 
similar characteristics to this earlier situation, for example, sitting their driver‟s license test.  
In this second situation, some of the environmental and internal cues associated with sitting a 
driver licence test (e.g. nervousness, anticipation, the presence of an examiner) may be 
similar to those present in the first testing situation.  These internal and external cues may 
then, via relational frames, activate the memory for the prior situation (finding out that they 
had failed), the thoughts and emotions that were experienced in that situation (sadness, 
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despair, “I must be stupid”) and the consequences of these internal experiences (hopelessness, 
deciding not to pursue a university degree).  Activation of this relational frame is not only 
likely to cause the individual a significant amount of distress, but also via repetition and the 
new associations to further environmental and internal cues, increases the salience and 
pervasiveness of the negative self-description (Wilson, Hayes, Gregg, & Zettle, 2001). 
 There is a large degree of overlap between the theoretical definitions of the 
„conceptualised self‟ and „narrative identity‟.  The first similarity is in the formation of the 
conceptualised self and narrative identity through linking descriptive and evaluative 
information about the self to one‟s experiences.  From a theoretical perspective, the life story 
and narrative identity is developed through autobiographical reasoning.  Autobiographical 
reasoning occurs when an individual describes an aspect of themselves such as a trait, 
characteristic or quality they possess, and links this self-description to a memory for a past 
experience (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McLean et al., 2007).  The conceptualised self is 
formed by the activation of descriptive and evaluative self-statements that are linked to 
external (e.g. environmental) and internal cues (e.g. thoughts, emotions, physical sensations, 
memories and mental images) through relational frames. 
The second similarity is that both models propose that links between self and 
experience are constructed through language, or narrative.  Life story models of identity 
propose that links between past event and current self (evidence of autobiographical 
reasoning) are constructed through narrative, whether it be a narrative that is communicated 
to others or internalised and retained as private to the self (McAdams, 2001).  Relational 
Frame Theory proposes that the conceptualised self develops through language, which is the 
tool that we, as humans, have to represent abstract constructs such as traits and personal 
characteristics.  These models both suggest that language is a symbolic tool that we use to 
represent and understand our world.  The symbolic nature of language can, however, be 
overlooked and, when applied to ourselves, has the power to influence and determine the 
beliefs we hold about ourselves.   
 Where Relational Frame Theory extends beyond the theoretical claims of the life 
story model of identity, is in its ability to account or individual levels of psychological 
functioning.  RFT posits that the conceptualised self can maintain symptoms of distress 
because negative self-statements are a) accepted by the individual as truly representing an 
aspect of the self, b) are triggered by a range of internal and external cues and c) as a result of 
their perceived truth and pervasiveness, prevent individuals from experiencing environmental 
contingencies that disconfirm the self-belief.  That is, the student who believes they are 
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„stupid‟ may demonstrate a bias towards environmental events that confirm this belief (or 
which appear to confirm this belief).  For example, forgetting to turn the oven off may be 
seen as evidence of this stupidity, rather than a consequence of being distracted by an 
unrelated event (e.g. having an extremely busy evening or someone knocking on the door).   
A question for research examining the links between life story development and 
psychological functioning, is whether this explanation adequately accounts for the 
relationships observed between negative self-event connections found in life story narratives 
and poor psychological functioning.  Psychological therapies that are based on Relational 
Frame Theory, namely Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999) may provide one avenue for examining this claim.  ACT encourages the 
development and use of six core processes.  One of these processes, termed „self as context‟, 
is directly aimed at reducing the power and control of negative self-descriptors on 
individuals‟ behaviour and emotions.  The notion of self as context refers to the experience of 
being aware of, and engaging with, the environment in the present moment.  Clients are 
encouraged to attend to their environment without allowing evaluative thoughts about 
themselves, their experiences, or others to enter their mind.  In doing so, negative thoughts 
about the self become less „believable‟, and come to be accepted as merely fleeting internal 
events with very little truth value.  Preliminary evidence suggests that developing these skills 
can reduce symptomatology among individuals with PTSD, and who believe their traumatic 
event is central to their identity (Boals, 2012).  Further research aimed at developing these 
skills among individuals who have a tendency to make negative self-event connections in the 
life story and tracking changes in psychological functioning before and after these skills are 
developed will address the validity of the claims made here. 
Future directions 
 The findings presented in this thesis could be usefully extended by considering gender 
and age differences in the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and psychological 
functioning.  Young adults were chosen for examination in the current studies as the 
development of the life story, and hence identity, is a theoretically significant achievement 
during this developmental period (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 1988; 1993).  
Highlighting this developmental difference, Pasupathi and Mansour (2006) found that the 
likelihood of constructing life story narratives containing autobiographical reasoning 
increased between adolescence and young adulthood and decreased in older adulthood.  Thus 
while the presence of autobiographical reasoning in life story narratives may be associated 
with positive psychological functioning in young adulthood, it may not show a similar 
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association to psychological functioning in older adulthood.  The findings of Study 1a show, 
however, that the valence of autobiographical reasoning is a stronger predictor of 
psychological functioning than the presence of autobiographical reasoning per se.  Given the 
theoretical importance of autobiographical reasoning in young adulthood, autobiographical 
reasoning valence may be a stronger predictor of psychological functioning in young 
adulthood than it is in older adulthood.   
Gender differences in the relationship between autobiographical reasoning were not 
able to be examined in the current studies due to the relatively small proportion of males who 
participated.  As mentioned in various Chapters, there are some qualitative differences in the 
way males and females construct stories about past events.  Namely, females typically 
construct longer narratives, and include more emotional and evaluative terms in their 
narratives than do males (Fivush& Buckner, 2003).  These gender differences may illustrate 
normative differences in autobiographical remembering that are learnt from an early age.  As 
outlined in earlier Chapters, mothers tend to be more elaborative when recalling past events 
with daughters than with sons, particularly in relation to emotional experiences (Reese, Hade, 
& Fivush, 1996).  No differences in the amount of autobiographical reasoning found in life 
story narratives have been found between older adolescent males and females, however 
(McLean & Thorne, 2003).  Thus although we might not expect to see gender differences in 
the amount of autobiographical reasoning found in life story narratives of young adults, 
gender differences may exist in the purported use of autobiographical reasoning.  Females 
may be more likely to use autobiographical reasoning to process difficult emotional 
experiences than males.  We may therefore expect that the relationship between 
autobiographical reasoning valence and psychological functioning may depend on the extent 
to which these emotional experiences are resolved, or in the process of being resolved (see 
Pasupathi, 2012).   
 In the four studies reported in this thesis, life story narratives constructed by young 
adults were examined for autobiographical reasoning valence, the extent to which past events 
were linked to positive and negative characteristics of the self.  The findings of these studies 
make a number of important contributions to the growing body of research examining links 
between autobiographical reasoning and psychological functioning.  First, psychological 
functioning in young adulthood was associated with the extent to which individuals‟ reason 
about the self in positive and negative ways in the context of the life story.  Reasoning about 
the self in positive and negative ways was also shown to be associated with a range of 
additional factors that had not yet been considered in prior work.  A more complete 
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understanding of the relationship between autobiographical reasoning valence and 
psychological functioning may be gained by considering how these additional factors 
(cognitive response styles), meaning in life, and autobiographical memory phenomenology 
may relate to the process of autobiographical reasoning.  The implications of these findings 
may also be usefully considered in the context of models of coping and Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).   
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Appendix A 
Themes within young adults’ life story narratives 
The purpose of this Appendix is to present key themes in the life story narratives 
written by young adults who participated in the studies comprising this thesis.  As discussed 
in Chapter One, the events included in the life story are guided by cultural norms regarding 
the events which are likely to occur in a „prototypical life‟.  Empirical work supports the 
existence of the cultural life script and in Western cultures, has converged on 35 key life 
events that are likely to be experienced over the course of the lifetime (Rubin, Berntsen & 
Hutson, 2008).   
Previous research examining themes in the types of events described in life story 
narratives have tended to use broader categories than the list of events outlined in the cultural 
life script.  For example, events such as attending university, beginning school and attending 
high school that appear in the cultural life script have been classified according to a broader 
category „educational events‟ (Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012).  This broader classification of 
life story events allows a greater number of events to be grouped into meaningful categories.  
For example, individuals may include the day they passed their final high school exams as a 
high point in the life story, which is related to the general life script event of „attending high 
school‟ but is not fully accounted for by this life script event.   
Coding narrative themes 
Themes within narratives of high points, low points and turning points were identified 
using the event type categories first reported by McLean and Pratt (2006) and adapted by 
Tavernier and Willoughby (2012).  This coding scheme was originally created, and in prior 
work has only been used, to categorise narratives of turning point events.  Upon inspection of 
the narratives collected in the current research, it became clear that these pre-defined 
categories would also account for the majority of high point and low point events (see Table 
A1).  The original coding scheme consists of five event-type categories: relationship events 
(interpersonal experiences, changes or conflicts with friends, family and intimate partners), 
travel events (experiences involving travel to another country and experiencing a new 
culture), moving events (permanent relocation to a different town, city or country), 
mortality/life-threatening events (experiences involving bereavement, major illnesses or 
accidents for the participant or close other), educational events (events relation to academics, 
career choices or university plans).   
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While the five main event categories accounted for the majority of narratives collected 
in the current studies, a significant proportion of narratives were coded as „other‟.  These 
narratives were then reviewed for additional themes.  A number of additional themes 
emerged during this review and were subsequently added to the coding scheme.  These 
additional categories included: sporting events (events involving participation and/or success 
in a sporting activity), holiday events (vacations and recreational trips; high points only), 
other achievements (successes in domains other than educational and sporting; high points 
only), mental health-related events (experiences involving mental illness or psychological 
distress for participants or close others; low and turning points only) and identity-related 
events (events that challenged or highlighted issues of sexuality, race or other identity 
domains; turning points only).  The original coding scheme also included a category for 
responses that were vague or responses that did not describe a particular experience (no 
event).  Over the course of the current studies, 460 high point narratives, 461 low point 
narratives and 266 turning point narratives were collected.  The following section provides a 
summary of key themes and excerpts from participants‟ life story narratives. 
Relationship events 
Overall, the most common theme in young adults‟ life story narratives was relationships.  
Approximately one-fifth of high point narratives (21%), one-quarter of turning point 
narratives (24%) and one-third (31%) of turning point narratives were based on events 
involving relationships with others.  Prior work examining themes in turning point narratives 
written by adolescents reported a similar proportion of relationship-related events (23%).  
Relationships are highly salient during the adolescent period as young people gravitate away 
from parent-child relationships and learn to navigate complex social relationships with peers 
(Collins, 1997).  McLean and Thorne (2003) found that adolescents‟ views, beliefs and 
thoughts about changes in, and differences between, their relationships with parents and peers 
were readily observed in narratives of self-defining memories.  As would be expected, the 
types of relationship events described in narratives of high, low and turning points differed.  
Some of the major themes in each of these narrative types will be presented. 
Relationship events as high points 
Many of the relationship events discussed as high points from the life story were based 
on experiences of gaining a romantic partner, or described occasions where participants had 
spent time with a romantic partner: 
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“There was this girl I really liked from a different school. We were friends for a 
while but I had a big crush on her ... After a long time, I asked her out and she 
said yes. She was my first ever girlfriend and I was ecstatic ... This gave me a 
good self-esteem boost. Having this girlfriend has changed me because it has 
taught me how to care for someone and being able to listen” 
“At age 17 I met my current boyfriend ... A few months after my 18th birthday he 
took me to meet his parents. We were staying all weekend and on the Saturday 
night we went to walk along the beach near the family home and that was where 
he told me he loved me for the first time. I had never felt so happy in my life ... I 
was so happy it brought tears to my eyes ... all the emotions associated with this 
moment make me happy and content with my life” 
Other relationship events that were a high point from the life story were based around special 
times spent with friends and family: 
“The high point in my life was when my friend flew up from Dunedin to surprise 
me for my 18th birthday ... I was the happiest and most excited I had felt in a long 
time. I couldn‟t believe what an amazing friend she was for giving me the best 
surprise I could have asked for. She made it an amazing 18th birthday ... This was 
an important event in my life as it made me feel extremely special. It showed me 
how much people, especially my friend, cared about me. It shows me that people 
value my friendship just as much as I value theirs” 
“I was 17 when my family and I went on a trip to Malaysia to see family ... I 
remember feeling especially happy one day when we celebrated my grandmas 
77th birthday ... It was such a joyous occasion being around family we see only 
every 5 years or so ... I think this event was important in my life because it made 
me see that nothing is depressing or sad forever, you will always get moments in 
life that make you happy” 
“Christmas when I was 17 years old ... This particular Christmas was a high point 
for me because my parents [gave me] a card and some money ... Inside the card 
was a long message from mum and dad telling me how proud they were of how 
hard I had worked this year, of the young women that I had become and of the 
way that I had handled everything over the year. I still have this card. My parent‟s 
approval in me was one of the best gifts that they had ever given me. This event is 
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so special to me because it reflects what I find important in life- my family and 
doing right by them” 
Relationship events as low points 
Unlike the types of relationship events reported as high points from the life story, 
which were positive in nature, relationship events reported as low points were negative 
in nature.  The large majority of relationship events discussed in narratives of life story 
low points described conflicts or difficulties that arose in the context of relationships 
with friends, family and significant others.   
“When I was 16 I went through a rough time in a relationship, involving someone 
who I really cared for. We had a really good friendship all throughout school and 
then in 6th form got together … Things turned very pear-shaped and we started 
having problems … most of it was due to mistrust, misunderstandings, jealousy, 
and lying … when things turned bad I remember this being one of the lowest 
points in my life … I was sad, depressed, upset all the time, felt vulnerable and 
tired and like I was constantly going to break down in tears … I have learnt to 
have more trust in people, but also not to be fooled by believing rumours from 
dodgy sources and to talk about things before they boil up and become a major 
issue” 
Relationship break-ups were also a common theme in low point narratives of 
relationship events.  These included both the separation of participants‟ from romantic 
partners and the separation or divorce of their parents.  Parental separation often led to 
further changes in family relationships and the amount of contact participants had with 
other family members. 
“When I was 17 years old I had been with my boyfriend for just over 3 years 
when he rung me up one morning and told me that he had slept with another girl 
at a party in the weekend. I was so distraught. It was such a shock. Although he 
sounded very apologetic I knew I would never be able to trust him the same 
afterwards. We broke up because of this … He was and always will be a huge part 
of my life story. He taught me many things about myself, life and about love that I 
will never forget … I feel stronger after this and now can move on knowing that if 
I can through this then I can get through anything” 
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“A low point in my life is when my parents separated 2 years ago. This hurt and 
shocked me as I didn't see it coming. It separated me and my sister from my 
brother as we lived with different parents … As my sister and I didn't have a 
mother figure anymore, I became that figure to protect my sister from being lost. I 
remember thinking that it was hard, and feeling sad but wanting to stay strong for 
my sister. This event has changed who I am today as I learnt a lot about people 
and emotions. I learnt a lot about responsibility and priorities also … I realised 
that there isn‟t anything you can do when you are in a situation like that and just 
to do your best” 
Relationship events as turning points 
Relationship experiences that were described in narratives of turning points often 
involved a change in participants‟ relationships with friends, romantic partners and family 
members.  Many of these changes to relationships were the result of negative experiences. 
“In seventh form (I was17 years old) the girl I considered my best friend 
randomly decided she would stop talking to me and started acting like I was 
invisible. It was totally unprovoked and came out of nowhere. When I eventually 
confronted her about it, she said the other girls in our group had told her that we 
spent too much time together. I was really [upset] by this … This has affected me 
in the way I am with new friends, I find it harder to fully trust people” 
“When I was 18 I entered into a relationship with someone for the first time … I 
was with this person for nearly two years … The person involved suffered from 
depression, and dealt with this though heavy use of drugs, an aspect of their 
personality that I was unaware of until a few months into the relationship … That 
person was my priority over my friendships and my university life, which as a 
result lead to bad grades, barriers arising between friendships, and a decreased 
well-being as I became severely anxious … However, I have now managed to 
move on from this person, a process which took a long time to do … It was 
definitely an experience that I was unprepared for, however, I reflect upon it now 
as a turning point that taught me resilience, and maturity” 
“Growing up I didn't have a dad so I lived alone with my mother and twin brother. 
We were not a wealthy family by any means as my mother was a stay-at-home 
mum looking after me and my brother … At the age of 6 we moved to from 
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Auckland to Wellington and my mum meet a man who would soon become my 
step father. We almost immediately moved in and they got married after about a 
year. He then adopted me and my brother and effectively treated us like his real 
sons. All our life we wanted that father figure and I believe that having a dad 
changed my life considerably” 
Educational events 
Overall, the second most common theme in life story narratives provided by young 
adults in the current studies were educational events.  Educational events were significantly 
more likely to be reported as high points from the life story than low or turning points.  That 
is, educational events comprised one-quarter (24%) of events discussed in high point 
narratives, 8% of low point narratives and 14% of turning point narratives.  The proportion of 
education-related events was higher in the current studies relative to the proportion of turning 
point events reported in earlier work (Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012).  The prevalence of 
education-related event in high point narratives most likely reflects a key characteristic of the 
sample who participated in this research.  Participants in the study by Tavernier and 
Willoughby (2012) were secondary school-aged adolescents.  Participants in the current study 
were undergraduate university students.  Given these participants developmental stage, their 
age, their decision to attend university, and the high standards for attaining university 
entrance, it is reasonable to expect that educational events may play a salient role in the life 
story of these participants.  
Educational events as high points 
Participants‟ experience of finishing secondary school was a common educational event 
described in young adults‟ high point narratives: 
“A high point in my life was walking across the stage with my mother in hand at 
my graduation from high school. I was feeling very proud and ecstatic at the fact 
that I had passed all NCEA levels and had planned to go Victoria University. This 
event is such a high point for me because on that day I had been rewarded all the 
hours that I sacrificed not to go out or to parties but to stay home and study. This 
event is important because it showed me that yes, if you do work hard and stay 
focused you will succeed in whatever you do” 
In addition to finishing high school, many educational events discussed as high points 
from the life story involved gaining entrance into, and starting, university: 
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“A high point in my life was getting in to university ... It was exciting as I felt like 
I was starting something new and there were many opportunities for me ... This 
event was important as it says that I am a hard working person and know when to 
put the effort in. It is also important as over these next few years I am going to 
change and mature as a person. What I do over the course of my degree will also 
play a huge role in what career path I take in my life” 
Academic achievements such as attaining good grades, receiving academic awards and 
excelling at other academic pursuits were also common education-related high points: 
“When I received my first year law results which were „A‟ grades ... When I 
looked at my results, I was so nervous that my heart was pounding and I felt I 
could not breathe ... when I saw that I had received A grades I felt the sweetest 
sense of disbelief and joy ... This is an important event in my life story because 
when I saw my results I decided I wanted to continue [studying] law” 
“When I was 13 I received the highest grades for my year. I was at prize-giving 
and was called up to receive the award for the top of year 9. The principal shook 
my hand and the audience clapped. I was very happy and pleased with my 
achievement. This event shows how capable of success I am, it shows how much 
potential I have” 
Educational events as low points 
Although relatively few low point narratives (8%) described an educational event, 
where young adults did describe an educational event as a low point, these events often 
described instances where participants were not successful in academic pursuits or 
struggled to meet the demands of their academic courses: 
“A low point in life would most likely have to be when I was at [secondary] 
school around year 10 - 11, so I was 16 years old. The event was low because I 
was not coping very well at school and especially in my studies, I felt I had to 
compete with my older brother for high grades and I couldn‟t do that … I gave up 
trying and just let my grades slip … I feel it is important event in my life as I have 
learnt to deal with situations on my own and become more independent. It also 
has taught me (due to passing the year badly) that I should work hard and get 
good results for myself not for my family or in comparison to my brother” 
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Educational events as turning points 
Many educational events described in narratives of turning points involved 
changes or transitions, for example, from primary to secondary school or from 
secondary school to university: 
“A turning point would be when I started high school. Over a period of about 2 
years I became much more confident and much less shy, which I think was 
important for me! I realised that I can talk to people and it's not so scary. I also 
made more friends, joined a jitsu club, and all of this made me content with life 
throughout high school. This event shows how over time I have developed into a 
much more mature, confident person who can take charge of their life” 
“For me the transition between no longer being a high school 'child' and the 
transition of being a university 'adult' was quite significant … For me this was  a 
hard time of life as [I had] to make some big decisions that will impact [my] 
future considerably. I remember the decision over whether or not to start a degree 
was an incredibly daunting prospect for me … I think this transition and feeling 
this way about it is incredibly normal for young people in the same situation and 
it‟s just a part of becoming an adult” 
Although not directly related to academics, many educational events described in 
turning point narratives were based on being awarded leadership positions with the 
school participants were attending: 
“[At] 12 Years of Age, [I] was given the responsibility of being a school 
ambassador … This is a turning point in my life as I think it taught me to be 
responsible and to be a role model to the people around me … Looking back now, 
this event made me grow as a person in becoming a good role model to my peers 
and to be responsible for my actions and for those around me” 
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Mortality / life threatening events 
One in three (32%) narratives of low points from the life story, and one in ten (10%) 
narratives of turning points from the life story were based on events concerning mortality 
(particularly loss of a loved one), major illnesses and life threatening events or accidents 
involving themselves or others.  As would be expected, no narratives of life story high points 
described mortality or life-threatening events.  Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) found that 
mortality / life –threatening events were the most common theme of turning point narratives 
written by adolescents (27%).   
Mortality events as low points 
Many low point narratives written about events involving mortality described the death 
of a grandparent to whom the participant had a close relationship.  This is not surprising as, 
given the age of participants; the death of a grandparent is likely to be a more common 
occurrence than the death of friends, siblings and parents: 
“I was about fifteen when my nana passed away, she had always been a big part of 
my life and my sisters.  It was really hard on both of us as my sister had only just 
moved away to university and we'd always been there for each other. It was at this 
time that I felt most alone and that I had no-one to turn to. I had seen my nana as a 
survivor because she'd fought breast cancer twice already but the last time she 
didn‟t have the strength. I refused to tell my friends what had happened and 
alienated myself because I felt that as long as I wasn't close to anyone no-one 
could hurt me … After this I don't think I have ever been the same, I don't let 
myself get too close to people in the fear of getting hurt” 
Accidents or life threatening illnesses experienced by the participant, other family 
members or their friends also featured in a number of low point narratives: 
“When I was 17 my dad [was] diagnosed with cancer. He went through a lot of 
tests and operations within the last 8 months. At the time I felt frightened and 
nervous as to how the results of each test and surgery and overall dad's health 
were to be ... This event is important in my life story as I dealt with a variety of 
emotions not just from myself but also experienced the emotions indirectly 
through my family and friends response to the event. It has made me appreciate 
every moment with my dad and view life through a more positive set of goggles 
than what I use to view life as” 
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“In 2007 when I was about 17 I was involved in a car crash due to a drunk driver 
losing control over his car … During this situation I went into shock mood and 
my memory of it all happening felt really quick … This is an important event 
because it taught me about how careful you need to be on the roads and that we 
were all lucky nothing fatal happened to anyone” 
Mortality events as turning points 
Similar to mortality events described in low point narratives, mortality events 
described in turning point narratives tended to be based on loss of a loved one, major 
illnesses and life threatening events or accidents: 
“An important moment in my life was when my mother‟s best friend died of 
cancer. She was like a second mother to me and her daughter was my best friend 
… She had been diagnosed with breast cancer about a year and a half before she 
died and this was a huge turning point in my life. I had never experienced any 
kind of grief before this point … It made me realise what the important things in 
life really were. Doing badly in a math‟s test or exam isn‟t the end of the world 
and this moment in my life made me realise this, and put things into perspective” 
“Last year, when I was 16, I got very sick with glandular fever and its associated 
illnesses. I was off school for 6 months … I felt quite alone at the time as I had to 
be shuffled around different family members so they could look after me. This is 
an important even in my life story as it forced me to re-evaluate my goals for the 
next year. University looked out of the picture. But I somehow managed to gain 
university entrance. Getting sick made me realise that situations can change 
quickly and this has changed me as a person and no I take nothing for granted” 
“I was 19 years old when I went through a traumatic ordeal that changed my life. 
In this event I woke up to a violent shaking of my house and it took me a few 
seconds to realise that I was experiencing a major earthquake … This was an 
important event in my life story because it changed me dramatically. I now have a 
fear of certain buildings; I can‟t attend movies at the theatre because loud noises 
make me feel anxious. I am consciously aware of exits and ways out of buildings 
in case I need to evacuate. Before the earthquake I was very relaxed and lived 
freely, I didn‟t worry about getting hurt or about any life changing events because 
I didn‟t think they would ever happen to me. This event has definitely shaped who 
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I am now, it has made me more empathetic and understanding, but has also made 
me fear things within the world which I would have previously never thought 
about or feared” 
Moving events 
 One-quarter (24%) of turning point narratives written by young adults in the current 
studies described an event which involved moving or relocating to a different city or country.  
The proportion of moving events reported as turning points in the current studies was much 
higher than that reported in prior work with adolescents (Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012).  
Again, this likely reflects the age and developmental stage of participants in the current study.  
Many of the young adults who participated in the current studies had recently moved to 
Wellington from another part of New Zealand in order to study at Victoria University.  Thus 
not only was the experience of starting university a salient experience (see earlier discussion 
„Educational events as high points), for many of these young adults a major transition 
involving relocation to Wellington had occurred in the recent past. 
Moving events as turning points 
Reflecting this characteristic and developmental stage of participants in the current 
studies, many turning point narratives describing moving events were based on the shift from 
participants‟ childhood home to Wellington in order to begin their university studies. 
“One turning point in my life was when I first went to university. I was 18 years 
old, and as I had to move to Wellington, I went into a hostel. This marked the first 
time I moved out of home, and was also the first time where I was put into an 
environment where I could not fall back on family and my long term friends. I 
found it very hard at first, but after a while I got used to it and came to enjoy 
having new freedoms and responsibilities. I felt this was important as it shows that 
I could adapt to new situations, as well as being the first milestone in becoming 
independent and self-motivated” 
Also, potentially a reflection of New Zealand‟s ethnic diversity, moving events 
described in turning point narratives commonly referred to participants‟ experience of 
emigrating to New Zealand from another country as a child.  These events were often 
perceived negatively by participants at the time of the move, however many were able 
to see positive outcomes from the move on reflection. 
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“A major changing point of my life would be when I left my hometown of 
Singapore at the age of 5 and came and lived in NZ with my family. I had grown 
up in this supportive and close group of friends and family in a place which I 
loved, and suddenly all this was about to be taken away from me and I was going 
to have to move to a new place where I knew no one … I feel that although my 
life would have been just as good if I remained in Asia, I am glad of the fact that I 
had a challenging youth even which caused me to develop as a person from a 
young age, and has since strengthened me as a person” 
“I was 11 years old when I moved to NZ from England, with my family.  This 
was a huge turning point in my life because I was moved to the other side of the 
world.  I thought it wouldn't be that different, but there is a huge variance in 
culture … At school we learnt about the Treaty of Waitangi and through my 
classes‟ eyes, it was all my fault.  Even my teacher directed her hate over the 
events that had happened towards me. [I was] feeling powerless at school, feeling 
powerless in the decision to move and feeling powerless over my emotions, I have 
grown a great need to be in control over every situation” 
Moving events as high and low points 
 Events involving relocation to another city or country were less commonly described 
in narratives of high points (7%) and narratives of low points (4%).  As with moving events 
described in turning point narratives, moving events described in high point narratives were 
tended to centre on a permanent relocation to New Zealand from another country or moving 
to Wellington where participants currently resided. 
“A high point in my life would be moving to New Zealand. I was 15 years old and 
at first it seemed like it would be horrible, moving to an entirely different country 
(I was moving from America) and not knowing a single person here other than my 
dad and sister … Eventually I just settled in though and I have met so many 
amazing new people from this. It is important in my life story because it has 
definitely changed me. I was very shy at school and having, being forced, to meet 
new people and introduce myself made me come out of my shell” 
“A high point for me would be when I moved away from my small town to 
Wellington, which seemed like a massive city at first. It was so exciting … The 
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move was such a positive experience for me and I feel as though I would not be 
the person I am today if I had of spend this year stuck in small town” 
In contrast, low point narratives that described experiences of moving tended to 
occur when participants were young and had little control over the move.  These 
experiences of moving at a young age were perceived in a negative way: 
“At the age of 15, my parents moved me over to New Zealand. Because of my age 
I was still under guardianship rules and so I had no choice in the matter, and had 
to move with my parents … I hated my parents for moving me, even though they 
tried to cheer me up and told me they understood what they were putting me 
through and that they were sorry.  The emigration was a very important event in 
my life. It changed who I am as a person because it taught me that things don't 
always go the way you want them too, and often you have to make the best of 
things … Since having moved to New Zealand, I have been to the UK [United 
Kingdom] twice. I still see it as home, and miss it heaps” 
Sporting events 
 Just over one in ten (13%) high point narratives described a sporting event.  This 
category was not included in the original list of event types by Tavernier and Willoughby 
(2012) however was identified as a common theme in the narratives provided by young adults 
who participated in the current studies.  The prevalence of sporting events in narratives of the 
young adults who participated in these studies may reflect the value on, and popularity of, 
sporting activities in New Zealand.  In New Zealand it is common for young people to be 
involved in sporting activities during their childhood.  The high level of engagement in 
sporting activities naturally exposes young people to successes or otherwise in this domain.   
Sporting events as high points 
 Consistent with this claim, sporting experiences described in high points mostly 
involved achievements such as winning important games or tournaments, being selected for 
prominent sports teams and representing one‟s region or country in sporting events. 
“A high point in my life would have to [be] when I was around 15 and I won a 
gold medal in a National New Zealand Karate tournament … I was ecstatic that I 
had won and standing up on the podium I felt a rush of happiness and was filled 
with endorphins … I think this is an important event in my life story because It 
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shows that you can do anything if you try hard enough and put your mind to it. 
This event says that I am a determined individual with a competitive spirit” 
“A high point I experienced in my life was being selected for the New Zealand 
Under 20s football team … After going through a week long training/selection 
camp, I was informed of my selection in the team a week later … The first thing I 
felt after hearing the good news was a bit of shock and I remember thinking to 
myself did he really just say I made the team? But that feeling was very short-
lived and was soon replaced by an overwhelming feeling of pride, joy and 
excitement because I would be representing my country in the sport that I love” 
“I represented New Zealand in the World Mountain Running Championships after 
winning the New Zealand Junior Championships … I was the only one from New 
Zealand and travelled with my mum to Albania which is a very, very different 
country to New Zealand.  I was a little bit anxious before the start as I had never 
competed at such a high level before in 40 degree heat against people I didn't 
know.  I think this is an important event in my life because it taught me how to 
cope in different environments - I had to live in a different culture before the race, 
eat different food, adjust to heat etc.” 
Sporting events and low and turning points 
 Sporting events were infrequently described in narratives of low points (2%).  Similar 
to the description of sporting events in high point narratives, sporting events described in 
narratives of turning points (7%) predominantly centered on sporting achievements that had a 
lasting impact on the participant: 
“I was 16 when a major turning point occurred in my life. The major event was 
winning a medal at the New Zealand secondary school rowing championships … I 
don't think I have even been as nervous as I was In the starting blocks of that race 
… However whilst in the race I found myself incredibly calm and collected. A 
voice kept telling me you can do this, and think of all the years of hard work that 
have led to this moment. Crossing the finish line in 3rd was one of the greatest 
moments of my life.  I felt a huge amount of elation. This event was so important 
to me, as it showed me that with perseverance and dedication comes success and 
that I should keep striving in life despite the pitfalls that may sometimes lie along 
the way. 
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Travel events 
Approximately one in ten (13%) high point narratives and 6% of turning point 
narratives were based on an experience involving overseas travel.  This is slightly higher than 
the proportion of turning points describing travel events by Tavernier and Willoughby 
(2012).  Again, this difference may reflect the older age group of participants in the current 
study and cultural norms present in the New Zealand context.  It is common for young people 
in New Zealand to travel overseas after finishing their secondary school education.  It was 
noted however, that the majority of travel related experiences narrated in high and turning 
points occurred when young adults were still at school.  These experiences often described 
the learning and personal development that accompanied exposure to another culture.  In 
many cases, these experiences changed the participants‟ view of the world and their culture 
and sparked in them an interest in further travelling: 
“When I was 15, I went on a school trip to Japan. It was my first time overseas, so 
I was incredibly excited to be leaving New Zealand and experiencing a new 
culture. I travelled with some classmates, two teachers, my brother, and some very 
good friends … I think it is an important event in my life story because it changed 
my entire perspective on life. It opened my eyes to different ways of life, and 
showed me the diversity that exists around the world. It encouraged me to think 
about things with a more open mind. It helped me to evaluate my beliefs and 
develop a new-found appreciation for what I have. It definitely stemmed an 
interest in learning about even more cultures, influencing my decision to major in 
Anthropology, because it was my first first-hand experience of another society” 
 “When I was 14, me and my family went on a holiday to Rarotonga. I really 
enjoyed the holiday as it was my second time out of the country and because I was 
old enough it opened my eyes to realising that travel is an important thing I want 
to do in life. While I was over there I loved the differences geographically, 
culturally, and in temperature from New Zealand to name a few. From this 
experience and others I now know that travel is something I really want to do. It 
made me click that there is a lot to see around the world and since then the 
prospect of travel has always been in my mind” 
 
Gender differences in narrative themes 
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Chi-square analysis showed that female participants were significantly more 
likely to write about experiences involving relationships in the context of life story 
turning points than were male participants.  Male participants on the other hand were 
more likely than female participants to narrate educational events as a turning point in 
the life story.  There were no other significant gender differences in the themes of 
turning point narratives.  Males were significantly more likely to narrate educational 
events as a low point in their life story than were females.  There were no other 
significant gender differences in the themes of low point narratives.  There were no 
significant gender differences in the themes of high point narratives. 
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Table A1 
Themes in narratives of low points, high points and turning points from the life stories of young adults  
Category Example 
Total 
(n=1,187) 
 High points 
(n=460) 
 Low points 
(n=461) 
 Turning 
points 
(n=266) 
 Tavernier & 
Willoughby  
(2012) 
%  %  %  %  % 
Relationship events “I was with my girlfriend and she told me she loves me - that was the happiest 
I‟ve been”   
26  
21 
 
32 
 
24 
 
23 
Travel events “when I was 18, I went over to the UK for a gap year – it gave me so much more 
knowledge of myself, the world, and people 
6  
13 
 
- 
 
6 
 
4 
Moving events “When I was 15 years old I moved to Australia indefinitely – I struggled to be 
myself in a new environment” 
10  
7 
 
4 
 
24 
 
4 
Mortality/life 
threatening events 
When I was 20 I had an horrible car accident – I learnt that you should always try 
to live your life as best as possible” 
15  
- 
 
32 
 
10 
 
27 
Educational events “When I was 13 I received the highest grades for my year level” 16  25  8  14  6 
Sporting events “my cricket team won the National Championships - it showed me that hard work 
can actually pay off” 
7  
13 
 
2 
 
6 
 
N/A 
Holiday events “One Christmas we stayed at the beach - It was so hot all we did was swim” 2  5  -  -  N/A 
Other achievements “my band released our first EP. It made me love music even more and gave me a 
taste of what it would be like to be in a famous band” 
2  
5 
 
- 
 
- 
 
N/A 
Mental health 
events 
“I was 17 I developed bulimia. - I believe it happened for a reason, and I can now 
sympathise and help others facing the same issues. 
4  
- 
 
7 
 
4 
 
N/A 
Identity events “I decided I was gay – I had been really conflicted for ages and very indecisive - I 
know who I am now 
1  
1 
 
- 
 
5 
 
N/A 
Other*  “When I was 17 years old  I got arrested for disorderly behaviour” 12  11  9  8  12 
* The „Other‟ category includes events such as getting into trouble, bullying  
N/A = Not Assessed
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Appendix B 
Participants’ Response to the Life Story Task 
After completing the autobiographical narrative task, participants from Study 2 
(Chapter Six) completed an additional two questions to assess their reaction to completing the 
task.  The decision to include these questions was based on anecdotal observations of 
participants‟ reactions and comments made in relation to the task.  When conducting Study 1, 
many participants commented at the end of the session, that the task was a positive 
experience for them.  These participants noted that writing about their experiences helped 
them to process the event, and that doing so was “therapeutic”.  While no participants 
mentioned that the task was a negative experience, the positive comments made by many led 
me to question whether this would be the case for all individuals.  To assess this, two 
questions were added to the end of the autobiographical narrative task in Study 2. 
These two questions assessed participants subjective assessments regarding their 
enjoyment of the life story task and the impact the task had on their feelings about 
themselves.  In the first question, participants were asked “How positive or negative was your 
experience of completing this [the life story] task?”.  This question was labelled as a measure 
of „enjoyment‟.  Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = extremely positive, 2 = 
somewhat positive, 3 = neither positive or negative, 4 = somewhat negative, 5 = extremely 
negative).  In the second question, participants were asked “How did this task make you feel 
about yourself?”.  This question was labelled as a measure of „impact‟.  Participants again 
responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = made me feel really good about myself, 2 = made me 
feel quite good about myself, 3 = didn‟t make me feel good or bad about myself, 4 = made 
me feel quite bad about myself, 5 = made me feel really bad about myself).   
For ease of analysis, the two questions measuring enjoyment and impact of the life 
story task were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflected a more positive response.  Table 
B1 presents participants ratings for each of these questions.  Of note, just under three-quarters 
of participants reported that completing the autobiographical narrative task was a positive 
experience (72%) and that completing the task made them feel good about themselves (73%).  
In contrast, approximately one in ten participants reported that completing the task was a 
negative experience (10%) and that completing the task made them feel bad about themselves 
(9%).  The remainder of participants reported that completing the task was neither positive 
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nor negative (18%) and that the task did not make them feel neither bad nor good about 
themselves (18%).   
Table B1 
Participants’ experience of the life story narrative task 
 
 Pearson correlations then examined associations between participants‟ subjective 
assessments regarding their „enjoyment‟ and the „impact‟ of the task and the number of 
positive or negative self-event connections found in life story narratives constructed in the 
task.  Of note, participants who made higher numbers of negative self-event connections 
across narratives of high, low and turning points (combined), were significantly more likely 
to report that they found the task to be a negative experience, and were more likely to report 
How positive or negative was your experience of 
completing this [the life story] task? 
n % 
Extremely positive 30 18 
Somewhat positive 89 54 
Neither positive or negative 29 18 
Somewhat negative 15 9 
Extremely negative 1 1 
How did this task make you feel about yourself?   
Made me feel really good about myself 35 21 
Made me feel quite good about myself 85 52 
Didn‟t make me feel good or bad about myself 30 18 
Made me feel quite bad about myself 11 7 
Made me feel really bad about myself 3 2 
Total 164 100 
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that completing the task made them feel negatively about themselves.  The number of 
positive self-event connections found in narratives of high, low and turning points 
(combined) were unrelated to participants‟ ratings of enjoyment and impact of the task. 
Table B2 
Correlations amongst participants’ subjective assessments of the enjoyment and impact of the 
autobiographical narrative task, and positive and negative self-event connections 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Enjoyment -    
2. Impact .63** -   
3. Positive self-event connections .15 -.08 -  
4. Negative self-event connections -.22** -.34** -.10 - 
 
 These findings have clear implications for research that employs autobiographical 
narrative tasks of a similar nature to that used in the studies presented in this thesis.   These 
findings show that for some young adults, the experience of completing the autobiographical 
narrative task was aversive and had a negative impact on their feelings about themselves.  
The ethical implications of these findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8: 
Discussion.  It is important to note, however, that researchers employing autobiographical 
narrative tasks in the future should be aware of possible harm to participants who may find 
such tasks aversive, and to mitigate these risks where possible.  
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